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Introduction
Tired of their small apartment, Dick and Jane were looking for a
new place to live. They answered an advertisement in the newspa-
per for an English cottage-style brick duplex with a bay window
and a garden. As soon as they saw it, they knew they wanted to
live there. When they spoke to the landlord, Mrs. Jones, she asked
if they were married. When they said no, she replied, "Then you'd
be living in sin, and I don't go for that stuff. I don't rent to unmar-
ried couples because sex outside of marriage is a sin." When Dick
and Jane allege that Mrs. Jones' discrimination violates the fair
housing law, Mrs. Jones claims an exemption from the fair housing
law based upon her free exercise of religion, and the court becomes
the arbiter in the culture clash. Should a landlord in the business
of leasing residential real estate be exempt from the civil rights
laws because he or she disapproves of the presumed conduct of
potential tenants? There is a great deal more at stake here than a
single landlord with a couple of duplexes for rent.
It is difficult to imagine a more volatile mix of issues than civil
rights, sexual privacy and the free exercise of religion. The issues
are problematic even when they arise in a largely religious context,
as when a church denies employment to an individual whose con-
duct does not comport with church teachings. But when those
same issues arise in a purely commercial context, the issues and the
potential consequences become far more troubling. When a land-
lord refuses to rent to an unmarried couple because of the land-
lord's belief or assumption that the couple will engage in conduct
that the landlord believes is sinful, -the court faces a delicate
situation.
Our headlines are dominated by violent sectarian disputes raging
in Bosnia, the Middle East, Northern Ireland and other troubled
1995]
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areas of the world. The United States largely has managed to
avoid the violence often associated with religious differences pre-
cisely because our civil rights laws prohibit discrimination in busi-
ness transactions and our Constitution prevents us from imposing
our religious beliefs on others. If our laws are to continue to save
us from the folly that religious zealotry engenders, it is incumbent
upon the courts to consider very carefully before allowing religion-
based bias. Broad-based religious exemptions from the fair hous-
ing laws threaten the precarious balance between religious free-
dom and religious tolerance that we have achieved.
State fair housing laws are designed to prevent discrimination by
businesses against individuals by prohibiting decisionmaking based
upon irrelevant personal characteristics, such as race, religion, sex
or marital status. If a landlord is permitted to practice otherwise
prohibited housing discrimination under the guise of free exercise
of religion, religion becomes a sword of oppression that threatens
to destroy civil rights laws. In a society as religiously pluralistic as
the United States, there is virtually no conduct that might not of-
fend the religious beliefs of someone else. Thus, individual, court-
ordered, free exercise of religion exemptions to landlords from the
antidiscrimination laws set a dangerous precedent and therefore
should not be granted. Based upon the history of the free exercise
exemption in the United States Supreme Court and upon the pol-
icy considerations underlying the fair housing laws, there is ample
justification for denying free exercise exemptions to landlords who
discriminate. Of the five state courts that have addressed this is-
sue, however, two different appellate courts in California,' as well
as the Supreme Court of Minnesota, 2 have decided in favor of the
landlord; the Alaska Supreme Court3 has decided for the tenants;
and the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts 4 remanded to the
trial court for further consideration. At the time of this writing,
Evelyn Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission5 is
pending before the California Supreme Court, following a grant of
1. See infra part fII.A.1.
2. See infra part JI.A.3.
3. See infra part III.A.2.
4. See infra part IU.A.4.
5. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (1994). Throughout this Article, this case will be referred
to as "Evelyn Smith" in order to distinguish it from the U.S. Supreme Court case,
Employment Div. v. Smith.
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certiorari in September of 1994.6 These are precedent-setting deci-
sions with extremely broad ramifications. Given the opportunity,
courts should curtail any further proliferation of such cases that
threaten to erode the civil rights laws.
This Article takes the position that no individual, court-ordered,
free exercise of religion exemption should be granted to landlords
who violate the fair housing laws by refusing to rent to unmarried
couples.7 Part I traces the history of the free exercise exemption in
the United States Supreme Court. Part II addresses housing dis-
crimination, especially discrimination against unmarried couples,
and the efforts to eradicate it. Part III discusses the interaction of
the landlord's free exercise claim and the tenant's right to discrimi-
nation-free rental housing. Finally, Part IV presents the numerous
justifications for denying the landlord's claim to a free exercise of
religion exemption.
I. History of the Free Exercise Exemption in the United States
Supreme Court
Prior to 1963,8 the United States Supreme Court had never held
that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution9 required the government to grant indi-
vidual exemptions from valid and neutral laws that conflicted with
religious beliefs. In its early history, the Free Exercise Clause gen-
erated very little litigation, with no reported decisions until 1845.10
Before Sherbert v. Verner," in 1963, the Supreme Court distin-
guished between belief, which was protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, and conduct, which could be subjected to governmental
regulation without implicating constitutional concerns. Subse-
6. Cert. granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994). In addition, the United States
Supreme Court recently denied a petition for certiorari in Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n., 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
7. This Article addresses the propriety of a court-ordered free exercise exemp-
tion from the fair housing laws for an individual landlord (or landlord couple) who is
engaged in the business of renting residential real property. An exemption for a reli-
gious institution or organization that operates as a landlord is beyond the scope of this
Article. The five cases that create the point of departure for this Article involved
unmarried heterosexual couples. Although many of the arguments advanced in sup-
port of the heterosexual couple may apply equally to homosexual couples, that appli-
cation is also beyond the scope of this Article.
8. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
10. Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of the Free Ex-
ercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1503 (1990) [hereinafter Origins].
11. 374 U.S. 398.
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quently, with the Sherbert case, the Supreme Court developed a
four-part test 12 that created the potential for more exemptions
based on free exercise claims. Most recently, in the 1990 Employ-
ment Division v. Smith case,13 the Court sought to reassert the con-
stitutionality of governmental regulation of conduct. The effect of
this case may be limited to some extent, however, with the passage
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.1 4 A summary of the
evolution of free exercise jurisprudence is developed more fully
below.
A. Reynolds and the BeHef/Conduct Distinction
In 1878, in Reynolds v. United States,15 the Supreme Court for
the first time suggested an analytical approach to free exercise
claims.16 As a result of a divine revelation to Joseph Smith, the
founder and prophet of the Mormon Church, Reynolds, a member
of that church, believed that he had a religious obligation to prac-
tice polygamy, or suffer eternal "damnation in the life to come. 7
The Court said that although Reynolds was free to believe that, he
had no right to act upon that belief by taking more than one wife in
violation of the federal law prohibiting polygamy. Chief Justice
Waite wrote that:
Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opin-
ion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order .... Laws are made for
the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices 18
The Court justified the belief-conduct distinction by concluding
that to excuse otherwise criminal conduct on the basis of religious
12. See infra part I.B.
13. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). To distinguish this case from a California case, "Evelyn
Smith," see supra note 5, the full name will be used throughout this Article.
14. Pub. L. 103-141, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
15. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
16. Reynolds, decided in 1878, was the Court's first significant free exercise case.
Although there are earlier reported decisions (the first was Pernoli v. Municipality
No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588 (1845)), those gave no indication as to how the Court
would analyze, categorize, limit or decide future free exercise cases. See Origins,
supra note 10, at 1503. In Reynolds, on the other hand, the Court articulated its first
test for free exercise claims. Although Sherbert and its progeny ostensibly rejected
the test set forth in Reynolds, the Court in post-Sherbert cases has frequently reached
back to Reynolds and other pre-Sherbert cases to justify its denial of claims for
exemption.
17. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161.
18. Id at 164, 166.
704
DISCRIMINATION-FREE HOUSING
belief would "make the professed doctrines of religious belief supe-
rior to the law of the land, and in effect... permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself."19 Under those circumstances, govern-
ment and any hope of an ordered society would simply cease to
exist. Despite the intervening 115 years, that observation reverber-
ates through the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence
today.
The Court again relied on the belief-conduct distinction in its
1940 decision, Cantwell v. Connecticut,2" which made the Free Ex-
ercise Clause applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Cantwell, the Court said
that the Free Exercise Clause "embraces two concepts-freedom
to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the na-
ture of things, the second cannot be."12 1 Thus, the government can
regulate conduct "for the protection of society."22
The Reynolds standard permitted the government to legislate re-
garding religious conduct. The government only rarely legislated
to compel belief, which was proscribed by Reynolds. Therefore,
the Reynolds standard, as long as it remained intact, functioned as
a nearly absolute barrier to exemptions from legitimate, secular
laws for religiously motivated conduct23 Because the belief-con-
duct distinction was a bright-line test, with a high degree of predict-
ability, few true free exercise exemption claims were brought in the
years between Reynolds in 1878 and Sherbert in 1963. Claimants
who prevailed during that time did so by challenging the general
constitutionality of restrictive laws rather than by requesting indi-
vidual exemptions from concededly valid laws.
In the handful of exemption cases between Reynolds and Sher-
bert, the Court consistently refused to grant exemptions, generally
on the grounds that although the Free Exercise Clause prohibited
government action specifically directed toward burdening religion
or religious practice or coercing belief,25 it did not forbid govern-
19. Id. at 167.
20. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
21. Id at 303-04.
22. Id at 304.
23. Ira Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv. 933, 938 (1989) [hereinafter Where Rights Begin].
24. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (reversing convictions for
mail fraud based on false statements about religious experience because Court cannot
decide truth or falsity of one's claimed religious beliefs); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing convictions of Jehovah's witnesses for religious solicitation
and street preaching without prior government approval, because it required the gov-
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ment action with a nonreligious purpose that only incidentally bur-
dened religious practice. 26 In Prince v. Massachusetts,27 the Court
upheld the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who allowed her
niece to sell religious literature on the street in violation of state
child labor laws. The Court, relying on the Reynolds belief-con-
duct distinction, said that "the family itself is not beyond regulation
in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty."' The
defendant argued that when state action impinges upon religious
freedom, the legislation must fail unless it is "shown to be neces-
sary or conducive to the child's protection against some clear and
present danger. '29 In rejecting the proposed standard, the Court
said that laws "appropriately designed" to address the evils of child
labor were within the state's police power, despite the claims of
religious scruples and parental control of the child.30 Thus, the
Court rejected a stringent standard of review analogous to the one
it would subsequently adopt some years later in Sherbert.31
TWo years before Sherbert, in Braunfeld v. Brown,32 the Court
upheld the conviction of Orthodox Jews who violated Sunday clos-
ing laws. The Braunfeld plaintiffs argued that the financial burden
of complying with Sunday closing laws, as well as their religious
obligation to remain closed on Saturday, their Sabbath, entitled
eminent to decide whether the cause was "religious" or not). Cantwell can also be
seen as a free speech case as wel as a free exercise case. In fact, all the pre-Sherbert
cases where the Court decided in favor of the individual and against the government
can be seen as either direct burdens on religion cases or free speech cases or both.
See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating state constitutional
provision requiring state officials to declare belief in the existence of God); West Vir-
ginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating compulsory flag sa-
lute requirement that was repugnant to Jehovah's Witnesses); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating revenue tax on door-to-door sales of
religious books and pamphlets). In fact, at least one commentator has argued rather
eloquently that many of the intractable problems encountered in Free Exercise
Clause analysis could be resolved by analyzing free exercise claims exclusively under
the Free Speech Clause. Wilam Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free
Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. Rnv. 545 (1983) [hereinafter Free Exercise Di-
lemma]; William Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Ex-
ercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. REs. L. Rnv. 357 (1989-90) [hereinafter Case Against
the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption].
26. See Stephen Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some
Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. Ky. L. Rnv. 265, 266 n.11 (1982) [hereinafter
Conundrum].
27. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
28. Id at 166.
29. Id at 167.
30. Id at 169.
31. See infra part I.B.
32. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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them to an exemption. In what might be called a "bridge" opinion
that both reflected earlier Free Exercise Clause decisions33 and
foreshadowed the Court's decision in Sherbert two years later,3 the
Court said:
Of course, to hold unassailable all legislation regulating conduct
which imposes solely an indirect burden on the observance of
religion would be a gross oversimplification. If the purpose or
effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions
or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is
constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be charac-
terized as being only indirect. But if the State regulates conduct
by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and ef-
fect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is
valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless
the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not
impose such a burden.35
Thus, in the few true exemption cases36 before Sherbert, the Court
simply did not recognize constitutionally compelled free exercise
33. Among others, the Court relied on Cantwell and Reynolds for the belief-con-
duct distinction. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603. It also relied on Reynolds and Prince
to distinguish those cases in which the religious practice itself conflicted with the crim-
inal laws and Braunfeld, in which the statute did not make any religious practice un-
lawful, but simply made it more expensive. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605. Another
significant difference in Braunfeld was that the context of the conduct was commer-
cial, not religious, and thus claimants had a "choice" between retaining their present
occupations and incurring economic disadvantage, on the one hand, or engaging in
some other commercial activity that would not require Saturday or Sunday labor, on
the other. The Court recognized the financial sacrifice involved for claimants to ob-
serve their religious beliefs, but found the situation "wholly different" from that in
which the legislature attempts to make a religious practice itself unlawful. Id at 605-
06.
34. Besides the quote from the majority opinion in the text, Justice Brennan's dis-
sent in Braunfeld directly foreshadowed the Sherbert decision. Brennan, in discussing
the "appropriate standard of constitutional adjudication" in Free Exercise Clause ex-
emption cases, said that the Court is "not confined to the narrow inquiry whether the
challenged law is rationally related to some legitimate legislative end .... [Freedom]
of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. [It is] susceptible of restric-
tion only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may
lawfully protect." Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 611-12.
35. Id at 607 (emphasis added).
36. Since Sherbert, Free Exercise Clause litigation has involved almost exclusively
requests for religion-based exemptions (either by individuals or religious institutions)
from valid and neutral laws with legitimate police power goals-to protect the health,
safety or general welfare of the population-rather than requests to invalidate laws
intended to harm or burden religion or to discriminate against persons or groups be-
cause of their religion. The two notable exceptions are Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993), where the Court struck down a city
ordinance banning animal sacrifice but containing sufficient exceptions so that the
Santeria religion was the only one affected by the law; and McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
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exemptions even for a claimant in the predicament of facing crimi-
nal sanctions for acting pursuant to religious belief.
B. Sherbert and the Compelling State Interest Standard
Sherbert, with its significantly more stringent standard of review,
is generally recognized as the first case in the Supreme Court's
modem free exercise jurisprudence.37 Sherbert involved the denial
of unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who had
been dismissed from her employment in a textile mill when she
refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. The South Carolina
Supreme Court found Sherbert's refusal a failure "without good
cause to accept available suitable work when offered '38 and af-
firmed the denial. In its reversal, the United States Supreme Court
for the first time used the Free Exercise Clause to exempt an indi-
vidual from a valid law solely because of the indirect burden on
religious liberty. Although there were no criminal sanctions com-
pelling Sherbert to work a six-day week, the Court found that the
financial pressure to forego her religious beliefs in order to obtain
government benefits was substantial.
The Court in Sherbert set forth the new test it purportedly would
use to analyze claims for Free Exercise Clause exemptions: (i) the
government may not substantially burden the exercise of religion,
even unintentionally or indirectly, unless it can show that the gov-
ernment action is necessary to protect a compelling state interest,39
and (ii) the government must demonstrate that "no alternative
forms of regulation" were available to achieve the state's goal.40
Sherbert was championed by some as a new and fertile source for
challenges by both individuals and religious groups to a vast array
618 (1978), where the Court invalidated a state law prohibiting ministers from serving
as delegates to a constitutional convention.
37. See, e.g., Origins, supra note 10, at 1412; Case Against the Constitutionally
Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, supra note 25, at 365; Ellis West, The Case
Against a Right to Religion Based Exemptions, 4 NoTre DAME J.L. ETmIcs & PUB.
POL'Y 591,594 (1990); LAuRENcE TRIBE, AmERIcAN CONSTrt-rIONAL LAW § 14-12,
at 1249 (2d ed. 1988).
38. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
39. Justice Brennan, this time writing for the majority, described the standard in
the same terms he had used in his dissent in Braunfeld two years earlier: "no showing
merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest" was enough; rather,
"only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permis-
sible limitation." Id at 406.
40. Id at 407.
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of laws that conflicted with conduct either mandated or prohibited
by their religious beliefs."
In Sherbert and the free exercise cases that followed it, the
Court, at least from a rhetorical perspective, refined what has come
to be known as the "Sherbert test" for analyzing a request for a
Free Exercise Clause exemption from a statutory obligation:
1. The claimant's belief must be religion-based and sincerely
held;
2. The state's interest in the regulation must be compelling or
overriding;
3. The state regulation must impose a constitutionally cogniza-
ble burden on that religious belief; and
4. The regulation must be the least restrictive means to achieve
the state's goal. 2
The claimant must prove the first and third elements; but the state
can successfully defend the enforcement of the regulation by prov-
ing the second and fourth elements. 43
41. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning
Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 241 (proclaiming Sherbert as "the dawn of a new day
for religious freedom claims"). Of course, not everyone agreed with the wisdom of
the Sherbert decision. Justice Harlan, in dissent, had two concerns: the Court's rejec-
tion (without overruling) of its earlier Free Exercise Clause decisions, especially
Braunfeld (Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 421); and the serious implications for future cases
that the Sherbert decision suggested. Besides the obvious Establishment Clause prob-
lem created by the "singling out of religious conduct for special treatment" (id. at 422)
when an individual exemption is granted, Justice Harlan was concerned about the
court, rather than the legislature, assuming the role of creating accommodations or
exemptions to generally valid laws:
But there is... enough flexibility in the constitution to permit a legislativejudgment accommodating [a] law to the exercise of religious beliefs ....
[H]owever, I cannot subscribe to the conclusion that the state is constitution-
ally compelled to carve out an exception to its general rule in the present
case. Those situations in which the Constitution may require special treat-
ment on account of religion are.., few and far between, and this view is
amply supported by the course of constitutional litigation in this area ....
Such compulsion is particularly inappropriate in light of the indirect, remote
and insubstantial effect ... on the exercise of appellant's religion and in light
of the direct financial assistance to religion that today's decision requires.
Id. at 423 (Harlan, J. dissenting). Based on the Supreme Court's treatment of Free
Exercise Clause claims in the thirty years following Sherbert, Justice Harlan's objec-
tion appears to have been well justified and the "revolution" in free exercise jurispru-
dence perceived by some appears to have been an egregious overstatement.
42. See TaIBE, supra note 37, § 14-12 at 1242 (emphasis added). The Sherbert test
parallels the strict scrutiny the Court uses in reviewing claims of infringement on con-
stitutional rights of association, free speech and equal protection. See Case Against the
Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, supra note 25, at 365-66; Where
Rights Begin, supra note 23, at 934.
43. TRaIE, supra note 37, § 14-12 at 1242.
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Despite the Court's fairly consistent articulation of the Sherbert
test in nearly all its free exercise cases for the last thirty years, the
test has been just that: articulated, rather than actually applied.
Since Sherbert, the Court has used the compelling interest test to
grant exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause in only four
cases. One of those, Wisconsin v. Yoder," is so limited to its facts
that it has little value as precedent. The other three are unemploy-
ment benefits cases identical in all essential aspects to Sherbert.45
In Yoder, the Court held that the Old Order Amish were entitled
to a constitutional exemption from state compulsory education
laws. The Amish claimed that compulsory school attendance after
eighth grade threatened their way of life, their salvation, and that
of their children4 because it exposed their children to "worldly in-
fluences" contrary to Amish religious belief. The Court recognized
the important state interest in compulsory education, but rejected
this interest as compelling, at least as it applied to the Amish.47 The
Court emphasized repeatedly the unique position of the Amish as
a law-abiding, self-sufficient community that had a longstanding
reputation for taking care of its own.4 In essence, the Court
seemed to say that the exemption granted to the Amish would not
undercut the state interest in compulsory education. Because the
Amish could be depended on to teach and train their own children,
excusing them from compulsory education would have no negative
effect on the state's interest.49 The emphasis of the Court's opin-
ion, written by Chief Justice Burger, on the unusual and unique
character of the Amish suggested that Yoder was in a real sense
limited to its facts and would have little precedential value for later
free exercise cases.50
44. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
45. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Serm., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); and Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
46. 406 U.S. at 209-10.
47. Id at 221. "[We must... examine... the impediment to those [government]
objections that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption." Id
"Wisconsin's interest in compelling the school attendance of Amish children to age
sixteen emerges as somewhat less substantial than requiring such attendance for chil-
dren generally." Id at 228-29.
48. Id at 220-29 and passim.
49. Id at 222.
50. See also 406 U.S. at 215-25, 234-36. "In light of this convincing showing [by
the Amish], one that probably few other religious groups or sects could make." Id at
235-36. One commentator has labeled Yoder as "the only truly countercultural free
exercise decision ever rendered by the Supreme Court," but noted that "it served as a
strong symbol of free exercise countermajoritarianism long after the case lost true
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In the other successful exemption cases, the trilogy of Thomas v.
Review Board,51 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission5 2
and Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,5 3 the
Court faced the identical issue as in Sherbert: whether the state
could deny unemployment benefits to a claimant whose unavaila-
bility for work was on account of religious belief. In each case, the
Court decided, as it had in Sherbert, that the claimant could not be
forced to choose between adhering to his beliefs and forfeiting gov-
ernment benefits on the one hand, and accepting a job that vio-
lated his religious beliefs on the other. In Thomas, the Court,
although it relied heavily on Sherbert, undertook an independent
analysis of the claim, deciding Thomas was entitled to an exemp-
tion. By the time it decided Hobbie in 1987 and Frazee in 1989, the
Court appeared to treat the cases from the outset as foregone con-
clusions under Sherbert (and Thomas). The opinions lack the de-
tailed analysis of the earlier two cases, consisting mostly of
quotations from Sherbert and Thomas.54 Thus, in the very limited
area of unemployment benefits, the Court seems to have estab-
lished a right to a constitutionally compelled free exercise exemp-
tion pursuant to a fixed constitutional standard. 5
Other than Sherbert, its progeny, and the aberrational Yoder, the
Court has consistently denied all claims for religious exemption
from a wide variety of statutory provisions, including the following:
the compulsory draft provisions of the Military Selective Service
Act,5 6 the tax payment requirements of the Social Security Act,5 7
the tax exemption provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 5 8 the
minimum wage and recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act,5 9 the government use of social security numbers for
force." Ira Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 743,757
(1992) [hereinafter Trouble with Accomodation].
51. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
52. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
53. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
54. These three cases are veritable clones of Sherbert. For this reason, hereinafter
they are referred to as the "Sherbert progeny."
55. This is reflected in the 1990 case of Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), where the Court rejected a compelling interestlSherbert test for free exercise
claims in general and adopted in its place an "incidental effects" test. See infra part
I.C. for further discussion of Employment Div. v. Smith. But even with the new Em-
ployment Div. v. Smith rule, the Court excepted the "unemployment benefits" cases
as still appropriately decided under the Sherbert test.
56. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
57. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
58. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
59. Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
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registration purposes for federal food stamp and Aid for Families
with Dependent Children programs,6° military dress regulations, 1
prison regulations,62 Forest Service plans for road construction
through sites used for Native American worship services,63 and
state sales tax provisions."
The various strategies the Court has utilized in rejecting the vast
majority of free exercise claims that have come before it, despite
ostensibly using the Sherbert strict scrutiny standard of review, can
perhaps best be understood in light of the first three elements of
the Sherbert test.65
60. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
61. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
62. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
63. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
64. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
65. Excluded from this analysis are those cases where the Court did not even pre-
tend to apply the compelling interest test, specifically those involving prison regula-
tions and military regulations. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987),
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, addressed directly the issue of the
appropriate standard of review for prison regulations claimed to inhibit prisoners'
free exercise of religion. Prison inmates and members of the Islamic faith claimed
that prison policies prevented them from attending Friday afternoon religious serv-
ices, attendance at which was commanded by the Koran. The Court readily conceded:
(1) that the prisoners' sincerely held religious beliefs compelled attendance; (2) that
the policies (having to do with work details) completely prevented prisoners' attend-
ance; and (3) that the policies imposed a burden on prisoners' free exercise of reli-
gion. However, the Court did not adopt the compelling interest test that it claimed to
have used in other free exercise cases, but rather adopted a rational relation, ex-
tremely deferential standard of review of the prison regulations:
To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we
have determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional
rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordi-
narily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights
.... When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it reasonably relates to legitimate penological interests.
Id. at 349.
Under this minimal scrutiny, the Court easily found that concerns for security and
institutional administration justified the burdens on prisoners' free exercise rights.
In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), another Rehnquist opinion, the
Court adopted the same straightforward approach in discussing the appropriate stan-
dard of review for military regulations that inhibited the free exercise of religion.
Claimant, an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi, sought an exemption from an Air
Force dress code that prevented him from wearing a yarmulke while on duty and in
uniform. The Court apparently accepted without dispute or discussion (perhaps be-
cause the conduct in this case, the wearing of a yarmulke by an Orthodox Jew, was
readily familiar): (1) that Goldman's sincerely held religious belief compelled the
wearing of the yarmulke; (2) that the Air Force dress regulations (no headgear while
in uniform and indoors) effectively prevented Goldman from complying with his reli-
gious dictates; and (3) that the military regulations imposed a burden on Goldman's
free exercise of religion. The Court again openly utilized a minimal scrutiny standard
of review of the military regulations:
DISCRIMINATION-FREE HOUSING
1. Belief Must Be Religion-Based and Sincerely Held
The Court has traditionally been reluctant about even addressing
the first element of the Sherbert test-that the belief must be reli-
gion-based and sincerely held-let alone utilizing the element for
any other purpose. Although nearly every free exercise opinion
mentions the "sincerely held religious belief" requirement, most
simply accept at face value the claim that the belief is religion-
based."6 Probably the most obvious and memorable examples of
the distinction between beliefs based on religion and those based
[W]e have repeatedly held that the military is, by necessity, a specialized
society separate from civilian society .... Our review of military regulations
challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than consti-
tutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society
.... [Wlhen evaluating whether military needs justify a particular restriction
on religiously motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the
professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative impor-
tance of a particular military interest.
Id at 506-07.
As O'Lone and Goldman illustrate, the Court has found an efficient way to dispose
of certain kinds of free exercise claims without ever having to enter the thicket of the
compelling interest test. Another possible explanation, which has been put forth for
Goldman but which probably applies as well to O'Lone, is that the Court, foreseeing
the consequences of an exemption, decided that no accommodation at all was prefera-
ble to an accommodation for some religions but not for others. See Michael McCon-
nell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 146, 154 (1986)
[hereinafter Neutrality]: "Although accommodation may be made for skull caps with-
out serious detriment to the appearance of uniformity, the demands of other religions,
such as turbans for Sikhs or dreadlocks for Rastafarians, would not be so easily
accommodated."
66. The Court will not question the propriety or correctness of a religious belief.
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715; Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87. The resolution of what is a "reli-
gious" belief "is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or prac-
tice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." Thomas,
450 U.S. at 714. In Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829
(1989), the claimant, who was not a member of an established sect or church, had
refused a position because he felt that "as a Christian" he could not work on Sunday.
The Court, relying on Sherbert, Hobbie and Thomas, said that the key in each of those
cases was that the claimant had a "sincere belief that religion required him or her to
refrain from the work in question," rather than that each was a member of a particu-
lar religious sect or that any tenet of the sect forbade such work. Id. at 832-33. The
Court's combination of an expansive definition of "religion" and a "hands off" atti-
tude about examining "religion" as the basis for a claim has resulted in an element of
the test that is frequently simply conceded rather than disputed. There are, however,
a few cases where a court rejected what was claimed to be a religious belief, although
they are mostly lower court cases. See, e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d
Cir. 1991) (upholding prison's refusal to provide prisoner with special diet on the
ground that his belief system was not "religious"); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp.
439 (D.D.C. 1968) (rejecting claim for exemption from prohibition on marijuana use
because defendant did not show that her beliefs regarding drug use were "religious").
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on morality, philosophy or conscience67 are the draft exemption
cases during the Vietnam War. The Military Selective Service Act
provided a draft exemption for anyone who, by reason of religious
belief and training, opposed participation in all wars in any form,
and it specifically excluded from the definition of "religious train-
ing and belief" all "essentially political, sociological or philosophi-
cal views or a merely personal moral code." In several cases
during that time, the Court struggled with the distinction set forth
in the Selective Service Act when conscientious objectors who had
been denied military draft exemptions brought claims under the
Free Exercise Clause.69 The Court's solution to the dilemma was
an expansive definition of "religion" 70 that no doubt included some
conscientious objectors whom Congress intended to exclude from
the legislative exemption.
The Court has had as much trouble with the requirement that
the religious belief be "sincerely held" as with the requirement that
it be "religious. ' 71 The sincerity issue comes up more frequently,
however, because the Court acknowledges the necessity of address-
ing it in order to determine the propriety of an exemption.72
67. This distinction was not created by the Court. The First Amendment ad-
dresses the free exercise of religion, not, for example, the free exercise of conscience.
Some scholars have argued that philosophical beliefs, if sincerely held, should qualify
for protection under the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Free Exercise Dilemma,
supra note 25, at 547; Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29
U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 5 (1961). Others, however, have argued just as vehemently that
religion is "special" in a way that sincerely held philosophical beliefs are not and that
the protections of the Free Exercise Clause should be limited to religion-based beliefs.
See, e.g., Origins, supra note 10, at 1488-1500; Mark Kohler, Neutral Laws, Incidental
Effects, and the Regulation of Religion as Speech, 40 DRAKE L. REv. 255, 272-75(1991); John Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L.
REv. 779, 792-94 (1985-86). The opinions of the latter group have consistently found
favor with the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
68. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 60), 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560).
69. See, eg., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
70. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. The Court in Seeger from the outset acknowledged the
enormous difficulty of defining "religion": "In no field of human endeavor has the
tool of language proved so inadequate in the communication of ideas as it has in
dealing with the fundamental questions of man's predicament in life, in death or in
final judgement and retribution." Id. at 174. The Court in United States v. Ballard,
some years before, was more succinct, but no less troubled- "Men may believe what
they cannot prove." 322 U.S. at 86.
71. For a discussion of the problems with the "sincerity" element, see, Case
Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, supra note 25, at
359, 386-88; Where Rights Begin, supra note 23, at 953-57.
72. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Serv., 489 U.S. 829 (1989);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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In dealing with sincerity, the Court nearly always prefaces the
discussion with a comment about the difficulty of deciding when a
religious belief is "sincere." 73 According to Justice Jackson in his
dissent in United States v. Ballard, resolving the sincerity issue is
not merely difficult; it is impossible.74
In order to determine whether religious beliefs are sincerely
held, first, one must separate an inquiry into what is "sincerely"
religious (an inquiry that is acceptable and even necessary) from an
inquiry into what is "religious" (an inquiry that is unacceptable and
to be avoided) without abrogating the inquiry into sincerity en-
tirely.75 The course, if one exists, between that Scylla and Charyb-
dis has proved to be beyond the ability of mere mortals, including
those on the Supreme Court. In addition, one cannot simply avoid
the sincerity question, as the Court has largely done with the "re-
ligiosity" question, because sincerity and religiosity are the only
possible criteria for distinguishing between legitimate and bogus
Compare this to the "religious" requirement where the Court in essence throws up its
hands and says, "anything goes."
73. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,457 (1971): "But we must also
recognize that 'sincerity' is a concept that can bear only so much adjudicative weight."
74. The Ballards were convicted of mail fraud in connection with promoting a
religious movement; the allegedly false statements encompassed their religious be-
liefs, doctrines and experiences. The major issue confronting the Court was whether
the truth or falsity of the defendants' statements about their religion should have been
decided by the court. Justice Jackson did not see how the issue of what is believed
could be separated from what is believable: "If we try religious sincerity severed from
religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the very considerations which in common
experience provide its most reliable answer." Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92-93 (Jackson, J.
dissenting). See also Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Ex-
emption, supra note 25, at 386-88. Marshall suggests that the serious problems with
the religiosity and sincerity requirements and yet the necessity of inquiry into those
areas where a free exercise exemption is requested justify the abandonment of the
free exercise exemption entirely. Of course, Marshall sees numerous and substantial
additional problems with free exercise exemptions beyond those of religiosity and
sincerity. Marshall is by no means alone in taking a position against any constitution-
ally compelled free exercise exemption. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
75. See supra note 74 for Justice Jackson's comment on this dilemma.
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religious claims.76 Further, the necessary inquiry into sincerity
often poses a threat to Establishment Clause values."
Confronted with the difficulty and discomfort of the religiosity-
sincerity requirement for a free exercise claim of exemption, the
Court has more often than not simply conceded the existence of a
religion-based sincere belief and manipulated the other require-
ments of the Sherbert test to find a reason for denying the claim.
2. State Interest Must Be Compelling
In rejecting the majority of free exercise claims it has heard since
Sherbert, the Supreme Court has found either that the govern-
ment's interest in enforcing the regulation was compelling78 or that
the claimant's free exercise right had not been burdened in a con-
stitutionally cognizable way.79 The definition of compelling inter-
est that the Court purports to use is that set forth in Sherbert. "only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests give occasion
for permissible limitation. °80 The post-Sherbert exemption cases,
however, where the Court found a compelling interest to support
denial of the exemption, rarely, if ever, involved state interests at
the exalted level envisioned by Sherbert.
76. Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, supra
note 25, at 359. Besides the very real possibility of fraudulent claims (the probability
of which rises in direct proportion to what is at stake or the advantage one might gain
by obtaining an exemption-the most obvious example is tax exempt status, see Lee,
455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring), but gaining a competitive advantage, see
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 609, or the right to discriminate would be tempting to some),
there is the problem of opening the floodgates if there is no inquiry into sincerity. In
a pluralistic culture such as ours, with an ever-expanding diversity of religious beliefs,
potentially "everything is covered by the free exercise clause." Garvey, supra note 67,
at 783.
77. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J. concurring); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at
609.
78. See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (federal government has compelling interest
in uniform application of tax laws and preserving fiscal integrity of the social security
system); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574 (1983)(federal government has compelling
interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education); Gillette, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(substantial government interest in procuring sufficient manpower for military
purposes).
79. See, e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. 439; Bowen, 476 U.S. 693; Jimmy Swaggart, 493 U.S.
378. Some scholars have recognized the way the Court has used the principles of
compelling interest and burden as "gatekeeper" doctrines to avoid granting free exer-
cise claims for exemption. See, e.g., Where Rights Begin, supra note 23, at 935, 944,
948; James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Icon-
oclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. Rnv. 1407, 1414 (1992).
80. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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In United States v. Lee,"' an Amish employer claimed an exemp-
tion from the withholding of social security taxes for his employees
who were also members of the Old Amish Order, based on a reli-
gious belief that it was sinful to support financially or to receive
benefits from a national social security system because the Amish
provide for their own elderly and needy. The Social Security Act
provided a specific exemption for self-employed Amish, but not for
employers or employees. The Court, relying on Prince and Reyn-
oldss3 (both pre-Sherbert cases), 84 began its analysis with a caveat:
"not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional."as The Court
then restated the compelling interest test from Sherbert and Yoder
and proceeded, ostensibly, to apply it. The outcome, however, sug-
gests otherwise.86 The Court found mandatory participation "in-
dispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system.
Widespread individual voluntary coverage under social security
would undermine the soundness of the social security program
[and] be... difficult if not impossible, to administer. Thus, the
government's interest.., is very high."s
In deciding whether accommodating the Amish belief would un-
duly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest, the Lee
81. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
82. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
83. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
84. See supra part I.A.
85. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257.
86. Most scholars question whether the Court really applied the strict level of
scrutiny that the compelling interest test should mandate. See, e.g., Case Against the
Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exception, supra note 25, at 368-69; Origins,
supra note 10, at 1417; Ryan, supra note 79, at 1414 n. 51; West, supra note 37, at 595;
Trouble With Accomodation, supra note 50, at 756. Not even all the Justices on the
Supreme Court agreed that the Court was really using a compelling interest test. Jus-
tice Stevens, in both an indictment of the Court's use of subterfuge and a dramatic
foreshadowing of the Employment Div. v. Smith case eight years later, said: "[A] stan-
dard that places an almost insurmountable burden on any individual who objects to a
valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes) better explains most of
this Court's holdings than does the standard articulated by the court today." Lee, 455
U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens added that in his opinion
"the principal reason for adopting a strong presumption against such claims is... the
overriding interest in keeping the government... out of the business of evaluating the
relative merits of differing religious claims." Id at 263. Stevens concurred in the
judgment because the "Court's analysis supports a holding that there is virtually no
room for a constitutionally required exemption on religious grounds from a valid tax
law that is entirely neutral in its general application." Id. at 263. Based on what
happened in Employment Div. v. Smith eight years later, one might predict that Jus-
tice Stevens would take the same position regarding constitutionally compelled ex-
emptions from other valid and neutral laws, such as antidiscrimination laws.
87. Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-59.
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Court relied almost exclusively on Braunfeld,88 another pre-Sher-
bert case. The Court, quoting Braunfeld, emphasized the potential
consequences of granting exemptions in a "cosmopolitan nation
made up of people of almost every conceivable religious prefer-
ence."89 The Court recognized that accommodating some religious
practices could require restricting legislative activities signifi-
cantly.9 The Court seemed almost nostalgic about the simpler,
pre-Sherbert days, before it had opened the Pandora's box of con-
stitutionally compelled religious exemptions. But faced with the
precedents it had established, the Court was compelled to distin-
guish Lee from Yoder, the opinion where it had eloquently dis-
cussed the overall self-sufficiency of the Amish and the negligible
effect of an exemption on the compulsory education law in Wiscon-
sin.91 It was quite clear that Congress had intended to exempt
from the Social Security Act only those self-employed Amish and
the self-employed members of other religious groups that had an
established history of providing adequately for their elderly and
needy.9 Therefore, the Court could hardly distinguish Lee from
Yoder on the grounds that an exemption would undermine the goal
of the statutory system-the Amish were, if anything, more obvi-
ously self-sufficient when it came to caring for their needy and eld-
erly than they were in the vocational education of their children.93
Also, it is difficult to defend a position that the state's interest in
educating its children was, on its face, less compelling than the
state's interest in the fiscal integrity of its tax system or administra-
tive convenience. 94
The Court therefore focused on the remaining distinctions be-
tween Lee and Yoder. First, the probability that others would seek
religious exemptions on similar grounds was a distinguishing factor;
88. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
89. Id. at 606.
90. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259 (citing Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606).
91. See discussion of Yoder, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
92. The exemption, provision is at Social Security Act, 26 U.S.C. § 1402 (g)(1).
93. The Court readily conceded that individual, self-employed Amish qualified for
the exemption: "Congress drew a line in § 1402(g), exempting the self-employed
Amish but not all persons working for an Amish employer." Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
The statute, of course, did not mention the Amish or any other religious group by
name.
94. Justice Stevens says as much in his concurring opinion: "The Court's attempt
to distinguish Yoder is unconvincing because precisely the same religious interest is
implicated in both cases, and Wisconsin's interest in requiring its children to attend
school until they reach the age of 16 is surely not inferior to the federal interest in
collecting these social security taxes." Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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probably few, if any, would seek an exemption from compulsory
education unless they truly had sincere religious objections. The
motivation for an exemption from tax laws of any kind would be
substantially higher, thereby creating "myriad exceptions flowing
from a wide variety of religious beliefs."95 As such, there was no
principled way of distinguishing among the claims.
The second basis for distinguishing Lee from Yoder was the con-
text of the conduct involved in Lee. Unlike education (which has a
traditional, if not essential, connection with many religions), the
context in Lee was commercial and having chosen to operate in
that sphere, Lee was bound by the regulations governing it:
[E]very person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident
to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious be-
liefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial
activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own
conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be super-
imposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others
in that activity. Granting an exemption... to an employer op-
erates to impose the employer's religious faith on the
employees. 96
The Court then noted that Congress had drawn a line, exempting
the self-employed Amish but not other Amish, and that the social
security system "must be uniformly applicable to all, except as
Congress provides explicitly otherwise." 97
In Bob Jones University v. United States,98 another post-Sherbert
free exercise exemption case, the Supreme Court was on more sta-
ble ground in finding a compelling interest to defeat the claim of
exemption. Bob Jones University contested the Internal Revenue
Service's revocation of its tax-exempt status as a religious school.
Bob Jones University, a religious and educational institution dedi-
cated to the propagation of fundamentalist Christian religious be-
liefs, maintained a policy, based upon Biblical interpretation, that
95. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260. Justice Stevens agreed: "A tax exemption entails no cost
to the claimant; if tax exemptions were dispensed on religious grounds, every citizen
would have an economic motivation to join the favored sects." Id. at 263 n.3 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
96. 1& at 261 (emphasis added).
97. Id The Court in Lee makes several points that are all critically important
factors in the analysis of Free Exercise Clause exemptions from the antidiscrimination
laws. See infra part IV. These points are: (1) avoiding opening the ftoodgates for
exemption claims, (2) no principled way to distinguish claims, (3) the commercial con-
text as a voluntary choice, and (4) the importance of limiting exemptions to those
created by the legislature.
98. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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denied admission to applicants who were involved in interracial
marriages or who advocated inteiracial marriage or dating. Bob
Jones University also disciplined students who engaged in interra-
cial dating or marriage. Based on these practices and the national
policy to discourage racial discrimination in education, the Internal
Revenue Service revoked Bob Jones University's tax-exempt status
because it did not meet the standards for tax-exempt status.99 In
other words, a tax-exempt entity must serve a public purpose and
not be contrary to established public policy.
The Court conceded that the religious belief regarding a biblical
prohibition on interracial dating and marriage was sincere.' 0 Af-
ter a fair amount of exegesis on the troubled history of race dis-
crimination in the United States,101 the Court did not mince words
in finding a compelling interest, described as "a fundamental, over-
riding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education."1 2
It is difficult to dispute the Court's characterization of the compel-
ling interest in Bob Jones University as a compelling interest.0 3
99. Id at 586.
100. Id at 580.
101. Id. at 592-96.
102. 461 U.S. at 604. The Court further described the government's interest in re-
moving racial discrimination in education as
substantially outweigh[ing] whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on
petitioner's exercise of their religious belief. The interests asserted by peti-
tioner cannot be accommodated with that compelling governmental interest
... and no less restrictive means are available to achieve the governmental
interest. Id.
103. The Court's eagerness to reject a free exercise exemption claim that, if
granted, would be tantamount to state approval of prohibited discrimination is in-
structive. That the history of racial discrimination in this country and the efforts to
eradicate it have traveled a long, difficult and well-documented path strewn with ob-
stacles cannot be disputed. This history has prompted the courts and the legislature to
treat racial discrimination as the disturbing, intractable problem that it is. But this
was not always the case. As the Court stated in Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604,
racial discrimination "prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 years of this
nation's history," and it is only since Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a
mere forty years ago, that the judicial and legislative attitude toward racial discrimina-
tion officially changed.
Certainly the history of discrimination against unmarried cohabitation is as old as
the history of racial discrimination-one need simply look at the thousands of statutes
favoring marriage, as well as the laws in many states, some still on the books,
criminalizing fornication and/or unmarried cohabitation. See infra part II. The efforts
to eradicate this form of discrimination do not have forty years behind them yet, but
there is no question that the law is moving in that direction and has been for a signifi-
cant period of time. See infra part II. The progress is not without its setbacks, but the
progress of the law in eradicating racial discrimination was not initially consistent
either. And all the same arguments-about the pervasive evils to the individual and
society of invidious discrimination, the public policy of discouraging and eradicating
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That the Court believed it really was applying a true compelling
interest test is evident in its tone-vehement, bordering on self-
righteous. This contrasts to its tone in Lee"14-tentative, bordering
on wistful.
3. Regulation Must Burden Religious Belief
Before the Court confronts the difficult task of deciding whether
the law in question is necessary to accomplish a compelling govern-
mental interest, the Court must decide that the law creates a con-
stitutionally cognizable "burden" on the claimant's right to the free
exercise of religion. °5 Thus, the Court can utilize the "burden"
element as another gatekeeper doctrine to reduce the number of
claims that require "compelling interest" analysis.106 Between
Sherbert in 1972 and Employment Division v. Smith in 1990,107 the
Court used the burden element to avoid strict scrutiny of the free
exercise claim in at least four cases: Alamo Foundation v. Secretary
of Labor,10 8 Bowen v. Roy, 109 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association"0 and Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board
of Equalization."'
In Alamo Foundation, petitioner contended that complying with
the minimum wage, overtime and recordkeeping requirements of
the Fair Labor Standards Act violated its free exercise rights. Peti-
tioner was a nonprofit religious organization whose income was de-
discrimination, the unfairness and injustice to individual rights from discrimination,
and the wisdom of not adopting a position that would appear officially to sanction
discrimination--can be applied to any form of discrimination, be it racial, ethnic, reli-
gious, or based on marital status or sexual orientation. The current arguments in
favor of bias and prejudice against unmarried cohabitants and against those with
whom one does not agree or of whom one does not approve sound all too familiar.
We have heard all of them used to support racial discrimination, including the argu-
ment that one should be granted a free exercise exemption because one's religion or
interpretation of the Bible compelled one to indulge in discriminatory conduct.
104. 455 U.S. 252.
105. For an excellent analysis of the "burden" requirement and a proposal for a
new approach to defining burden in Free Exercise Clause cases, see Where Rights
Begin, supra note 23.
106. See id. at 935.
107. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
108. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
109. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
110. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
111. 493 U.S. 378 (1990). The four cases cited are in chronological order, but the
full flowering of the Supreme Court's instrumental use of "burden" occurred in Lyng
in 1988. According to Ira Lupu in Where Rights Begin, supra note. 23, until Lyng "the
concept of free exercise burden remained in the background, unclarified and incho-
ate." Id. at 943. That is certainly true in Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). The
Court in Bowen began the process that reached its culmination in Lyng.
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rived mainly from the operation of a number of commercial
businesses, which were staffed mostly by the Foundation's "associ-
ates." The Foundation first argued that it was not a "commercial"
enterprise under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court dis-
agreed. 12 Next, the Foundation argued that the free exercise
rights of its associates were infringed by the Fair Labor Standards
Act requirement of "wages." The Court disagreed, essentially find-
ing no "burden" on the free exercise of religion. "It is virtually
self-evident that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an ex-
emption from a governmental policy unless... inclusion in the
program actually burdens the claimant's freedom to exercise reli-
gious rights." 13 Because theAct did not require cash wages, the
benefits the associates received were acceptable under the Act.
Petitioner also argued that the recordkeeping requirements of the
Act "inhibited religious activity.1 114 The Court said those require-
ments "apply only to commercial activities undertaken with a 'busi-
ness purpose' and would therefore have no impact on petitioner's
own evangelical activities."'11 5 The Court, by finding no burden on
the religious element of the enterprise,' 6 was able to avoid the
compelling governmental interest inquiry associated with a strict
scrutiny standard.
The Supreme Court's next venture into narrowing the definition
of "burden" came in Bowen" 7 in 1986. Steven Roy, a Native
112. "[I]t would be difficult to conclude that the... commercial enterprise oper-
ated.., by the foundation was nothing but a religious liturgy engaged in bringing
good news to a pagan world. By entering the economic arena and trafficking in the
marketplace, the foundation has subjected itself to the standards Congress has pre-
scribed for the benefit of its employees. The requirements of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act apply to its laborers." 471 U.S. at 294-95. The analogy to those who would
hide behind religion in order to escape antidiscrimination laws that bind them in their
business/commercial ventures is inescapable. See infra part III.
113. 471 U.S. at 303.
114. Id at 305.
115. Id
116. Obviously, compliance with requirements for recordkeeping, disclosure, em-
ployee wages, etc., created an economic burden on the Foundation; but because the
burden affected only the commercial aspects of the Foundation's activities, and not
the religious or evangelical aspects, there was no constitutionally cognizable burden
for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause. Only religious burdens, not economic ones,
count. For a discussion of the problems created by this type of line-drawing, see
Where Rights Begin, supra note 23, at 942-43 n.37.
117. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). One scholar asserted that in Bowen, "the compelling in-
terest standard sustained its first significant assault." Kohler, supra note 67, at 264. It
might be more accurate to say that Bowen was the first frontal assault on the compel-
ling state interest standard. Prior to Bowen (and other than Yoder and the two unem-
ployment compensation cases that had been decided at that point), the Court had
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American of the Abenaki Tribe, obtained federal benefits under
the Aid for Families with Dependent Children and food stamp pro-
grams, which required that participants furnish social security num-
bers to the state welfare agency as a condition for receiving
benefits. Roy objected to the requirement based on a sincere reli-
gious belief that either the state's use of, or an obligation by him to
furnish, a social security number for his two-year-old daughter, Lit-
tle Bird of the Snow, would rob her of her spirit and prevent her
from obtaining greater spiritual power. Although the Court held
that requiring Roy to obtain a social security number for his daugh-
ter would constitute a burden on his free exercise of religion, 18 the
governmental use of her social security number that the state had
already obtained did not constitute a legally cognizable burden on
the free exercise rights of either Roy or his daughter.11 9 The basis
of Roy's objection was not that the statutory requirement placed
any restriction on what he could believe or what he could do, but
rather that the state use of the social security number would harm
his daughter's spirit.12° Thus, in terms of the traditional distinction
the Court has made regarding the scope of free exercise protection,
the regulation had no impact on either Roy's belief or Roy's con"
duct. What Roy sought was the right to regulate the government's
conduct, and the Supreme Court quickly rejected that as beyond
the scope of any exemption the Court had ever granted:
Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First
Amendment to require the government itself to behave in ways
that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual devel-
opment or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise Clause
simply cannot be understood to require the government to con-
duct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the reli-
gious beliefs of particular citizens. 21
In regard to Roy's second objection-to furnishing a social se-
curity number for his daughter-the Bowen Court found that
although the claim was not moot, it lacked merit.m The Court first
either chipped away surreptitiously at the compelling interest standard or ignored it
entirely.
118. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 701-04.
119. Id at 699-701.
120. Id at 699.
121. Id at 699-700. The Court went on to discuss Roy's objection to furnishing a
social security number to the government. Although his daughter already had a social
security number, Roy's suit sought an exemption from the operation of any part of
the statute involving social security numbers, so the Court believed it necessary to
address the second objection. Id at 702 n.7.
122. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 702.
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distinguished exemption cases involving a denial of government
benefits from exemption cases involving an affirmative obligation
and governmental sanctions for failure to comply.123 The Court
then found that these two types of Free Exercise Clause cases are
not to be judged by the same constitutional standard because the
nature of the burden determines the standard the government must
meet.124
The Court then rejected the compelling interest standard of
Sherbert-Yoder and adopted a far more deferential standard for the
enforcement of requirements for the administration of welfare pro-
grams that reach millions of people. "Absent proof of intent to
discriminate against particular religious beliefs or against religion
in general, the government meets its burden when it demonstrates
that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral
and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting
a legitimate public interest.1 25 The Court then distinguished the
Bowen case from its decisions in Sherbert and Thomas, which were
also denial of benefits cases."26 Once the Court adopted a minimal
scrutiny standard, it was quite easy to find that the social security
number requirement promoted the legitimate governmental inter-
est of preventing fraud and that the requirement was a reasonable
means of reaching that goal. 27
Bowen is significant in its enthusiastic and undisguised retreat
from the Sherbert-Yoder standard of review for free exercise ex-
emption cases generally, in its apparent yearning for a return to the
pre-Sherbert approach to free exercise claims, and in retrospect in
its foreshadowing of the Employment Division v. Smith 2 decision
that would follow four years later. 2 9 The case is also significant for
123. Id at 703-08.
124. Id at 706-07.
125. Id at 707-08.
126. Id. The manner in which the Court distinguished Bowen from Sherbert and
Thomas is significant. Although the description of Sherbert and Thomas as essentially
religious discrimination cases-the state recognized only nonreligious reasons for re-fusing work-was iejected in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136, 141-43 (1987), the following year, it was resurrected in Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), when the Court relied on Bowen to distinguish the Sher-
bert-Thomas line of cases, which still required a compelling interest standard of re-
view, from other types of exemption cases, which did not.
127. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 709-10.
128. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
129. Justice Stevens in his concurrence in Lee, 455 U.S. at 262-63 (Stevens, J., con-
curring), and Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Thomas, 450 U.S. 707 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), had already indicated a desire to return to the Court's pre-Sherbert ap-
proach to free exercise cases. In Bowen, it appears that Chief Justice Burger was
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the Court's manipulation of the "burden" requirement as a vehicle
for removing certain types of claims from the strict scrutiny of the
compelling interest standard.
Besides marking progress in the Court's ongoing retreat from
Sherbert, the decision in Bowen also laid the groundwork for the
Court's decision two years later in Lyng,130 which tightened the
noose around the concept of burden. In Lyng, the United States
Forest Service proposed to build a paved road through federal
land, adjacent to an area historically used by Native Americans for
religious rituals that depended on privacy, silence and an undis-
turbed natural setting. Various Native American organizations and
individuals sued to enjoin the construction of the road because it
would interfere with "training and ongoing religious experience of
individuals using sites within the area for personal medicine and
growth. ' 131
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, found this type of
claim indistinguishable from that made in Bowen; both claims in-
volved significant incidental interference with individuals' "ability
to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their... religious be-
liefs [but] in neither case ... would the affected individuals be
coerced by the government's action into violating their religious
beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize religious ac-
tivity... ,,132 The Court admitted its unwillingness, and perhaps its
incompetence, to compare the adverse effects on religion from one
case to another. The comparison would be tantamount to deter-
mining the truth of the underlying beliefs, a practice the Court has
consistently recognized as unacceptable:
This court cannot determine the truth of the underlying beliefs
that led to the religious objections here or in [Bowen v.] Roy ...
and accordingly cannot weigh the adverse effects on the appel-
lees in [Bowen v.] Roy and compare them with the adverse ef-
converted to that position. The Court's increasing reluctance not only to grant a free
exercise exemption but even to use the compelling interest test to decide whether to
grant an exemption is not based on cowardice, bias or laziness. It is because of the
inherent arbitrariness of the test itself and the possibility or even likelihood that the
use of the test will result in injustice, unfairness or even religious discrimination. See
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 707. See also West, supra note 37, at 606-07. West argues that the
only way for the court to avoid those and other unfortunate results is either to grant
all claims for exemptions simply on the word of the claimant (which everyone agrees
would create a most untenable situation) or to .reject all claims for religion-based
exemptions. West endorses the latter approach. See West, supra note 37, at 609-11.
130. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
131. Id. at 448.
132. Id. at 449.
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fects on the Indian respondents. Without the ability to make
such comparisons, we cannot say that the one form of incidental
interference with an individual's spiritual activities should be
subjected to a different constitutional analysis than the other.133
This statement is remarkable considering that the Court acknowl-
edged the uncontroverted evidence in Lyng that the road was likely
to have "devastating effects" on traditional Indian religious prac-
tices and could render the practices utterly impossible. 13 But the
Court did not see a relative degree of burden between the two
cases. Instead, the Court perceived a complete lack of a constitu-
tionally cognizable burden in both, because neither coerced the
religious objector. Simply making religious practice more difficult,
more expensive, more inconvenient or even impossible, was not
enough to trigger the compelling governmental interest standard of
review unless the government action also involved coercion. 135
133. l1& at 449-50. Justice O'Connor was not finished expounding on the Court's
limitations in assessing claims for exemption. She attacked Justice Brennan's dissent
for trying to put the Court back into the middle of the muddle from which the major-
ity was apparently trying to extricate itself:
Seeing the court as the arbiter, the dissent proposes a legal test under which
it would decide which public lands are "central" or "indispensable" to which
religions and by implication which are "dispensable" or "peripheral," and
would then decide which government programs are "compelling" enough tojustify "infringement of those practices." We would accordingly be required
to weigh the value of every religious belief and practice that it is said to be
threatened by any government program. Unless a "showing of central-
ity,"... is nothing but an assertion of centrality .... the dissent thus offers
us the prospect of this court's holding that some sincerely held religious be-
liefs and practices are not "central" to certain religions, despite protestations
to the contrary from the religious objectors who brought the lawsuit. In
other words, the dissent's approach would require us to rule that some reli-
gious adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs. We think such an
approach cannot be squared with the Constitution or with our precedents,
and that it would cast the judiciary in a role that we were never intended to
play.
Id. at 457-58.
134. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451. "Nevertheless, we can assume that the threat to the
efficacy of at least some religious practices is extremely grave. Even if we assume that
we should accept the Ninth Circuit's prediction, according to which the G-O Road
will 'virtually destroy the... Indians' ability to practice their religion,'... the Con-
stitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding respondents'
legal claims." Id. at 451-52.
135. "This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government pro-
grams, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have
no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, re-
quire government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful
actions." IM at 450-51.
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Although it is difficult to perceive Lyng in the "solely internal
operations of government" category that the Court used to charac-
terize Bowen, it is relatively easy to appreciate the dilemma that
drove the Court to do so. It is the central dilemma that informs
nearly every free exercise exemption case, what might be called the
constitutional version of "one man's poison." Justice O'Connor
stated the problem succinctly:
[G]overnment simply could not operate if it were required to
satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires .... The Con-
stitution does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the vari-
ous competing demands on government, many of them rooted
in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a
society as ours. That task, to the extent that it is feasible, is for
the legislatures and other institutions.'36
C. Employment Division v. Smith and the Post-Sherbert Free
Exercise Claim
It was clear from Lyng that the compelling governmental interest
standard of Sherbert no longer applied to many Free Exercise
Clause exemption claims. All the cases in which the claimed "bur-
den" did not result in coercion were now outside the scope of Sher-
bert and Yoder. It was thus a short step to Employment Division v.
Smith,137 perhaps one of the most vilified decisions in United States
Supreme Court history.138 The poorly crafted opinion itself may
136. Id at 452. Justice O'Connor's statement is also a throwback to the observa-
tion in Reynolds that excusing one from compliance with the law because of religious
beliefs would make the doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
with the unfortunate result that "government could exist only in name under such
circumstances." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
137. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Court decided Jimmy Swaggart, 493 U.S. 378, the
same year it decided Employment Div. v. Smith. The significance of Jimmy Swaggart
(other than the fact that the Court denied the claim for exemption, which by this time
was not all that significant) was that the Court again focused on the concept of burden
to deny the claim. In Jimmy Swaggart, the Court found no violation of either the Free
Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause in California's generally applicable, neu-
tral sales tax as it applied to Jimmy Swaggart Ministries' retail sales of religious
materials. The claimed burden was economic only-a reduction in income because
appellant had to charge higher prices-and thus not constitutionally significant: "At
bottom, though we do not doubt the economic cost to appellant of complying with a
generally applicable sales and use tax, such a tax is no different from other generally
applicable laws and regulations-such as health and safety regulations-to which ap-
pellant must adhere." Id. at 391.
138. "Members of the media, academics, members of Congress and religious inter-
est groups greeted the decision with condemnation and despair. A lead editorial in
the Los Angeles Times denounced the decision as an exercise of 'pure legal adventur-
ism.' Of the law review articles and notes written on the case, all but one condemned
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partly explain the reaction. Indeed, even those who enthusiasti-
cally supported the result in Employment Division v. Smith took
pains to distance themselves from the opinion itself.139 But there is
no question that most of the reaction to Employment Division v.
Smith was from individuals who truly were outraged by the result
the Court reached and what it portended for the future of free ex-
ercise claims.
In Employment Division v. Smith, Alfred Smith and Galen
Black, two employees of a drug rehabilitation clinic, were fired
from their jobs for using peyote during religious rituals of the Na-
tive American Church. The case arose after the Employment Divi-
sion of the Oregon Department of Human Resources denied their
the result." Ryan, supra note 79, at 1409. Several scholars described the decision as
"a sweeping disaster for religious liberty." Ryan, supra note 79, at 1409 (citing Ed-
ward M. Gaffney, Douglas Laycock et al., An Open Letter to the Religious Commu-
nity, FIRsr THINGS, Mar. 1991, at 44). Others believed religious freedom no longer
had a place in the Bill of Rights, or anywhere else, for that matter. See Ryan, supra
note 79, at nn.15-19, and accompanying text.
139. William Marshall, one of the leading proponents of the complete abolition of
constitutionally compelled Free Exercise Clause exemptions (and the lone voice cry-
ing in the wilderness-the one exception referred to in Ryan, supra note 79) em-
braced this delicate balance: "My task is then to defend Smith's rejection of
constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions without defending Smith itself."
William Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
"REv. 308, 309 (1991) [hereinafter In Defense of Smith]. Since Ryan, supra note 79,
other scholars have come out in favor of the result in Employment Div. v. Smith,
although one would be hard pressed to find a defender of the opinion itself. Of
course there are a number of scholars who agree generally with Marshall that the
constitutionally compelled Free Exercise Clause exemption should be abolished. See,
e.g., West, supra note 37; Phillip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992); Mark
Thshnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SuP.
Or. REv. 373. Philip Kurland was the first to advocate this position. See Kurland,
supra note 67.
The other side of the Free Exercise Clause exemption issue is also well represented.
Michael McConnell, Douglas Laycock and Stephen Pepper are leading advocates for
this position. Se4 eg., Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup.
Or. REv. 1 [hereinafter Accomodation]; Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Reli-
gion: An Update and a Response to Critics, 60 Guo. WASH. L. REv. 685 (1992) [here-
inafter Accommodation Update]; Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The
Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 841 (1992); Stephen Pepper, Tak-
ing the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 299; Stephen Pepper,
Some Thoughts on Perspective, 4 Noam DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 649 (1990);
Conundrum, supra note 26. Ira Lupu seems to occupy what might be called the mid-
dle ground, perceiving serious problems with Free Exercise Clause exemptions, but
not advocating their wholesale abolition. See, e.g., Where Rights Begin, supra note 23;
Ira Lupu, Free Exercise Exemptions and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employ-
ment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. Rav. 391 (1987); Ira Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Reli-
gion, Equality and Speech in the United States Constitution, 18 CoN-N. L. REv. 739
(1985-86) [hereinafter Keeping the Faith].
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claim for unemployment compensation on the ground they had
been dismissed for "work related misconduct." Smith and Black
challenged the denial based on the application of the Oregon drug
law (which contained no exemption for the sacramental use of pe-
yote) as a violation of their free exercise rights. Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the Court, held that the Free Exercise Clause permitted
Oregon to include religion-based peyote use within the reach of its
general criminal prohibition on the drug, thus rendering permissi-
ble as well the denial of unemployment benefits to persons dis-
missed from their jobs because of peyote use in a religious
context. 14° Purportedly relying on the constitutional text and its
Free Exercise Clause precedents, the Court boldly asserted that the
Supreme Court had "never held that an individual's religious be-
liefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate, ' 141 and that
the right of free exercise "does not relieve an individual of the obli-
gation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicabil-
ity on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' "142
After stating essentially a new standard for free exercise exemp-
tion claims, the Court then proceeded to explain, not altogether
successfully, why it was not really a new standard. Apparently un-
able to convince a majority to overrule outright the Sherbert-Yoder
group of cases, the Court settled for distinguishing them. In an
assertion that startled most avid court watchers and several Justices
on the Court, the majority explained that Yoder was really a "hy-
brid" constitutional case involving not only free exercise rights but
also another constitutional right, the right of parents to direct the
education of their children.1 43 Next, the Court rejected the argu-
140. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
141. IL at 878-79. The Court quoted from Reynolds the now famous passage about
the belief-conduct distinction: that to excuse an individual's conduct that violates the
law because of his contrary religious belief would "make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land and in effect permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself." Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). The Court's reli-
ance on cases like Reynolds and Nfinersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940),
suggests a return to a pre-Sherbert standard for free exercise cases.
142. 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
143. Id. at 881. Most of the other cases in the Court's "hybrid" group are from the
1940s, well before the Court had even considered the compelling interest test it
adopted in Sherbert in 1961. Therefore, the need to distinguish them is not readily
apparent, unless they are merely window dressing to bolster the unpersuasive attempt
to distinguish Yoder. Prior to Employment Div. v. Smith, everyone had assumed
Yoder fit exactly into the category the majority just said never existed. In Yoder, the
Court held that the Amish religious beliefs excused them from compliance with a
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ment that Sherbert should govern this denial of benefits case. First,
the majority attempted to limit the prior application of Sherbert to
denial of unemployment compensation cases by admitting that the
Court had not seriously applied the compelling interest test, or had
avoided it entirely, in other contexts:
We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis
of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compen-
sation.... In recent years we have abstained from applying the
Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at
all.'"
The Court then unequivocally rejected the use of the Sherbert test
for this and future cases that were not precise Sherbert clones:
Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life be-
yond the unemployment compensation field, we would not ap-
ply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal
valid and neutral compulsory school attendance law that was clearly within the state's
police power to pass. As one commentator points out, there is an essential difference
between disagreeing with a particular precedent and denying the existence of the pre-
cedent. See Michael McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REv. 1109,1120 (1990) [hereinafter Free Exercise Revisionism]. It is incon-
ceivable that five Justices on the Supreme Court did not understand that difference,
thus leading to the inescapable conclusion that the hybrid concept was an invention
born of the necessity to distinguish Yoder if it could not be overruled. Free Exercise
Revisionism, supra, at 1121.
Both Justice O'Connor's concurrence and Justice Blackmun's dissent in Employ-
ment Div. v. Smith expressed surprise at the majority's revisionist interpretation of
Yoder. O'Connor accused the majority of trying to escape from Yoder. Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Blackmun, accused the ma-
jority of "the wholesale overturning of settled law" by adopting a "distorted view" of
precedents. Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144. The Court also reviewed relevant cases, observing that:
In Bowen v. Roy, we declined to apply the Sherbert analysis to a federal
statutory scheme that required benefit applicants and recipients to provide
their Social Security numbers. The plaintiffs in that case asserted that it
would violate their religious beliefs to obtain and provide a Social Security
number for their daughter. We held the statute's application to the plaintiffs
valid regardless of whether it was necessary to effectuate a compelling inter-
est. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, we de-
clined to apply Sherbert analysis to the Government's logging and road
construction activities on lands used for religious purposes by several Native
American tribes, even though it was undisputed that the activities "could
have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices." In
Goldman v. Weinberger, we rejected application of the Sherbert test to mili-
tary dress regulations that forbade the wearing of yarmulkes. In O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, we sustained, without mentioning the Sherbert test, a
prison's refusal to excuse inmates from work requirements to attend worship
services.
494 U.S. at 883-84.
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law .... We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the
approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is
to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges 14
Despite its earlier assertions to the contrary, the Court's tardy
admission that it had not really applied Sherbert outside the unem-
ployment compensation context was a relief to those who dis-
agreed with the potentially broad sweep of the Sherbert test as
stated. The Court's rationale for refusing to apply (or even pre-
tend to apply) Sherbert to generally applicable laws was ultimately
sound. As the Court explained,
The government's ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry
out other aspects of public policy, "cannot depend on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's
spiritual development." To make an individual's obligation to
obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his
religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is "compel-
ling"-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law
unto himself," contradicts both constitutional tradition and com-
mon sense.
1 4 6
Cognizant of the validity and value of the compelling state inter-
est test in the arenas of equal protection and free speech, the Court
took care to limit its criticism and rejection of the compelling state
interest test to the free exercise context. According to the Court,
The "compelling government interest" requirement seems be-
nign, because it is familiar from other fields. But using it as the
standard that must be met before the government may accord
different treatment on the basis of race, or before the govern-
ment may regulate the content of speech, is not remotely com-
parable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it
produces in those other fields-equality of treatment and an un-
restricted flow of contending speech-are constitutional norms;
what it would produce here-a private right to ignore generally
applicable laws-is a constitutional anomaly.147
The Court said that it could not delve constitutionally into the
centrality of religious belief to a claim, because of the danger of
encroaching upon the taboo issue of the verity of the claim. There-
fore, the Court found that the compelling interest test could not be
limited effectively to appropriate cases. If, on the other hand, the
145. Id at 884-85.
146. Id. at 885.
147. Id. at 885-86.
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compelling interest test truly was applied to all claims, in the same
way it was in other areas of the law, then most laws would not
withstand scrutiny. The Court correctly observed that "any society
adopting such a system would be courting anarchy," the probability
of which is directly proportional to the society's diversity of reli-
gious beliefs. 48 The Court reached back to Braunfeld149 to remind
us once again that "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of peo-
ple of almost every conceivable religious preference [who] cannot
afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to
the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not
protect an interest of the highest order."'150 The Court's final sug-
gestion was to leave accommodation to the political process, de-
spite the disadvantages that might result for some, because
otherwise we would have a "system in which each conscience is a
law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."''
The latter observation and suggestion are not only accurate, but
they strike at the very heart of the Free Exercise Clause dilemma-
that there does not appear to be any principled way of dealing with
the concept of constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions.
It is unfortunate that the wisdom of the majority's final words on
the subject was obscured by the veritable firestorm of protest that
greeted the actual decision in Employment Division v. Smith. Cer-
tainly the Employment Division v. Smith opinion deserves to be
challenged for its careless, misleading and often downright errone-
ous use of precedent. The manner in which the Court distin-
guished Sherbert and Yoder denies, that the Court had ever
recognized the existence of constitutionally compelled free exercise
exemptions. Obviously the Employment Division v. Smith decision
cast serious doubt on the future viability of a constitutionally com-
pelled free exercise exemption. Even if one agreed with the result,
however, the Court's revisionist approach to its earlier decisions is
disturbing. No one, including the Court, had ever characterized
Yoder as representing a "hybrid" constitutional claim. This distinc-
tion, created out of whole cloth simply to support this decision, is
brazenly deceptive."5 2
148. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
149. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
150. 494 U.S. at 888 (quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606).
151. 494 U.S. at 890.
152. The Court's treatment of Yoder has been variously described as "sophistic,"
Keeping the Faith, supra note 139, at 756; bordering on "fiction" and "particularly
illustrative of poetic license," In Defense of Smith, supra note 139, at 309 and n.3;
732
DISCRIMINATION-FREE HOUSING
The Court's attempt to distinguish the Sherbert unemployment
cases was irrational, illogical and careless. First, the Court cited the
"three" unemployment cases where it invalidated state unemploy-
ment compensation rules that conditioned availability of benefits
on willingness to work under conditions forbidden by the appli-
cant's religion. The Court cited Sherbert,'53 Thomas'54 and Hob-
bie,155 and completely and inexplicably omitted the fourth
unemployment case, Frazee, 56 a unanimous decision from the pre-
vious year. Then the Court purported to distinguish the Sherbert
line of cases by saying that they involved "a context that lent itself
to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the
relevant conduct."'157 Why a statutory "mechanism for individual-
ized exemptions" is the only context (other than hybrid constitu-
tional claims, of course) that might support a constitutionally
compelled free exercise exemption is not made clear. In a sense,
all Free Exercise Clause exemption claims are made on an individ-
ualized basis-the claimant is asking for an exemption based on his
or her individual circumstances. One suspects that, as with the hy-
brid constitutional claim, this distinction was custom made for this
decision.158
Besides the Employment Division v. Smith Court's free form,
creative use of precedent to distinguish cases it apparently could
not overrule, its use of precedent to support its decision is even
more bizarre. First, the Court relied heavily on the 1879 Reynolds
decision, which stood for the proposition that the Free Exercise
Clause offered no protection for religious conduct, but only for
religious belief.159 The Court had rejected this theory sixty years
after Reynolds, but fifty years before Employment Division v.
Smith.'6° Secondly, the Court relied on Minersville School District
v. Gobitis,'6' which permitted the criminal prosecution of school
children for refusing on religious grounds to recite the Pledge of
"shocking" and "created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this case,"
Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 143, at 1120-21.
153. 374 U.S. 398.
154. 450 U.S. 707.
155. 480 U.S. 136.
156. 489 U.S. 829.
157. 494 U.S. at 884.
158. For a detailed analysis of the "shocking" use of precedent by the Court in
Employment Div. v. Smith, see Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 143, at 1120-27.
159. See supra part I.A.
160. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296.
161. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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Allegiance. The Court failed, however, to mention that three years
later, Gobitis was overruled by West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette,162 which struck down a state statute that provided
criminal sanctions against the parents of school children who re-
fused on religious grounds to saluteothe flag.163
If the Employment Division v. Smith opinion were not so bla-
tantly manipulative, one could almost admire the majority's recog-
nition that the emperor wears no clothes. 164 It is a relief for a
majority of the Court finally to admit what most commentators had
known for some time and what Justice Stevens suspected in his
concurrence in Lee 6 5-- that the Court had not really been applying
a compelling governmental interest standard in a great many cases.
The Court was correct in observing that if the compelling interest
test is actually applied, as it is in free speech and equal protection
cases, the result is that the presumptively invalid law invariably
falls.16
The Supreme Court's record in free exercise exemption cases
speaks for itself. Other than Yoder and the Sherbert four, the gov-
ernment has won every Free Exercise Clause exemption case in the
United States Supreme Court. That result would be inconceivable
if the Court had been taking the compelling interest/strict scrutiny
standard seriously as it did in other areas of the law.167 In this light,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Employment Division v. Smith
seems particularly disingenuous: "[W]e have not 'rejected' or 'de-
clined to apply' the compelling interest test in our recent cases ....
The cases cited by the Court signal no retreat from our consistent
adherence to the compelling interest test. '168
162. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
163. McConnell says that relying on Gobitis without mentioning Barnette is like
relying on Plessy v. Ferguson without mentioning Brown v. Board of Educ. Free Exer-
cise Revisionism, supra note 143, at 1124. McConnell points out that the "primary
affirmative precedent marshalled by the court to support its decision consists entirely
of overruled and minority positions." l at 1125.
164. "Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test .... 494
* U.S. at 883 (emphasis added).
165. 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Employment Div. v. Smith
Court, in articulating the standard to replace compelling interest, quoted directly from
Stevens' concurrence in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
166. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
167. "In an area of the law where a genuine 'compelling interest' test has been
applied, intentional discrimination against a racial minority, no such interest has been
discovered in almost half a century." Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 143, at
1127. See also Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 593.
168. 494 U.S. at 900 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Besides being infamous for its excessively creative approach and
(to some) its shocking result, the Employment Division v. Smith
decision was significant because it focused attention on the un-
resolved dilemma of Free Exercise Clause interpretation. In Em-
ployment Division v. Smith, except for the two narrow exceptions
allowed for hybrid constitutional claims and precise Sherbert
clones, the Court effectively eliminated the constitutionally com-
pelled Free Exercise Clause exemption by reducing the standard of
review from alleged compelling interest/strict scrutiny to rational
basis/minimal scrutiny, the most deferential level of judicial review
of government policies. The Court probably thought it had finally
"escape[d]," to use Justice O'Connor's word,169 from the difficult
balancing act of the compelling interest test previously required in
Free Exercise Clause cases. 170 The Court, however, appears to
have misgauged the reaction to its decision in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smiih.
1. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
After the failure of a petition for rehearing in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, supported by a substantial coalition of academics and
religious interest groups, 1 the United States Congress became in-
volved. With bipartisan support, both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate introduced bills,172 the purpose of which was
both to point out the error of the Supreme Court's reasoning, as
reflected in Employment Division v. Smith, and to correct the defi-
ciency legislatively by reestablishing the compelling interest test as
the appropriate standard for judicial review of free exercise claims
of exemption. After nearly three years of debate and delay, a bill
passed both houses of Congress and was signed by President Chin-
169. Id, 494 U.S. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
170. One commentator observed that the Court, by eliminating the constitutionally
compelled exemption, achieved its real goal: "But Smith will no doubt be successful in
realizing its author's central objective-discouraging free exercise litigation and free-
ing courts from the federal constitutional obligation to weigh state interests against
the impact upon religion worked by state policies." Keeping the Faith, supra note 139,
at 759.
171. The group included more than fifty law professors, including Gerald Gunther,
Michael McConnell and Laurence Tribe; and a diverse group of religious and public
interest groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union and People for the
American Way, as well as groups representing the religious right and representatives
from a wide variety of denominations. See Petition for Rehearing, Employment Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
172. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990 [hereinafter RFRA], H.R. 5377,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 3254, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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ton on November 16, 1993.173 In section two of the law, Congres-
sional Findings and Declaration of Purpose, the Congress finds that
the compelling interest test "as set forth in prior federal court rul-
ings is a workable test"; the purpose of the law is "to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert... and... Yoder
... and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise
of religion is substantially burdened."174
The legislative history of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
includes a detailed analysis of the Employment Division v. Smith
decision, some speculation (including a few actual cases) about the
impact of the Employment Division v. Smith decision, and a flat
rejection of the Employment Division v. Smith Court's invitation to
let the political process provide whatever exemptions are war-
ranted.175 The House Report is very explicit that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act restores the compelling interest test that
was previously applicable to Free Exercise Clause cases. It is also
adamant, however, that Congress is neither approving, disapprov-
ing nor codifying the result in any particular decision. The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act does not say that the courts must
apply the compelling interest test as applied in Sherbert, but only as
defined in Sherbert, thus leaving the door open for all the permuta-
tions of the Sherbert test that have evolved over the last thirty
years, except for wholesale rejection, as in Employment Division v.
Smith.176 The comments of various members of the House of Rep-
resentatives on changes to the bill support this interpretation:
173. Pub. L. 103-141, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 42 U.S:C. § 2000bb.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (a)(5), (b)(1).
The mandate of the statute is set forth in section three:
(a) Government should not substantially burden a person's exercise of reli-
gion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, ex-
cept as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates the application of the burden to the person (1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (a), (b)(1).(2).
175. H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), 1993 WL 158058 (Leg. Hist.)
[hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 88].
176. Id. One commentator has observed that, with RFRA, Congress has "passed a
clear and articulated standard for evaluating state imposed burdens on religion. In so
doing Congress might have restored something that never truly was." Leon Szetpycki
& Jean Arnold, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 88 ED. L. REP. 907 (April 1994).
The House Judiciary Committee's direction included the following:
It is the Committee's expectation that the courts will look to free exercise of
religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether or
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The bill does not reinstate the free exercise standard to the high
water mark as found in Sherbert and Yoder, but merely returns
the law to the state as it existed prior to Smith .... [T]he pur-
pose of the statute is to "turn the clock back" to the day before
Smith was decided. In interpreting the statute, courts are not to
look exclusively to the compelling state interest test as applied
in Sherbert and Yoder, but to all prior federal court cases. 77
The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee is similar to the
House report; the emphasis was on "pre-Employment Division v.
Smith case law" generally in the free exercise area and not exclu-
sively on Sherbert and Yoder.178
If one were to believe the superficial, sound-bite-oriented jour-
nalistic reports published when the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act was passed, Congress had erased not only Employment Divi-
not religious exercise has been burdened and the least restrictive means have
been employed in furthering a compelling governmental interest.... There-
fore, the compelling governmental interest test should be applied to all cases
where the exercise of religion is substantially burdened; however, the test
should not be construed more stringently or more leniently than it was prior
to Smith.
H.R. REP. No. 88, supra note 175.
It is curious that the statutory version of the compelling state interest test is not
taken from either Sherbert or Yoder, but from later cases, mostly the dissent in Em-
ployment Div. v. Smith, which interpreted Sherbert and Yoder. The differences in the
Court's enunciations of the test may be partly explained by the fact that Employment
Div. v. Smith marked the end of a thirty-year line of cases, beginning with Sherbert,
that had for at least twenty of those years (since Yoder) constricted the application of
the Free Exercise Clause. See Szetpycki & Arnold, supra. Why the Congress chose a
version of the compelling interest test that was nowhere to be found in either of the
cases it cited as models is puzzling, unless it found the articulation of the test in the
Employment Div. v. Smith dissent (being the product of moral outrage at the majority
position) more lucid or more forceful than the earlier versions.
177. H.R. REP. No. 88, supra note 175. Additional Views of Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Hon. Bill McCollum, Hon. Howard Cable, Hon.
Charles T. Canady, Hon. Bob Ingles, Hon. Robert W. Goodlatte.
178. Pre-Employment Division v. Smith case law makes it clear that only gov-
ernmental actions that place a substantial burden on the exercise of religion
must meet the compelling interest test set forth in the Act. The Act thus
would not require such a justification for every governmental action that
may have some incidental effect on religious institutions. And, while the
Committee expresses neither approval nor disapproval of that case law, pre-
Smith case law makes it clear that strict scrutiny does not apply to govern-
mental actions involving only management of internal government affairs or
the use of the government's own property or resources.
Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 2st Sess.
(1993), 1993 WL 286695 (Leg. Hist.). In connection with this paragraph, the Commit-
tee included a footnote reference to Lyng and Bowen, suggesting that those cases
should control in deciding whether a burden even exists so as to trigger the compel-
ling interest test.
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sion v. Smith but the twenty or thirty years of Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence since Sherbert and Yoder as well. 179 That is clearly
not the case. Although it is never easy to predict what the
Supreme Court might do with the restoration by Congress of a con-
stitutional test that the Court has abandoned,180 there is no reason
to believe that the Court, when confronted with interpreting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, will ignore those decades of
decisions either. Both the text and the history of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act are unequivocal that the Court is to util-
ize all its pre-Employment Division v. Smith free exercise jurispru-
dence and not simply Sherbert and Yoder. One might characterize
this approach as the Congressional version of "let's just pretend
this single mistake never happened." The status quo ante is the day
before Employment Division v. Smith was decided in 1990, not
1961 when Sherbert was decided, nor 1972 when Yoder was
decided.181
Although it is too early to determine, it is unlikely that the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act will usher in the new era of un-
precedented religious liberty that some of its supporters would
like.112 More likely, it will deposit the Supreme Court back into
179. See, e.g., David Anderson, Signing of Religious Freedom Act Culminates
Three-Year Push, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1993, at C6; New Measure Strengthens Reli-
gious Freedoms, SAN Dmoo UNION TRIB., Nov. 20, 1993, at A7; A Joint Congress
Calls for Passage of Religious Freedom Bill in Light of Survey Financing, Right to
Religious Practice 'Endangered', NswswiRn, INc., available in LEXIS-NEWS library,
Sept. 18, 1992.
180. See Szetpycki & Arnold, supra note 176. Of course, there is always the possi-
bility that the Supreme Court could decide that RFRA itself is unconstitutional Con-
gress passed RFRA pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
empowers Congress "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Ar-
ticle." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. The Supreme Court incorporated the Free Ex-
ercise Clause of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell,
310 U.S. 296 (1940). Whether the Supreme Court might decide that Congress had
exceeded its powers in passing RFRA is beyond the scope of this Article, but for a
discussion of this possibility, see Michael McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legisla-
tion Restoring the Broader Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y, 181, 187-90 (Winter 1992). For citations to various views on the sub-
ject, see Ryan, supra note 79, at n.177 and accompanying text.
181. Of course, the constitutional standard is still that articulated by the majority in
Employment Div. v. Smith. It is anticipated, however, that most or all Free Exercise
Clause claimants will sue for violation of their statutory right to free exercise under
RFRA as well, thus triggering the broader protections provided under its compelling
interest test.
182. As of the date of this Article, no cases involving RFRA have reached the
Supreme Court, although a few lower court decisions have been reported. A Minne-
sota bankruptcy judge ruled in favor of the creditors and against an evangelical
church, which was ordered to return $13,000 contributed by a couple who continued
to tithe right up to the date they filed for bankruptcy. Young v. Crystal Evangelical
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the middle of the controversy about the appropriate judicial review
of free exercise cases, which was the very controversy that the
Court was trying to escape when it decided Employment Division
v. Smith. In construing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
the Court will probably continue to treat Free Exercise Clause
cases with the "flexibility" (if one approves) or "inconsistency" (if
one disapproves) that it demonstrated in the several decades
before it decided Employment Division v. Smith.1 as How the Court
will handle a case that could be governed by either of two conflict-
ing pre-Employment Division v. Smith precedents is anyone's
guess.
H. Efforts to Eradicate Housing Discrimination
Free exercise jurisprudence is concerned with determining the
proper balance between individuals' rights and beliefs and govern-
mental regulation of conduct. Similarly, the housing laws also at-
tempt to reconcile the rights of individuals who control access
to housing and the governmental interest in preventing
discrimination.
For more than 125 years, the United States has taken an official
stand against various forms of discrimination.' s With President
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 ,185 the Thirteenth
Amendment,1 6 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,187 the country em-
barked upon its long, tortured and still uncompleted journey away
from discrimination based upon race. The issue that divided the
nation; precipitated the Civil War; and caused riots, lynchings and
other devastating social upheaval remains intractable. But sub-
stantial progress against race discrimination has resulted from
dedicated vigilance by individuals, courts and legislatures in fight-
Free Church, 152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993). On the other hand, a federal judge in
Washington, D.C,, sided with the church and against the zoning board in a dispute
about the church's right to operate a soup kitchen to feed the homeless without ob-
taining a special permit. Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjust-
ment, 849 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994). For a general discussion of RFRA and a
suggestion that free exercise claimants should look to the political arena generally for
protection of religious rights rather than to the federal courts' anticipated interpreta-
tion of RFRA, see Ryan, supra note 79.
183. Szetpycki & Arnold, supra note 176.
184. Of course, the country's official stance against religious discrimination is as old
as the Bill of Rights itself. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
185. Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat. 1268 (1864).
186. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII (1865).
187. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (1868).
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ing those who would deny others the civil rights that they them-
selves enjoy.
The progress against discrimination based on race provides am-
ple analogies for discrimination based on other characteristics-
such as marital status, the subject of this Article. Statistically, the
number of couples cohabitating without marriage has increased
tremendously over the past few decades. This Part details that sta-
tistical increase and then summarizes federal and state efforts to
eliminate both housing discrimination in general and housing dis-
crimination based on marital status in particular.
A. Statistical Evidence
The changing attitudes among some judges toward unmarried
cohabitation and the willingness to include unmarried couples
within the prohibition against marital status discrimination in hous-
ing reflect vast changes in our society over the last forty years.
From 1960 to 1970, the number of persons in the United States
cohabiting without marriage increased by 800 percent.188 By 1980,
the number had increased more than threefold from 1970.189 The
number more than doubled again between 1980 and 1992.190 In
1992, there were 3,308,000 unmarried couple households in the
United States,191 or more than 6.6 million individuals cohabiting.
Although the number of unmarried couple households is still rela-
tively small when compared to the total number of married couples
(53.5 million in 1992), the ratio of unmarried couples to married
couples grew from 1:100 in 1970 to 6:100 in 1992. Both the number
of unmarried couple households and the ratio continue to grow.' 92
Because of factors such as the increased rate of divorce, the delay
of marriage and the increase in unmarried cohabitation, the mar-
ried adult population in the United States has grown much more
188. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPr. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF Popu-
LATION, PERSONS BY FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, tbl. 11, at 4B; U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION, PERSONS BY FAMILY
CHARAcrEmsTcS, tbL 15, at 4B (cited in Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing
Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 275
n.1). See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 n.1. (Cal. 1976).
189. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS, Series P 20-468, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:
March 1992, at XVI, tbl. K. (Dec. 1992).
190. Id
191. Id The Census Bureau defines "unmarried couple household" as a household
containing two adults of the opposite sex with or without children present in the




slowly than the unmarried adult population.193 As there is nothing
to suggest that these trends of the last forty years will suddenly
change direction, the present need to protect the rights of unmar-
ried couples from discrimination will only become more urgent.
This is true, despite the moral pronouncements of judges whose
decisions are often more reflective of our society in 1955 than in
1995.194
The data certainly suggest that the majority of the population do
not find unmarried cohabitation immoral. With ever-increasing
numbers of unmarried cohabitants, the attitudes of society as a
whole have adjusted more readily than those of some judges who
may be insulated from the political process. The growing public
acceptance of unmarried cohabitation is pervasive, as reflected
both in legislative changes and sources more accessible to the soci-
ety generally. In addition to repeal and nonenforcement of the
criminal antifomication or anticohabitation laws of many states,195
both legislatures and courts have, since Marvin v. Marvin in
1976,196 moved away from traditional "meretricious spouse" rules
that prevented the enforcement of property agreements between
unmarried couples.197 For example, unmarried cohabitation is less
likely than before to be a relevant consideration in deciding cus-
tody and visitation issues.198 Moreover, zoning ordinances limiting
occupancy to a single "family" have either expanded the definition
of "family" to include unmarried couples or created an exception
so that unmarried couples can occupy single family residences.199
Furthermore, both the United States Supreme Court and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court have recognized that the fundamental right
193. Id. at V.
194. See infra part II.C.3.b.
195. See infra part II.C.2.
196. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
197. See Matthew Smith, Comment, The Wages of Living in Sin: Discrimination in
Housing Against Unmarried Couples, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1055, 1062 n.39 (1992)
[hereinafter Living in Sin], and cases cited therein.
198. See Wellman v. Wellman, 164 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1980); see also Fineman, supra
note 188, at 328-29; Joseph W. De Furia, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Mere-
tricious Relationships; Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NomE DAME L.
Rnv. 200, 209 (1989).
199. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (single family resi-
dence ordinance allowed occupancy by two unrelated adults); City of Santa Barbara
v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980); Braschi v. Stahl Assoc's., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y.
1989) (New York court broadly defined "family" to include gay lifetime partner of
deceased tenant).
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of privacy established in Griswold v. Connecticut2°° and Eisenstadt
v. Baird201 applies equally to unmarried individuals. 2m
In California, courts have recognized the prevalence of
nonmarital relationships and society's acceptance of them both
early and often.203 Although California's recent decisions in Dona-
hue v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission 4 and Evelyn
Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission205 suggest a
desire by certain judges to turn the clock back, any such attempt
will prove futile. It is simply too late in the day for a court's reac-
tionary decision denying the rights of unmarried couples to have
any effect in reducing the significant numbers of individuals who
have, for one reason or another, chosen these living arrange-
ments.2°6 Indeed, the data suggest that despite some adverse court
200. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
201. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
202. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Vinson v. Superior Court,
740 P.2d 404 (Cal. 1987); Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d 695 (Cal. 1985).
203. See, e.g., Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122:
In summary, we believe that the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in
modem society and the social acceptance of them, marks this as a time when
our courts should by no means apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the
so-called meretricious relationship to the instant case .... The mores of the
society have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabitation that we
cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have
apparently been so widely abandoned by so many.
See also Wellman v. Wellman, 164 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1980) (quoting Marvin regarding
the pervasiveness of nonmarital relationships in current society and injunction against
courts imposing moral standards that have been discarded by the vast majority of
society); Vinson, 740 P.2d 404,410 (reaffirming California's commitment to the funda-
mental, constitutional right of privacy, including protection for the "sexual lives of the
unmarried").
204. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (1991). See infra part IIL.A.I.a.
205. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (1994). See infra part mI.A.1.b.
206. Finding a "public policy" supporting marriage and condemning all other rela-
tional associations, in order to enforce one's own personal norms rather than social
norms, is an abrogation of judicial responsibility. The veritable explosion of domestic
partnership provisions in the recent past testifies to the increasing interest in and need
for increased protection of the rights of unmarried couples. In the private sector as
well as the public sector at both the municipal and state level, more and more corpo-
rations and governmental entities are creating various protections for unmarried part-
ners. For example, on February 14, 1994, two bills were introduced into the California
Assembly. The first, the Domestic Partnership Registration Act, A.B. 2810, would
have allowed same-sex or opposite-sex domestic partners to register with the state in
order to obtain family hospital visitation rights and conservatorship rights for each
other. The second bill, A.B. 2811, would have extended health care coverage to regis-
tered domestic partners of public employees who are covered under contracts with
the State Public Employees Retirement System. See Capitol Digest, SACRAM:ETO
BEE, Feb. 15, 1994, at A4. The bills passed both houses of the Legislature, but were
vetoed by Governor Wilson (who was running for reelection) on September 11, 1994.
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decisions regarding their rights, the numbers of unmarried couples
are growing and will continue to grow. Both judicial recognition of
the societal trend and judicial concern for protecting the legisla-
tively mandated rights of such a large and growing segment of the
population are important. An opportunity to provide such protec-
tion presents itself each time a landlord, in a commercial setting,
claims a religion-based right to practice unlawful, socially and mor-
ally unacceptable discrimination. Some judges have denied these
religion-based claims and refused to accommodate such wholesale
evisceration of the antidiscrimination laws. Others, unfortunately,
have not.
B. Federal Efforts
Housing has always been a focal point of efforts to combat dis-
crimination. After waging and winning the Civil War to obtain
physical freedom for persons held as slaves, the federal govern-
ment passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, thereby affirming the
real property rights of nonwhite citizens. 07 The most significant
progress in eradicating discrimination of all kinds has occurred in
the forty years since the United States Supreme Court, in Brown v.
Board of Education,08 held that "separate but equal" was inher-
Wilson Vetoes Domestic-Partners Rights Bill, SAN DIEGO UmoN-TRm., Sept. 12,1994,
at A3.
The District of Columbia has had a domestic partnership law since 1992, Health
Care Benefits Expansion Act of 1992, D.C. CODE 1981 § 36-1401-08. Vermont was
the first state to pass a domestic partnership law extending health and dental coverage
to unmarried partners of its state workers. Benefits Extended to Unwed Partners, SAN
DIEoO UNIoN-TRIm., June 13, 1994, at A6. San Diego recently joined thirty other
U.S. cities, including San Francisco, Sacramento, Seattle, New Orleans, New York and
Minneapolis, and numerous major private corporations, including Lotus Develop-
ment Corporation, Levi Strauss and Company, and Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., in
extending benefits to unmarried couples. San Diego's Domestic Partnership Ordi-
nance extended health benefits to domestic partners of all unmarried city workers.
City O.K.'s Benefits for Unwed Partners, SAN DinoO UmNoN-T~iu., June 3, 1994, at
Al. For further discussion of various municipal domestic partnership ordinances, see
Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union; A Legal and
Societal Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 CoLuM. L. Rv. 1164 n.119-
155 (1992), and accompanying text. Some companies provide domestic partnership
benefits only to gay or lesbian employees who do not have the option to marry. See,
e.g., Sidebar, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 30,1992, at 2 (Mllbank, Tweed first New York City law
firm to extend health care benefits to domestic partners of gay or lesbian attorneys or
employees); Stanford to Provide Benefits for Partners of Gays, L.A. TIMs, Dec. 9,
1992, at B4 (Stanford not the first, but "among the pioneers" in instituting domestic
partnership policy).
207. Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1982 (originally enacted as Ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27 (1866)).
208. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ently unequal. Although Brown dealt specifically with race dis-
crimination in the context of education, its holding and its lessons
were soon extrapolated to other contexts of discrimination, partic-
ularly housing, and to grounds for discrimination other than race.
The Civil Rights Act of 1968, including the Federal Fair Housing
Act, expanded the bases for prohibited discrimination from race to
color, religion, sex and national origin, and prohibited discrimina-
tion in advertising. °9 In the same year, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Company,210 the Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 barred all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in
the sale or rental of property. Subsequently, Congress amended
the Federal Fair Housing Act in 1988 to include prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of family status and handicap.211
To date, the Federal Fair Housing Act has not included marital sta-
tus in its enumerated categories and has not specifically prohibited
discrimination against unmarried couples in the sale or rental of
housing.
Although lacking the broad protections of the Federal Fair
Housing Act, unmarried couples are protected by federal law from
housing discrimination in two areas. The Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act212 prohibits discrimination on the basis of marital status in
credit transactions regarding housing. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, in Markham v. Colonial Mortgage
Service Company,13 held that "marital status" as used in the stat-
ute prohibited the lender from discriminating against an unmarried
couple who had applied jointly for a mortgage. The court opted for
a broad interpretation of the phrase "sex or marital status" to in-
clude unmarried couples and not the narrow interpretation, "single
and married women," that the lender had advocated.21 4 Besides
the court's perception of the "plain meaning" of the statute, the
court found unlawful the lender's differential treatment of married
and unmarried couples in terms of aggregating income to deter-
mine creditworthiness.215
Federal law also protects unmarried couples from discrimination
in the area of public housing. A federal district court, in Hann v.
209. Title VIII of the CIVIL RIoTs Acr oF 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-07.
210. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
211. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-07.
212. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982).
213. 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
214. Id at 569-70.
215. Id.
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Housing Authority,216 held that the United States Housing Act of
1937217 intended to provide housing for low-income families, and
therefore prevented a local housing authority from arbitrarily ex-
cluding all unmarried couples from public housing. The unmarried
couple, with their two children, did not fit the authority's imper-
missibly restrictive definition of "family," which the Court noted
was narrower than the definition promulgated in regulations by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 218
Although the Federal Fair Housing Act does not specifically in-
clude marital status as a basis for prohibiting discrimination, the
longstanding public policy of the federal government against arbi-
trary discrimination in the general area of housing is beyond
dispute.
C. State Efforts
1. California as a Representative Jurisdiction
State and local governments, with varying degrees of alacrity,
followed the lead of the federal government in moving toward
eradicating discrimination, particularly in the area of housing.219
California, with a long and relatively successful history of antidis-
crimination efforts, is fairly representative. As early as 1893, the
California Legislature enacted laws to prohibit racial discrimina-
tion in places of public amusement.m In 1897, in the forerunner to
the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Legislature expanded those pro-
tections by guaranteeing full and equal accommodations to all citi-
216. 709 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
217. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437u.
218. 709 F. Supp. at 609.
219. I chose California to illustrate the evolution of the fair housing laws for several
reasons. California courts decided two of the five cases that have addressed the pre-
cise subject of this Article, the free exercise claim of a landlord who violates the fair
housing laws by refusing to rent to unmarried couples. California has a fairly long
history of antidiscrimination efforts in its courts and legislature. Among the generally
progressive states, California has a fairly typical history with its fair housing laws.
California presently has all the mechanisms in place that a court needs to justify a
decision in favor of the tenants: 1) strong antidiscrimination statutes generally (the
Unruh Act and the FEHA); 2) fairly expansive interpretation of the antidiscrimina-
tion statutes in the decisional law; 3) no anticohabitation or antifornication law pres-
ently in effect or being enforced; 4) a fair housing law that includes marital status as a
prohibited basis for discrimination and 5) consistent decisional law to the effect that
unmarried couples are protected under the prohibition on marital status discrimina-
tion. California is intended to be a representative jurisdiction, rather than an exem-
plary jurisdiction.
220. 1893 CAL. STAT. 220.
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zens, -1  and in 1919 and 1923, included prohibitions on
discrimination in public conveyances= 2 and "all other places of
public accommodation." 23 Between 1905 and 1959, California had
explicit statutory civil rights protections in §§ 51-54 of the Califor-
nia Civil Code. During that time, however, judicial interpretation
of those statutory protections varied widely.224 In response, the
California Legislature expanded and clarified those sections of the
Civil Code in 1959, prohibiting discrimination in "all business es-
tablishments of every kind whatsoever," and relabeling the sections
the Unruh Civil Rights Act.225 Other than minor revisions not rel-
evant here, the Unruh Civil Rights Act has provided the same ex-
pansive coverage since 1959.26
In 1959, the California Legislature also passed its first fair hous-
ing law, the Hawkins Act, which prohibited racial discrimination in
publicly assisted housing.227 In 1963, the legislature replaced the
Hawkins Act with the Rumford Fair Housing Act, which extended
the housing discrimination prohibitions to housing generally and
included an unequivocal statement of public policy:
The practice of discrimination because of race, color, religion,
national origin or ancestry in housing accommodations is de-
clared to be against public policy. This part shall be deemed an
exercise of the police power of the State for the protection of
the welfare, health, and peace of the people of this State. 8
221. 1897 CAL. STAT. 137. In 1905, this Act became CAL. Cv. CODE § 51.
222. 1919 CAL. STAT. 309.
223. 1923 CAL. STAT. 485 (current version at CAL. Crv. CODE § 51).
224. See Anthony Beck, Comment, Apartment for Rent Adults Only; No Children
Allowed, 15 CAL. W. L. REv. 219, 225 (1979-80).
225. 1959 CAL. STAT. 4424.
226. CAL CxV. CODE § 51, Historical and Statutory Notes (West 1994).
227. 1959 CAL. STAT. 4074. The Hawkins Act was superseded in 1963 by the Rum-
ford Fair Housing Act, 1963 CAL- STAT. 3823. See Beck, supra note 224, at 226. The
law was originally codified at CAL HEALTH & SANr= CODE § 35700.
228. 1963 CAL. STAT. 3824. The Rumford Fair Housing Act for the first time
afforded an administrative remedy for housing discrimination and authorized the
administrative agency to take steps to prevent violations of the housing antidis-
crimination statutes. See Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment and Hous.
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 704, 711 (Cal. 1991). As with most jurisdictions, California's pro-
gress in eradicating discrimination has not been without its setbacks. In 1964, Califor-
nia voters passed Proposition 14, an initiative that gave real property owners absolute
discretion in choosing buyers or lessees. Proposition 14, which then became Article I,
§ 26 of the California Constitution, was intended to overturn California's recently
enacted fair housing laws. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the Supreme
Court affirmed a decision by the California Supreme Court that Article I, § 26 vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. California's treat-
ment of Asian-Americans has also been somewhat equivocal. See, e.g., Oyama v.
State, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (reversing California Supreme Court and finding California
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Subsequent amendments to the fair housing law in 1975 added sex
and marital status as prohibited bases for discrimination and re-
peated the statement that the practice of discrimination on any of
the enumerated bases was against public policy.229
Since 1959, both the judiciary and the legislature in California
have broadened the reach of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the
fair housing law to further the public policy against discriminatory
housing practices.230 On numerous occasions, the courts have re-
minded us that the Unruh Civil Rights Act is a remedial statute, to
be construed liberally with a view toward achieving the goal of the
statute (a society free from arbitrary discrimination) and promot-
ing justice. 31 Legislative amendments to the Unruh Act over the
years have continually broadened and increased its protection by
increasing the types of establishments covered by the law,22 ex-
panding the categories of prohibited discrimination, 3 and increas-
ing the penalties for those who violate the law.234 The courts in
California have also greatly expanded the protection offered by the
Unruh Act, first by a consistently inclusive definition of "business
Alien Land Law violative of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause);
Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (holding Alien Land Law-as amended
after Oyama-violative of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution).
229. 1975 CAL. STAT. 2942 (then codified at CAL HEALTH & SAFErY CODE
§§ 35700-711, 35720. The year after the addition of "marital status" to the categories
of prohibited discrimination, the court in Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority,
130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976), held that "marital status" discrimination included discrimi-
nation against unmarried cohabiting couples. In 1980, the Rumford Fair Housing Act
was combined with the provisions of the California Labor Code prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination (formerly CAL. LABOR CODE § 1411) as the Fair Employment
and Housing Act, 1980 CAL. STAT. 3138-3167 and codified at CAL. GOV'T. CODE
§§ 12900-906, 12920-927.
230. Besides the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Hawkins Act, the Legislature en-
acted a third law directed to the declaration and enforcement of civil rights: the Fair
Employment Practices Act, 1959 CAL. STAT. 1999-2005, codified at CAL. LABOR
CODE §§ 1410-15 prohibiting employment discrimination. Subsequently, the Legisla-
ture combined the employment and housing antidiscrimination statutory schemes into
the Fair Employment and Housing Act, 1980 CAL. STAT. 3140-42. See Walnut Creek,
814 P.2d at 711.
231. See, e.g., Winchell v. English, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1976); Crowell v. Isaacs, 45
Cal. Rptr. 566 (1965); Lambert v. Mandel's of California, 319 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1958).
232. The change in 1959 to cover "all business establishments of any kind whatso-
ever" replaced a specific list of places covered by the statute in the earlier version.
1959 CAL. STAT. 4424.
233. The original statute covered discrimination based on color, race, religion, an-
cestry or national origin. The categories were legislatively expanded to add sex, 1974
CAL. STAT. 2568; age, 1984 CAL. STAT. 2781, 1984 CAL. STAT. 4681-82; blindness and
physical disability, 1987 CAL. STAT. 557-58.
234. See, e.g., 1976 CAL. STAT. 1013.
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establishment" and secondly, by liberal interpretation of the "cate-
gories" of discrimination prohibited by the law.
Almost without exception, the California courts have rejected
various claims by defendants that the Unruh Act did not apply to
them because they were not "business establishments. '235 The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court found all of the following to be business
establishments within the meaning of the statute: a subdivision
homeowners association, 36 a nonprofit religious corporation that
published "Christian Yellow Pages, 'z 7 a condominium associa-
tion, 38 a Boys' Club that operated a community recreational facil-
ity,239 the Rotary Club, 40 a nonprofit privately owned country
club ul physicians,2 42 the Boy Scouts,243 real estate brokers,'
home builders and developers,2 5 and construction companies.3
Although the Unruh Civil Rights Act lists seven specific bases
upon which one may not discriminate, the protection against dis-
crimination afforded by the Act extends to "all persons." There-
fore, the enumerated categories are illustrative, but not
exclusive.t 7 The courts have consistently held that the purpose of
the Act is to prevent arbitrary discrimination by business establish-
ments and that the focus should be on that goal, not on whether a
claimant fits precisely into one of the enumerated categories.
235. One of the very few exceptions is Hart v. Cult Awareness Network, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 705, review denied, (1993) (requiring cult awareness group to admit members
of the Church of Scientology would violate group's right to freedom of expressive
association and no finding of compelling governmental interest).
236. Park Redlands Covenant Control Comm'n v. Simon, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199
(1986).
237. Pines v. Thomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1984).
238. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assoc., 662 P.2d 427 (1983). The Associa-
tion tried to characterize itself as an organization that mowed lawns for owners de-
spite the fact that it was charged with employing a professional property management
firm, obtaining insurance for the benefit of all owners and maintaining and repairing
all common areas and facilities for a 629-unit project. The court was not fooled.
239. Isbister v. Boys Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (1985).
240. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 224 Cal. Rptr.
213, aff'd, 481 U.S. 537 (1986).
241. Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 262 Cal. Rptr. 890, reh'g denied
(1989).
242. Washington v. Blampin, 38 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1964).
243. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 195 Cal. Rptr. 325,
appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1983).
244. Crowell v. Isaacs, 45 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1965); Lee v. O'Hara, 370 P.2d 321 (Cal.
1962).
245. Don Wilson Builders v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 621 (Cal. 1963).
246. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1962).
247. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858(1982).
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Thus, the California Supreme Court has extended the protection of
the Act to claimants who were discriminated against on the basis of
age,2 8 appearance,249 parental status250 and sexual orientation.251
The progress of the fair housing law in California has been simi-
lar to that of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Both the legislature and
the judiciary have contributed to broadened and expanded cover-
age under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The
provisions in the FEHA itself refer directly to the Unruh Act.
Government Code § 12955, the operative section of the FEHA,
provides that it is unlawful for anyone subject to the Unruh Civil
Rights Act to discriminate in housing against any person on the
basis of Unruh's categories or the FEHA enumerated categories,
including marital status.252 In addition, § 12955.8 provides that the
term "business establishment" shall have the same broad meaning
it has in the Unruh Act.253
Although there are fewer court decisions interpreting the FEHA
than the Unruh Act, the courts have adopted a liberal interpreta-
tion of the FEHA, considering its dual preventive and remedial
purposes.254 The California Court of Appeal decided Atkisson v.
Kern County Housing Authority in 1976,'255 the year after marital
status was added to the FEHA as a protected category. In Atkis-
son, the local housing authority prohibited low-income public
housing tenants from cohabiting "with anyone of the opposite sex
to whom the tenant is not related by blood, marriage, or adop-
tion."'256 The housing authority's stated reason for the policy was
that: (1) cohabitation was immoral; (2) frequent turnover of cohab-
248. O'Connor, 662 P.2d 427.
249. In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1970).
250. Marina Point, LtL, 640 P.2d 115.
251. Curran, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325. As recently as 1991, the California Supreme Court
had the opportunity, but refused to overrule the earlier decisions that expanded the
protection of the Unruh Act beyond the enumerated categories. See Harris v. Capital
Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1991).
252. CAL Gov'T CODE § 12955(d) (West 1994).
253. CAL GOV'T CODE § 12955.8(b)(2) (West 1994).
254. "The statutory focus on corrective measures [is] consistent with the legislative
purpose to provide a streamlined procedure to prevent and eliminate housing discrim-
ination," as an alternative to the more cumbersome and costly procedure of a civil
suit. Walnut Creek, 814 P.2d at 713. The goal is to prevent discrimination before it
occurs, but if it does happen, to offer a quick and efficient process to make its victim
whole in the context of housing. Id. Because of the administrative focus of the
FEHA, most of the reported cases are adminstrative decisions rather than court
decisions.
255. 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
256. Id. at 377.
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itants resulted in management problems and a demoralizing effect
on tenant relations; and (3) cohabitants were a bad influence on
others. 57 The court held that the fair housing law's prohibition on
marital status discrimination did indeed protect unmarried couples;
that the housing authority's policy created an unconstitutional, ir-
rebuttable presumption of immorality, irresponsibility and demor-
alizing effect, none of which were based in fact; and that the policy
violated the tenants' rights of due process, equal protection and
privacy.5-8 The court stated that the legislature's inclusion of "mar-
ital status" as a prohibited basis of discrimination in housing "must
be given effect as a general policy statement .. by the State of
California."'259 The court found that the Act "on its face" prohib-
ited the eviction of an unmarried couple simply because they were
unmarried.m-
In Hess v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission,2 1 land-
lords refused to rent a duplex to an unmarried couple because the
individuals failed separately to qualify financially. The landlords
conceded, however, that as a business practice, they required only
one spouse of a married couple to qualify and that, had the unmar-
ried couple been married, they would have rented to them.
Although they would have qualified as a married couple and one
individual qualified separately, the landlords refused to aggregate
the incomes of the unmarried couple. The court relied on Mark-
ham v. Colonial Mortgage Service Company262 and Atkisson to
hold that no legitimate business interest existed to justify the land-
lords' disparate treatment of married and unmarried couples, and
that the landlords had violated the FEHA prohibition against dis-
crimination based on marital status.
For more than a hundred years, the California Legislature and
the courts have been fighting discrimination, and for the last
twenty years, discrimination in housing on the basis of marital sta-
tus has been both expressly prohibited and against express public
policy. In this context, therefore, a court should be extremely re-
luctant to grant exemptions from the antidiscrimination statutes to
individuals who would erode a long and generally successful tradi-
tion of fighting discrimination in all its ugly manifestations.
257. Id
258. Id at 379-81.
259. 130 Cal. Rprt. at 381.
260. Id.
261. 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1982).
262. 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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Further, those jurisdictions with a long, well-documented anti-
discrimination history might set the example for those where the
antidiscrimination record is more equivocal. Strong antidis-
crimination statutes, such as the Unruh Act and the FEHA in Cali-
fornia, and expansive interpretation of those statutes in the courts,
create a firm basis for protecting the rights of unmarried couples.
Several other factors provide additional support. Again California
is merely representative of several of those factors: (1) California
repealed its law against adulterous cohabitation twenty years
ago,26 3 and California has never had a general anticohabitation
statute; (2) California has a fair housing law;264 (3) California's fair
housing law specifically includes marital status as a prohibited basis
for discrimination, 265 and California courts have consistently held
that discrimination against unmarried couples is included in the
prohibition against discrimination based on marital status;266 and
(4) California has often demonstrated perspicacity and courage in
recognizing ideas whose time has come.267
2. Cohabitation Statutes
Although California at one time prohibited adulterous cohabita-
tion,268 that proscription was repealed in 1975,269 the same year the
California Legislature added the statutory prohibition against mar-
ital status discrimination in housing.270 Unlike many other jurisdic-
tions, however, California has never had a general antifornication
statute or anticohabitation statute.271 Apparently recognizing that
263. 1975 CAL. STAT § 5.
264. FEHA, CAL GOV'T CODE § 12900-906, 12920-927 (West 1994).
265. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(b) (West 1994).
266. Atkisson, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375; Hess, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712.
267. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (no public policy pre-
cludes the court from enforcement of property agreements between unmarried
couples, rejecting traditional "meretricious spouse" rule); 1969 CAL STAT. 3324 (first
state legislature to pass "no fault" divorce law); 1975 CAL. STAT. 133 (legislature
passed "consenting adults act"); 1975 CAL. STAT. 2943 (legislature added marital sta-
tus to prohibited categories of discrimination under FEHA); Wellman v. Wellman,
164 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1980) (parent is not considered unfit for child custody or visitation
merely because parent lives with an unmarried partner).
268. In re Cooper, 121 P. 318 (Cal. 1912). Adulterous cohabitation is cohabitation
between two persons where each is married to another. Id.
269. 1975 CAL. STAT. 133.
270. 1975 CAL. STAT. 2943.
271. Antifornication statutes prohibit sexual intercourse between unmarried people
(people not married to each other); anticohabitation statutes prohibit cohabitation by
two unmarried adults. See Donahue v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 32, 38 (1991), review dismissed and cause remanded (1993). Because cohabi-
tation suggests sexual relations, it is therefore often associated with fornication. How-
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such statutes are hopelessly outdated, several states have repealed
their antifornication statutes.2 72 Surprisingly, fornication is still a
crime on the books in about one-fourth of the states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.273 Although these statutes are rarely enforced, a
number of courts have embraced the atavistic notions expressed by
the statutes or the mere existence of the dormant statutes as indica-
tive of a public policy against protecting the rights of unmarried
couples against housing discrimination. 274 Not all judges, of course,
adopt that approach. In Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com-
mission,2 75 the Supreme Court of Alaska flatly rejected the land-
lord's argument that antidiscrimination provisions were not
intended to protect unmarried couples because cohabitation was a
criminal offense at the time, stating:
In 1975 ... the legislature declared that "the criminal code of
the State of Alaska ... is ... vastly out of step with constitu-
tional and social developments of recent decades .. ." [W]e
think it would be manifestly unreasonable to limit the effect of
ever, because the sexual relationship, if any, is rarely proven in cases in which the
landlord refuses, on moral or religious grounds, to rent to a couple because they are
not married, the landlord's refusal is usually based upon a very significant unwar-
ranted assumption. The Donohue court's unquestioning acceptance of this rationale
for refusal to rent, without demanding proof, compounds and exacerbates the result-
ing discrimination. Thus the court, without a scintilla of evidence to support the land-
lord's claim, directly contravenes stated public policy and a compelling governmental
interest in preventing discrimination.
272. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.03 (West 1976) (repealed 1983) (held uncon-
stitutional in Purvis v. State, 377 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. 1979)); Ky. REv. STAT. ANm.§ 436.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (repealed 1975); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:110-1(West 1985) (repealed 1979).
273. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1002 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2010 (Harrison
1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 11-8 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1991); MAss. GEN. LAWS AM. ch. 272, § 18 (West 1990); MiNN. STAT. ANN.§ 609.34 (West 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-29-1 to -9 (1972 & Supp. 1991); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1986); N.D. CEw,. CODE § 12.1-20-08 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN.§§ 16-15-60, -80 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (1990); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-344 (Michie 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 944.15 (West Supp. 1991).
274. See, e.g., Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d. 1152 (IMI. App.), appeal
denied, 561 N.E.2d 694 (IMl. 1990) (although the last recorded incident of prosecution
under the antifornication statute was in 1916, the court said that the criminal prohibi-
tion against fornication still expressed the public policy of Illinois against open and
notorious cohabitation, and then justified landlord's refusal to rent to an unmarried
couple); Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (based upon state's policy as
evidenced in antifornication statute, under which last reported conviction was in 1927,
court refused to interpret marital status to include unmarried couples).
275. 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989).
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these modem, remedial provisions [the antidiscrimination laws]
by reference to an outdated criminal statute.276
Although some states have also repealed their anticohabitation
statutes,277 cohabitation remains a crime in eleven states.278 Need-
less to say, those statutes are also not enforced. As with antiforni-
cation statutes, however, their mere existence creates an
opportunity and an excuse for those who choose to deny unmar-
ried couples freedom from housing discrimination. Because both
antifornication and anticohabitation statutes are rarely enforced
and too frequently misused to produce unfairness, they should sim-
ply be repealed.279
3. Fair Housing Laws and Interpretation of "Marital Status"
If a tenant is to have a colorable claim against a landlord who
discriminates on the basis of marital status, the tenant must first be
in a jurisdiction that has a fair housing law. Fortunately, forty-
seven states and the District of Columbia have enacted fair housing
276. Id at 1202. Compare the enlightened attitude of the Alaska Supreme Court in
Foreman with the benighted, moralistic attitude of the court in French, 460 N.W.2d at
8: "It is simply astonishing to me that the argument is made that the legislature in-
tended to protect fornication and promote a lifestyle which corrodes the institutions
which have sustained our civilization, namely, marriage and family life."
277. See, e.g., Act of June 19, 1989, Pub. Act 86-490, § 1, 1989 ILL. LAWS 2890
(codified at ILL- ANN. STAT. ch. 38 1 11-8(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991)) (deleting
reference to cohabitation in Illinois statute criminalizing fornication); Act of May 2,
1979, 1979 KAN. SEss. LAWS 521, 527 (repealing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-118, which
criminalized cohabitation); Act of May 5, 1987, 1987 MASS. Acrs 46 (codified at
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 16 (West 1990)) (deleting reference to cohabitation
in Massachusetts statute criminalizing open and gross lewdness and lascivious
behavior).
278. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1409 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANm. § 798.02 (West
1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-6604 (1987); MIcH. Com. LAWS § 750.335 (1979) (MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.567 (Callaghan 1990)); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (1972); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-10-2 (Michie 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1986); N.D. CNr.
CODE § 12.1-20-10 (1985); S.C. CODE ANm. §§ 16-15-60, -80 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (re-
quires "living together and carnal intercourse"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-345 (Michie
1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-4 (Michie 1989).
279. A few courts have invalidated criminal statutes prohibiting cohabitation and/
or fornication, generally on constitutional right to privacy and equal protection
grounds. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985) (antifornication
statute violated constitutional right of privacy; state may encourage marriage, but not
at the price of crucial constitutional liberties), vacated on other grounds, 782 F.2d 1202
(4th Cir. 1986). Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), where the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the Georgia law prohibiting consensual sodomy, perhaps cast doubt on
the validity of these decisions, but there are some good arguments that criminal stat-
utes prohibiting consensual sex between adults are indeed unconstitutional. See Note,
Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre and Extramarital Sex,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1660, 1665-67 (1991).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
laws.2 0 Secondly, unless a court interprets the jurisdiction's fair
housing law very broadly (to include nonenumerated categories),
the statute must include "marital status" as one of the bases upon
which housing discrimination is prohibited. Fair housing laws in
the District of Columbia and twenty-one states (including Califor-
nia) do include "marital status" as a prohibited basis for discrimi-
nation,281 although none of these statutes expressly prohibits
discrimination against "unmarried couples. ' '282  Therefore, the
question of protection for unmarried couples from housing dis-
crimination has been left to the courts to resolve.
Whether the term "marital status" includes protection for un-
married couples is a critically important threshold question that
must be resolved before the constitutional or other issues can be
addressed. Before a court can balance the landlord's moral or reli-
gious claim against the tenant's right to be free from housing dis-
crimination, the court must first decide that the tenant does indeed
have such rights. Because of the vagaries of the judicial system and
the bias of some judges, the decisions on this issue have been
mixed, sometimes with opposite results from two different jurisdic-
tions interpreting nearly identical statutory language and often
with both courts relying on the "plain meaning" of the phrase
"marital status. ' '283 Moreover, in several instances, two different
courts within the same jurisdiction have decided differently on the
issue.
The most recent tally appears to be as follows: in California,2'
Massachusetts 2- and Alaska,m the term "marital status" unequiv-
280. See Living in Sin, supra note 197, at 1073 n.78 (citing the District of Columbia
and 47 state fair housing laws). Only Arkansas, Mississippi and Wyoming have not
enacted fair housing laws. Id
281. Id at 1074 n.80.
282. Id at 1073-74. In most of the states, the legislature, even when it defines
"marital status," provides no guidance whatever as to whether "marital status" pro-
tection was intended to include unmarried couples. Id. at 1074-76.
283. For a synopsis of a number of these cases, see Carroll J. Miller, Annotation,
What Constitutes Illegal Discrimination Under State Statutory Prohibitions Against
Discrimination in Housing Accommodations on Account of Marital Status, 33 A.L.R.
4th 964 (1984 and Supp. 1993).
284. See Evelyn Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (1994); Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32
(1991), review granted (1992), review dismissed and cause remanded (1993); Hess, 187
Cal. Rptr. 712 (1982); Atkisson, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
285. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); Worcester Hous.
Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrim., 547 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1989).
286. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d
1199 (Alaska 1989).
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ocally does include protection for unmarried couples. In Mary-
land,2 7 Minnesota2m and Wisconsinu 9 it unequivocally does not.
In New Jersey,290 the term "marital status" likely includes unmar-
ried couples; in New York,29 1 it likely does not. And in Illinois2m
and Washington State,293 the issue has been addressed but with
conflicting results.
a. "Marital Status" Includes Unmarried Couples
(1) California
TWenty years ago in Atkisson, 94 the California Supreme Court
decided that the plain meaning of "marital status" in the California
fair housing law included protection of unmarried couples from
housing discrimination. Because the meaning of "marital status"
was clear "on its face," the court did not find it necessary to "inter-
pret" or analyze what was obvious.295 Likewise in Hess296 six years
later, the court had no trouble with the plain meaning of "marital
status" as used in California's fair housing law. The court stated,
"[t]he California Fair Employment and Housing Act prohibits dis-
crimination based on marital status, including that against unmar-
ried couples. '' 297 In the nine years between Hess and Donahue,298
the term "marital status" somehow became ambiguous. As a re-
sult, the Donahue court was compelled to interpret it, reasoning,
"[w]hen the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need
287. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 475 A.2d
1192 (Md. 1984); Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 431 A.2d 745
(Md. 1981).
288. Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
289. Dane County v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 1993); Dane County v. Nor-
man, 504 N.W.2d 874 (Wis. App. 1993) (unpublished opinion).
290. Kurman v. Fairmount Realty Corp., 8 NJ. Admin. 110 (1985); see, Zahorian v.
Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 301 A.2d 754 (NJ. 1973).
291. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 450 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1983); but see Braschi
v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989); Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights,
481 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1984).
292. Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 694
(III. 1990); but see Wolinsky v. Kadison, 449 N.E.2d 151 (M11. 983).
293. McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d 146 (Wash. 1980); but see Loveland
v. Leslie, 583 P.2d 664 (Wash. 1978).
294. 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976). See discussion of Atkisson, supra notes 255-60 and
accompanying text.
295. 130 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
296. 187 CaL Rptr. 712 (1982). See discussion of Hess, supra notes 261-62 and ac-
companying text.
297. 187 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
298. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32.
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for construction .... [T]he operative phrase ... 'marital status' is
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. '" 299
Relying on Atkisson and Hess, the court easily could have re-
jected the landlords' tenuous argument in Donahue that "marital
status" did not include protection for unmarried couples, but in-
stead protected only one's circumstance or condition regarding
marriage, such as single, married, widowed or divorced. 3°0  The
court, however, indulged in a fairly lengthy analysis of the language
of the statute (which provided "no definitive answer" 301), the legis-
lative history (which was "not particularly helpful" 302), and the
"chronology of relevant case law, 303 which the court found more
enlightening. The legislature amended the FEHA in 1980, after
Atkisson had interpreted "marital status" to include protection for
unmarried couples, but the amendment did not alter Atkisson's
conclusion about the meaning of marital status. Therefore, the
Donahue court found that the legislature's failure to take advan-
tage of that opportunity when presented constituted "acquiescence
in the judicial interpretation. '30 4
In ultimately finding that the prohibition against marital status
discrimination did indeed include protection for unmarried
couples, the Donahue court also relied on several other extrinsic
aids: a related provision in the FEHA and the interpretation of
similar provisions from other jurisdictions,05 California's lack of
criminal sanctions for cohabitation,306 and certain rules of statutory
construction.3° The FEHA prohibited marital status discrimina-
tion against any "person" and defined "person" to include "one or
more individuals. ' 308 The Alaska Supreme Court in Foreman,309
299. Id4 at 36.
300. Id.
301. Id
302. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36-37.
303. Id, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37.
304. Id
305. Id
306. Id. at 38.
307. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
308. Id. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12955(a), 12925(d). Courts in analyzing the
meaning of "marital status," as it applies to unmarried couples, often deal as well with
definitions and/or interpretations of the terms "person" and "family." For the latter,
see, e.g., Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrim., 547
N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1989); Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt
Homes, Inc., 475 A.2d 1192 (Md. 1984); Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 415 N.E.2d
234 (N.Y. 1983). For the former, see, e.g., McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d
146 (Wash. 1980); Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 301 A.2d 754 (Wash.
1973); Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989).
DISCRIMINATION-FREE HOUSING
interpreting identical statutory language, concluded that marital
status discrimination included discrimination against two individu-
als such as an unmarried couple.3 10 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Worcester Housing Authority v. Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination11 found protection for an un-
married couple in the state's statute describing the protected class
of persons in both singular and plural terms.312 Based upon these
analogies, the Donahue court found that the similarly worded pro-
vision in the FEHA compelled the same conclusion in California.
The Donahue court noted that not only had California never
prohibited cohabitation by unmarried couples, but even the pro-
scription on adulterous cohabitation had been repealed fifteen
years earlier, at the same time the legislature added marital status
as a prohibited basis for housing discrimination. Therefore, "no
state statute outlawing cohabitation or fornication exists to under-
mine a finding of the legislative intent to prohibit housing discrimi-
nation against unmarried couples. '31 3
In its relentless pursuit of the true meaning of a phrase whose
plain meaning had been determined fifteen years earlier, the Don-
ahue court next turned to rules of statutory construction. The
court then stated a truism that it would totally disregard several
pages later: "When a statute contains an exception to a general
rule, no other exception should be implied. '31 4 In the FEHA, the
legislature specifically exempted from the proscription against mar-
ital status discrimination the narrow category of college and uni-
versity housing for "married students."315 Therefore, the court
inferred that the general reference in the FEHA to "marital status"
included all single people and all other couples whether married or
not.
316
309. 779 P.2d 1199.
310. Id at 1201-02.
311. 547 N.E.2d 43.
312. Id at 45.
313. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38. The court thus distinguishes the Donahue case from
French, 460 N.W.2d 2 and McFadden, 613 P.2d 146, where the respective courts had
relied on such criminal statutes to decide that unmarried couples should not be pro-
tected from housing discrimination. Of course, the mere presence of such a statute
does not mandate a finding that unmarried couples should not be protected. For a
refreshing perspective on the relevance of such statutes in the real world, see Fore-
man, 779 P.2d 1199.
314. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38. See infra part II.A.1. for discussion of the court's subse-
quent abandonment of this principle.
315. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12995(b) (West 1994).
316. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
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The court's last point on the issue of "marital status" addressed
an argument by the Donahues that because they did rent to some
single people (other than unmarried couples), they were not guilty
of discrimination. The court said that even if the landlords did not
discriminate against all single persons, that did not preclude a con-
clusion that they discriminated against some single persons.31 7
In Evelyn Smith,318 the California Supreme Court, relying on
Atkisson and Hess (but without mentioning Donahue),31 9 simply
stated that "marital status" includes unmarried couples. 320 Thus, it
appears to be well-settled in California that the prohibition on
"marital status" discrimination does protect unmarried couples.
(2) Massachusetts
Massachusetts also interprets "marital status" to include protec-
tion for unmarried couples. In Worcester Housing Authority,321 the
public housing authority denied benefits to three unmarried
couples (and their respective children) because none of the three
couples met the authority's narrow definition of "family" as "two
or more persons.., who are related by blood, marriage, or opera-
tion of law." 32 Although the statute prohibited refusing to rent to
"any person or group of persons.., because of... the marital
status of such person or persons," 323 the authority argued that the
term "marital status" should protect only divorced and single indi-
viduals. The court relied on the "reasonably straightforward," "un-
ambiguous" language of the statute, which twice referred to the
protected class in both singular and plural terms, to hold that the
statute prohibited discrimination against unmarried couples.3u
The court emphasized that words should be given their ordinary
meaning and that the court should not resort to intrinsic aids to
317. Id
318. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395.
319. The California Supreme Court initially granted review in Donahue on Febru-
ary 27, 1992, 825 P.2d 766 (1992), which vacated the Court of Appeal decision; but
after the case was completely briefed and awaiting oral argument, the Supreme Court
dismissed review as "improvidently granted," pursuant to California Rules of Court
rule 29.4(c), and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal, 859 P.2d 671 (1993),
without ordering the Court of Appeal decision republished. Therefore, although the
Court of Appeal opinion remains intact as to the parties, it cannot be cited as prece-
dent unless and until it is ordered republished by the California Supreme Court.
320. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403.
321. 547 N.E.2d. 43.





interpret legislation when the ordinary meaning of the words pro-
duces a workable result consistent with stated public policy.3 25
(3) Alaska
The Alaska Supreme Court has held twice that the prohibition
against discriinination based on marital status protects unmarried
couples. In Foreman,32 6 the court looked to "precedent, reason
and policy" as well as the "ordinary and common meaning" of the
words to determine the meaning of "marital status. ' 327 The policy
of the antidiscrimination statute was to eliminate and prevent
housing discrimination. The language of the statute defined "per-
son" to include "one or more individuals." It would have been
"manifestly unreasonable" to limit the effect of a modem remedial
statute by reference to an outdated anticohabitation statute that
had been repealed eleven years earlier. As such, the term "marital
status" did include protection for unmarried couples, and the land-
lord's conduct constituted unlawful discrimination based on marital
status.3,8
In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,329 the court
adopted the reasoning and the holding of Foreman in rejecting the
landlord's claim that he did not unlawfully discriminate because he
rented to both singles and married couples, but not to unmarried
couples. The Swanner court reasoned that "[b]ecause Swanner
would have rented the properties to the couples had they been
married, and he refused to rent the property only after he learned
that they were not, Swanner unlawfully discriminated on the basis
of marital status. 330
b. "Marital Status" Does Not Include Unmarried Couples
(1) Maryland
In Maryland, the courts have held that marital status does not
include protection for unmarried couples. In Prince George's
County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.,331 a housing cooperative, by nar-
rowly defining "family," excluded all unmarried couples from joint
325. lId
326. 779 P.2d 1199.
327. Id. at 1201.
328. Id. at 1203.
329. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
330. Id. at 278.
331. 431 A.2d 745.
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membership. The cooperative's policy was challenged by the
county's human relations commission for violating the local an-
tidiscrimination ordinance. In an opinion that demonstrates troub-
ling insensitivity toward those whom the Maryland legislature may
well have meant to protect, the court addressed definitions of both
"marital status" and "family. ' 332 The court's bias results in a
strained, unrealistic definition of "marital status": "[N]either com-
plainant was denied membership individually because of his or her
individual marital status. While each separately had a marital sta-
tus, collectively they did not. '333 The court justified its decision on
the basis of a public policy favoring marriage.334
Subsequently, the Maryland court rejected the commission's
broad definition of "family" and agreed with what it perceived as
the "commonly accepted" definition of family as requiring a mari-
tal or blood relationship.335 The court appeared to congratulate
Greenbelt Homes for refusing to treat the unmarried couple as
married, or, as the court said, for refusing "to acknowledge that the
naked emperor was wearing clothes. ' 336 Considering this court's
dogged nineteenth century view of the realities of life in the latter
part of the twentieth century, it is surprising that the court cannot
see the application of that fable to itself.337
332. The opinion, a model of sarcasm and moral superiority, directs its barbs not
only at the unmarried couple, but also at the Human Rights Commission and the
legislature that created it: "Reluctant to plunge into the sea of matrimony, John
Hemphill and Lynn Bradley were nonetheless eager to settle upon its shores," id. at
746; "to their chagrin, they were denied membership because they were not married,
[a]ccording to their precipitous complaint to the Human Relations Commission," id.;
"anxious to fulfill its destiny as destroyer of discrimination, the Commission made
ready to do battle, apparently to provide surcease for the sensitivities of those whom
they elept 'complainants.'" Id.
333. ld. at 747-48.
334. Id. at 748. The court stated that
[t]he law of Maryland does not recognize common law marriage or other
unions of two or more persons .... Such relationships are simple, illegiti-
mate unions unrecognized, or in some instances condemned by the law.
That public policy message rings out from the procedural prerequisites for
legitimating "marriages," and the statutory condemnation of other relation-
ships.... Even contemporary discrimination laws are not intended to pro-
mulgate promiscuity by favoring relationships unrecognized by statute or
case law as having legal status.
Id.
335. See id
336. 431 A.2d at 748.
337. One commentator described the rationale employed by the Maryland courts
(that couples do not have a marital status) as seeming "to owe more to Lewis Carroll
or Joseph Heller than to Holmes or Frankfurter." Peter B. Bayer, Rationality-and
760
DISCRIMINATION-FREE HO USING
Three years after Prince George's County, Greenbelt Homes was
back in court on the same issues, this time litigating with the state
commission on human rights about the meaning of the state an-
tidiscrimination statute. In Maryland Commission on Human
Rights v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.,338 the court found the language of
the statute "clear and unambiguous" and meaning "precisely what
it says: no person shall be discriminated against in regard to hous-
ing because of that person's marital status. As we see it, 'marital
status' connotes whether one is married or not married. '339 The
fact that the female resident was not married to her male compan-
ion but had they been married there would have been no violation
of the regulation and both would have been allowed to stay was,
for this court, irrelevant. There would have been a violation if, in-
stead of her male companion, he had been her "best girl friend, her
favored aunt, her destitute cousin, or her infant nephew. '340 The
prohibition was on all persons who were not members of the resi-
dent's "immediate family," not only on those to whom the resident
was not married. The court relied on both the holding and the rea-
soning of Prince George's County,3 1 particularly the public policy
"to promote rather than denigrate the institution of marriage."' ' 2
The court buttressed its holding that unmarried couples were not
protected under the prohibition against marital status discrimina-
tion by looking to similar cases from other jurisdictions, particu-
larly the New York case of Hudson View Properties v. Weiss. 343
The dissenting judge in the Maryland Commission case agreed
that the language of the Maryland Code was "clear and unambigu-
the Irrational Underinclusiveness of the Civil Rights Laws, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1,
94 n.293 (1988).
338. 475 A.2d 1192.
339. Id. at 1196.
340. i
341. 431 A.2d 745.
342. Maryland Comm'n, 475 A.2d at 1197. The courts that do not find protection
for unmarried couples in a prohibition on marital status discrimination generally per-
ceive the choice as an "either-or" proposition. In their view, apparently a policy
favoring the institution of marriage cannot coedst with protection for unmarried
couples. Yet they seem to encounter no such logical infirmity in protecting the rights
of single individuals, while simultaneously recognizing and affirming a policy favoring
marriage, apparently even if the individuals who are single have chosen that state as
preferable to marriage. One suspects the true objection is moral and not logical. Per-
sons who have chosen to remain single, although their choice may well be based upon
a rejection of the state's preference for marriage, simply do not engender moral um-
brage in the same way as those who have rejected the state's preference for marriage
and have chosen to "live in sin."
343. 450 N.E.2d 234. See infra part fl.C.3.c.(2) for discussion of the case.
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ous" and meant "precisely what it says," and agreed that the term
"marital status" connotes whether one is married or not.344 On
those "facts," however, the dissent came to the opposite conclu-
sion: that the resident was discriminated against with regard to
housing because of her marital status. The dissenting judge stated:
Here the record shows that ... Kuhr [the resident] ... was
entitled, without Greenbelt approval, to reside in a Greenbelt
housing unit with [her male companion,] Searight, if she was
married to him. Kuhr, however, was not entitled, without
Greenbelt approval, to reside in a Greenbelt housing unit with
Searight if she was not married to him. Manifestly,... Kuhr's
right to reside in a Greenbelt housing unit with Searight de-
pended upon whether she was "married or not married," and
therefore, depended on her "marital status."345
(2) Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Cooper v. French346 found the
meaning of "marital status" in the Minnesota Human Rights Act
ambiguous. Purportedly based upon public policy, legislative in-
tent and previous decisions of the Minnesota courts,347 the court
opted for the meaning that excluded unmarried cohabitants. The
court found that the legislature's policy was to discourage fornica-
tion and protect the institution of marriage. This was evidenced by
the existence of an antifornication statute in Minnesota, notwith-
standing the facts that there had been no convictions under the
statute for sixty-three years (and only two prior to that), and that
the legislature had added "marital status" as a prohibited basis for
discrimination as recently as 1973.3"8 The majority also found more
persuasive legislative intent in the legislature's failure to repeal the
antifornication statute than in the legislature's express guidelines
for interpreting the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The guidelines
stated that the Act was to "be construed liberally for the accom-
plishment of [its] purposes, which include securing for persons in
this state, freedom from discrimination.., in housing. '' 49
The court in French relied as much on previous decisions from
other jurisdictions as on Minnesota decisions, perhaps because the
344. 475 A.2d at 1198 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
345. Id. The dissent also cited similar cases from other jurisdictions, including
Atkisson, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, and Hess, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712.
346. 460 N.W.2d 2.
347. Id at 5.
348. L at 5, 19.
349. Id at 12.
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court reached a conclusion at odds with Minnesota precedent. Mc-
Clure v. Sports & Health Club,350 a Minnesota Supreme Court deci-
sion that addressed the issue of marital status discrimination under
the Human Rights Act in the context of a claim of free exercise of
religion, seems to be more factually and legally relevant (perhaps
even controlling) to the French case than Mister v. A.R.K. Partner-
ship,351 an Illinois appellate court decision. The French court relied
on the Illinois decision for its holding that the prohibition against
marital status discrimination did not protect unmarried couples.5 2
In advocating for the inclusion of unmarried couples in the pro-
tections of the Minnesota Human Rights Act's prohibition on mar-
ital status discrimination, the dissent in French made a much more
convincing case than the majority. Citing the recent statement of
public policy and the more relevant legislative intent behind the
Human Rights Act (liberal construction to eradicate discrimina-
tion), the dissent asserted that unmarried couples should be pro-
tected. Moreover, recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases, rather
than those of intermediate courts in other jurisdictions, supported
this conclusion. 5 3 But despite McClure (which French did not
overrule, but attempted to distinguish), it appears that Minnesota
has adopted the position that does not include protection for
unmarried couples in its definition of "marital status"
discrimination.354
350. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985). Although McClure involved the clash of free
exercise of religion claims and the prohibition against marital status discrimination in
the context of employment rather than housing, the case is clearly on point. The Min-
nesota Human Rights Act, like California's FEHA, prohibited marital status discrimi-
nation in the context of employment or housing. See Minnesota Human Rights Act,
MmN,. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-.15 (1991).
351. 553 N.E.2d 1152.
352. The French Court also relied on Foreman, 779 P.2d 1199, for the proposition
that the state cannot impose sanctions on a landlord who discriminates against unmar-
ried couples unless the state first repeals its antifornication law. The court misread
Foreman when it said that Foreman "relied entirely on the fact that Alaska's antiforni-
cation statute had been repealed eleven years earlier in concluding that protection for
unmarried, cohabiting couples was included." French, 460 N.W.2d at 7. Rather, Fore-
man relied heavily on the fact that the antifomication statute was completely outmo-
ded and not at all a reflection of current society, an observation that the French court
conveniently ignored.
353. French, 460 N.W.2d at 11-21. The dissent relied on the same line of Minnesota
cases that the Court of Appeals did in its decision in French, which was reversed by
the Minnesota Supreme Court. Id
354. Based on French, the Minnesota Supreme Court's most recent pronounce-
ment, Minnesota is on this side of the unmarried cohabitation issue for now. But
because of McClure, the fact that French was a split decision (with four justices in the
majority and three dissenting), and the fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court has
replaced several members since the French case was decided, there is hope that Min-
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(3) Wisconsin
Like French, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dane County v.
Norman,355 in a four-to-three decision, reversed a lower court rul-
ing that the landlord had discriminated on the basis of marital sta-
tus by refusing to rent to unmarried persons who intended to live
together. Unlike French, however, Norman did not involve an un-
married couple. Instead, Norman refused to rent to two different
groups of potential tenants, 56 simply because the groups were un-
related individuals seeking to live together. The court found no
violation of the marital status provision of the county ordinance
because "living together is 'conduct' not status." 357 This decision is
disturbing for two reasons. First, the ordinance in question prohib-
ited housing discrimination based on "marital status" and defined
marital status as "being married, divorced, widowed, separated,
single, or a cohabitant. '358 Second, the court completely invali-
dated the provision protecting cohabitants and then based its deci-
sion on Wisconsin's policy of encouraging and protecting
marriage. 59
The dissent aptly described the unreal quality of the majority de-
cision: "[T]oday's holding defies legal examination and legislative
resolve alike. ' 360 The dissent also noted a common fallacy in the
decisions that reject protecting unmarried couples because of a
state policy supporting marriage; just because the state supports
nesota may use another case in the future to reverse the French decision. See Pat
Doyle, Rent Rule Deplored- Decision Allows Landlords to Reject Couples Not Mar-
ried, MMnm.-Sr. PAUL STAR TRIB., Sept. 6, 1990, at lB. This journalist also described
Minnesota's antifornication law, upon which French relied to deny protection to un-
married couples, as "seldom enforced and often ridiculed." Id
355. 497 N.W.2d 714.
356. One group consisted of three single women and the other group consisted of
two single women and one of the women's two children.
357. 497 N.W.2d at 714.
358. Id at 715 (quoting Chapter 31.03(5) of Dane County Ordinances, "Fair
Housing").
359. Id at 716. The court found the county ordinance outside the enabling author-
ity granted to the municipality by the state legislature. See id Wisconsin had re-
pealed its antifornication statute ten years before this decision, see id. at 720 n.4, so
the majority relied on (or misinterpreted, according to the dissent) policy statements
in Wisconsin's Family Law Act to support its decision. See id at 716-17, and id. at 720
(Heffernan, C. J., dissenting). The serious ramifications of the court's decision that a
landlord need not rent to unrelated individuals become clear when one realizes that
Dane County is both the seat of the state government and the site of the state's larg-
est university campus, both institutions attracting large numbers of young, single peo-
ple for whom rent sharing may well be the only way of obtaining affordable housing.
See id at 719 (Heffernan, CJ., dissenting).
360. Id at 718 (Heffernan, C. J., dissenting).
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marriage in some manner does not mean that the state advocates
marriage to the exclusion of all other relationships. 61 It is neither
logically nor legally inconsistent for the state, on the one hand, to
support marriage as a stabilizing institution in society and, on the
other, to recognize the compound evils of discrimination and lack
of affordable housing as amply justifying prohibiting marital status
discrimination.
c. "Marital Status" May or May Not Include Unmarried Couples
(1) New Jersey
In New Jersey, it appears that the term "marital status" includes
protection for unmarried couples. Although there are no decisions
directly on point, in Kurman v. Fairmount Realty Corporation,362 a
decision by the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights, an administra-
tive law judge held that a refusal to rent an apartment to an unmar-
ried couple violated the prohibition on marital status
discrimination in housing. The judge saw little connection between
antifornication statutes and the term "marital status" as used in a
remedial statute that was to be construed liberally in order to "in-
sure that its salutary purposes are to be faithfully carried out. 363
New Jersey's probable position in favor of protecting unmarried
couples from marital status discrimination is supported further by
Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency,364 where the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that a landlord who refused to rent to
two single women violated the state's prohibitions against housing
discrimination based on sex and on marital status. The landlord
argued that refusing to rent to one single unmarried woman would
be discrimination, but refusing to rent to two single unmarried wo-
men was not. The court rejected the argument because the statute
prohibited discrimination against any "person or group of persons"
because of sex or marital status.365
(2) New York
In New York it appears that the term marital status will not pro-
tect unmarried couples from housing discrimination. In Weiss,366
361. I
362. 8 NJ. Admin. 110.
363. Id at 115.
364. 301 A.2d 754.
365. Id at 757.
366. 450 N.E.2d 234.
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the Court of Appeals, in a very brief opinion, held that a landlord
did not discriminate against a tenant on the basis of marital status
when the landlord sought to evict the tenant for allowing another
person who was not part of her "immediate family" to live with
her. Relying on one of its earlier employment discrimination deci-
sions, 367 but in language reminiscent of Maryland Commission,368
the court found that the discrimination was based not upon the
tenant's marital status, but upon her relationship. This relationship
was not a prohibited basis for discrimination under the New York
state human rights law.3 69 Based upon Weiss, it appears that New
York does not include protection for unmarried couples in the pro-
hibition on marital status discrimination.
Six years after Weiss, however, the Court of Appeals decided
Braschi v. Stahl Associates,370 and construed the term "family" in
the rent control ordinance very broadly so as to prevent the evic-
tion of the gay life partner of a tenant in a rent controlled apart-
ment. The court rejected the landlord's narrow, traditional
definition of "family" in view of the remedial purpose of the
statute.7
The intended protection should not rest on fictitious legal dis-
tinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its founda-
tion in the reality of family life .... A more realistic and
certainly equally valid view of a family includes two adult life-
time partners whose relationship is long term and characterized
by an emotional and financial commitment and interdepen-
dence. This view comports both with our society's traditional
concept of "family" and with the expectations of individuals
who live in such nuclear units.3
367. Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 415
N.E.2d 950 (N.Y. 1980).
368. 475 A.2d 1192, 1196. "Were the additional tenant a female unrelated to the
tenant, the lease would be violated without reference to marriage. The fact that the
additional tenant here involved is a man with whom the tenant had a loving relation-
ship is simply irrelevant. The applicability of that restriction does not depend on her
marital status." Weiss, 450 N.E.2d at 235.
369. Weiss, 450 N.E.2d at 235. In response to the reactionary decision in Weiss, the
New York Legislature in 1983 enacted the "roommate" law, codified at Naw YoRK
REAL PROPERTY LAW § 235- (McKinney 1983), which granted rights to persons liv-
ing with but unrelated to the tenant of record.
370. 543 N.E.2d 49.
371. The court in Braschi found that Weiss was not controlling, because no one
even argued that the male occupant of the apartment in Weiss was part of the resi-
dent's "family." Id at 53.
372. Id. at 53-54.
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One wonders if Weiss might have been decided differently if in-
stead of 1983,; it had been decided in 1989 by the same judges who
decided Braschi.373
(3) Illinois
The Illinois Appellate Court in Mister 74 held that the prohibi-
tion against discrimination based on marital status in the state
Human Rights Act did not include protection for an unmarried
couple. The Human Rights Act defined "marital status" as "the
legal status of being married, single, separated, divorced, or wid-
owed. ' 375 The court found the term "marital status" ambiguous as
it related to unmarried couples, and looked to the public policy
embodied in the Illinois statute prohibiting "open and notorious
fornication" and the Illinois legislature's renouncement of common
law marriages.376 Although mere cohabitation was no longer a
crime in Illinois, the court found that when unmarried couples seek
to rent apartments, that behavior alone makes their cohabitation
"open and notorious" and thus criminal under the Illinois
antifornication statute.377 In order to further what the court per-
ceived as the legislature's "clear expression of a policy disfavoring
private alternatives to marriage," the court felt compelled to deny
protection to unmarried couples from marital status
discrimination.
(4) Washington
Within a two-year period, two different appellate courts in Wash-
ington State addressed the issue of marital status discrimination
373. See also Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights, 481 N.Y.S.2d 858 (lower
court in New York found condominium association guilty of discrimination based on
marital status for refusal to sell to two single female roommates).
374. 553 N.E.2d 1152. Defendant landlords asserted that the basis for their refusal
to rent to an unmarried couple was their religious belief that unmarried cohabitation
is immoral, but as there was nothing in the record concerning defendants' religious
beliefs the court did not address that issue. See id. at 1154.
375. IU at 1156.
376. Id at 1157. The court acknowledged that the antifornication statute had fallen
into disuse-the last conviction was in 1916-but the court found that the statute still
expressed the policy of the state against open and notorious nonmarital cohabitation.
Id.
377. Id at 1157-58.
378. Id at 1158. The Mister court distinguished an earlier Illinois appellate court
case, Wolinsky v. Kadison, 449 N.E.2d 151, where the court addressed the issue of
marital status discrimination, but under a municipal ordinance against a plaintiff who
was not cohabiting with a member of the opposite sex.
1995]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
and reached opposite results. In Loveland v. Leslie,379 landlords
challenged the state law prohibition against marital status discrimi-
nation as unconstitutionally yague because the meaning of "marital
status" was unclear. The court rejected the challenge, stating that
"persons of normal intelligence commonly relate the term 'marital
status' to the existence or absence of a marriage bond. We hold the
statute provides fair notice that discrimination based solely on the
absence or existence of a marital relationship is prohibited. '380
Although Loveland involved two roommates of the same sex, it is
clear that the court's definition of "marital status" would provide
protection for an unmarried couple as well.
Yet, in McFadden v. Elma Country Club,8 l the Washington
Court of Appeals held that the state fair housing law prohibiting
marital status discrimination did not protect an unmarried couple
denied membership and the opportunity to purchase country club
property. Although the state had repealed its anticohabitation
statute some years earlier, the court found that the overlapping
existence for three years of the anticohabitation statute and the fair
housing law's prohibition on marital status discrimination vitiated
any argument that the legislature intended marital status discrimi-
nation to include protection for unmarried couples. 38 The court
also found protection for unmarried couples inconsistent with the
statutory language prohibiting discrimination against a "person. "383
Although the court grudgingly admitted that unmarried cohabita-
tion "appears to be more widely tolerated than in the past,""s the
court could perceive no public policy or other reason for the court
to indulge in such toleration and protect that type of living
arrangement.
It is apparent that courts that want to deny to unmarried couples
protection against housing discrimination have used numerous de-
vices to do so. By finding ambiguity in the term "marital status" as
used in the antidiscrimination statute, the courts have taken advan-
tage of the opportunity to define narrowly not only "marital sta-
379. 583 P.2d 664.
380. Id. at 666.
381. 613 P.2d 146.
382. Id. at 150.
383. Id. at 151. The court also distinguished employment discrimination cases that
had defined marital status broadly. Unlike in the employment context, in McFadden
the court found no discrimination against the country club applicant based on the
identity of her companion or based on either party's individual marital status, but
rather on their "joint living arrangement." Id.
384. Id. at 152.
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tus" but often "family" and "person" as well. Many of the
resulting definitions are strained and unrealistic and, one suspects,
custom crafted to achieve the particular result.
Courts wishing to deny protection to unmarried couples have
also routinely relied on outdated antifornication or anticohabita-
tion statutes that have not been enforced in decades and may well
be of dubious constitutionality. 385 As they are technically still "on
the books," however, the courts have not hesitated to dig these
statutes out of the mothballs and resurrect them as an expression
of the state's "public policy," while conveniently ignoring much
more recent, relevant statements of the state's public policy as re-
flected in the antidiscrimination statutes. The use of strained defi-
nitions and obsolete statutes creates an air of unreality in the
decisions, as if they were made in a cultural and societal vacuum.
Yet, the use of these devices demonstrates how far some courts are
willing to stretch to deny the protection of the antidiscrimination
laws to those the laws were probably intended to protect. The
shortsighted results in these cases illustrate the need for greater
protection of unmarried couples from housing discrimination. The
statistical evidence of a growing trend, on the other hand, demon-
strates the justification for greater protection of unmarried couples
from housing discrimination.
III. Interaction of Landlord's Free Exercise Claim and Tenant's
Right to Discrimination-Free Rental Housing
A. Landlord Discrimination Cases
The fair housing laws can and must be applied constitutionally.
Courts in California, Alaska, Minnesota and Massachusetts have
addressed the precise issue of an individual landlord who refused
to rent to an unmarried couple, claiming a free exercise exemption
from the state's prohibition against marital status discrimination
based on the landlord's alleged religious belief that unmarried co-
habitation is sinful.3  One expects that there will be many more of
385. See infra part I.C.2.
386. TWo different appellate courts in California have ruled on the issue. Donahue
v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 [reprinted without
change to permit tracking pending review by California Supreme Court; originally
printed at 1 Cal. App. 4th 387], review granted (and opinion superseded), 825 P.2d 766
(Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993). The
above suggests Donahue's rather tortured history. After the Court of Appeal deci-
sion in November 1991, the California Supreme Court (all seven Justices concurring)
granted review in February 1992. A year and a half later, in September 1993, after the
case was fully briefed and awaiting oral argument, the California Supreme Court, in a
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these cases in the future, particularly if courts are inclined to pro-
.vide such a tempting opportunity for landlords, property owners,
property managers, real estate agencies and others who are gener-
ally opposed to fair housing laws or who would be inclined to
discriminate.
five-two decision, abruptly and without explanation (other than citing California
Rules of Court Rule 29.4(c), which permits the court to dismiss if review was "im-
providently granted"), dismissed review and remanded the case to the Court of Ap-
peal without ordering the lower court decision republished. The decision to dismiss
review as "improvidently granted" after all seven Justices had voted to hear the case
came as a surprise to everyone, including all the attorneys involved in the case. Spec-
ulation as to why the court suddenly reversed direction ran the gamut from probably
"unable to muster a majority" to "politically hot." See Philip Carrizosa, Justices Drop
Key Housing Bias Appeal, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 4, 1993, at 1. For the remainder of this
Article, this case will be referred to as simply Donahue. The Court of Appeal deci-
sion is binding between the parties, but because the California Supreme Court did not
order it republished, it cannot be cited as legal precedent.
The second California case is Evelyn Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395. Petition for Re-
view was granted by the California Supreme Court on September 8, 1994. In another
mysterious development, on June 28, 1994, the California Attorney General's office,
which had aggressively represented the FEHC throughout the litigation in Donahue
and for the five years Evelyn Smith had been working its way through the courts,
abruptly withdrew from the Evelyn Smith case. The official explanation from the At-
torney General's office was that the Attorney General had concluded that Evelyn
Smith was correct "as a matter of law," despite the fact that the Attorney General is
charged with defending state agencies and state laws against constitutional attack.
Once again, speculation was that the true motive was political rather than legal: At-
torney General Dan Lundgren was running for reelection in November and the suspi-
cion was that this was "a political decision by Lundgren to appease the religious right
and stimulate contributions for his November election." The attorneys in the Attor-
ney General's office who had been most actively involved in Donahue and Evelyn
Smith declined to comment on the move. Hallye Jordan, Attorney General Bows Out
of Rental Discrimination Action, L.A. DAILY J., July 11, 1994, at 3.
The other three cases are: Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233; Swanner, 874 P.2d 274; and
French, 460 N.W.2d 2.
Two additional cases are occasionally cited in connection with this issue, Dane
County v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714 (1993), and Mister, 553 N.E.2d 1152, but neither
addresses the entire issue. In Mister, the landlord's policy against renting to unmar-
ried couples was apparently based on his religious belief that cohabitation was a sin,
but because there was nothing in the record about religious beliefs, the court did not
address his free exercise rights. In Norman, the landlord refused to rent to two differ-
ent groups of unrelated individuals, one group of three single women and the other of
two single women and two children. Although there was no suggestion of homosexu-
ality and thus no "cohabitation" issue in the usual sense of the word, the landlord
claimed he refused to rent to two or more unrelated persons because to do so would
violate his Roman Catholic faith. See Jerry DeMuth, Court Backs Landlords on Re-
fiusaL Justices Rule Owners Don't Have to Rent to Unrelated Applicants, WASH. POST,
May 1, 1993, at F-1. That claim and the court's acceptance of it defies law, logic and
theology. Nonetheless, the court did not address any free exercise rights the landlord
might have.
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These cases present most of the same difficulties that generally
plague all constitutionally compelled free exercise exemption cases
and that apparently have caused the United States Supreme Court
to retreat significantly from the Pandora's box it opened with Sher-
bert and Yoder.3 s The nature of the free exercise exemption at
issue in these cases, however, is sufficiently distinct from that in
other free exercise cases. As such, this type of case warrants a gen-
eral policy that no individual free exercise exemptions should be
granted by the courts. If exemptions to the antidiscrimination laws
are justifiable at all, they should be granted only by the legislature
and then only to religious institutions and on very narrow, well-
defined grounds. Otherwise, complete evisceration of the antidis-
crimination laws may result. Although these landlord discrimina-
tion cases addressed specifically marital status discrimination
against unmarried couples in the context of housing, there is no
principled or effective way to limit the exemptions that would be
sought from laws prohibiting discrimination on other bases, such as
race or sex or religion, or in other contexts, such as employment or
education.
A general policy against individual exemptions can be justified
on the following grounds: (1) there is a compelling state interest in
preventing and eradicating discrimination generally, which includes
marital status discrimination against unmarried couples in the con-
text of housing; (2) this type of exemption always results in direct
harm to individuals who are members of the group the statute was
designed specifically to protect; (3) the exemption causes substan-
tial harm to society as well; (4) the "burden" on the claimant's free
exercise, if it exists at all, is extremely slight and self-imposed; and
(5) there is simply no principled or effective way to dispense and
administer such individual exemptions. After a discussion of the
five cases that have addressed this issue, each of these justifications
will be examined in detail.
1. California
a. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission
Landlords John and Agnes Donahue refused to rent an apart-
ment in their multi-unit building to Verna Terry and Robert Wil-
der, an unmarried heterosexual couple, after they questioned Terry
and Wilder and discovered they were not married. The California
Fair Employment and Housing Commission (FEHC) found the
387. See discussion supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
1995]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXII
Donahues guilty of unlawful marital status discrimination in viola-
tion of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Although
the Donahues had rented to an unmarried couple in the past and
regularly rented to singles* and married couples, the Donahues
claimed an exemption from the provisions of the FEHA based
upon their sincere religious (Roman Catholic) beliefs that fornica-
tion is a sin and that it would be sinful for them to aid another in
the commission of a sin. On appeal, the court held that the
Donahues' refusal to rent to the unmarried couple indeed violated
the FEHA prohibition on marital status discrimination. The court
held that the Donahues were, nevertheless, entitled to an exemp-
tion from the FEHA because the state's interest in protecting co-
habiting couples from discrimination was not such a paramount
and compelling state interest as to outweigh the Donahues' legiti-
mate assertion of their right to the free exercise of religion.3 M
Based upon twenty years of California law, the court rejected the
Donahues' argument that the prohibition on marital status discrim-
ination did not include unmarried couples. 389 The court accepted
without question that the Donahues' beliefs were religious and sin-
cere.390 The court acknowledged that the analysis of a free exercise
claim is generally similar under federal and state constitutional law.
The court also noted the apparent departure of Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith391 from the Supreme Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence and declined to apply Employment Division v. Smith,
opting instead for a balancing test/compelling interest analysis392
that provided the Donahues with a free exercise exemption from
the antidiscrimination law.
The FEHC proposed that the court, if it chose to weigh the
state's interest against that of the Donahues, balance the absence
of any religious belief required or furthered by the Donahues' con-
duct as landlords against the compelling governmental interest in
eradicating invidious discrimination. The court rejected the
388. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33.
389. See supra part II.C.3.a.(l).
390. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
391. 494 U.S. 872. See supra part I.C.
392. One of the California Supreme Court's more recent iterations of the compel-
ling state interest test was in Molko v. Holy Spirit Assoc., 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989). The Donahue majority's perception that Molko was
based on independent state constitutional grounds, as well as on federal constitutional
law, was disputed by the dissent, who would have decided Donahue on the basis of
Employment Division v. Smith.
772
DISCRIMINATION-FREE HO USING
FEHC's proposal and found no conduct by the Donahues that
would work to impose their religious beliefs on their tenants:
An exemption in the present case would not impose religious
beliefs on others, who are entitled to the same religious free-
dom. The Donahues do not require their tenants to adhere to
any religious beliefs. The Donahues simply do not rent to un-
married cohabiting couples because to do so would compromise
their own religious beliefs.393
The court characterized the FEHC's approach as "miss[ing] the
mark" and as utilizing "strained reasoning. '394
The same description more accurately describes the court's rea-
soning. Although the Donahues do not actually require their ten-
ants to "adhere" to any religious beliefs, they certainly require
their tenants, if they wish to rent from the Donahues, to act as if
they adhere to the Donahues' religious beliefs. If the tenants are
unwilling to conform their conduct to the Donahues' religious be-
liefs, the Donahues simply will not rent to them. That policy is
tantamount to the imposition of the Donahues' religious beliefs on
their tenants.
The court characterized the burden on the Donahues' religious
beliefs as the choice between adhering to their religion by refusing
to rent or modifying their behavior to comply with the fair housing
law. The court minimized the fact that the Donahues were operat-
ing in a commercial context, even though that is precisely the con-
text at which all fair housing and employment laws are directed.
Moreover, the court completely ignored both the availability to the
Donahues of a method of completely avoiding the burden on their
religion and the far greater burden the exemption placed on the
victims of the Donahues' discrimination, the would-be tenants.
The court dismissed with virtually no discussion the tenants' consti-
tutional right to privacy.395
Although the statement of public policy in the FEHA suggests
that there is a compelling governmental interest in providing dis-
crimination-free housing generally, the court defined the state in-
terest as narrowly as possible-an interest in prohibiting marital
status discrimination against unmarried couples-and found that
such an interest, when viewed within a hierarchy of state interests,
393. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 41.
394. Id
395. Id at 43.
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"simply does not rank very high.''396 The court justified its dim
view of the importance of preventing discrimination against un-
married couples by listing other contexts in which unmarried
couples are treated differently from married couples, examples, ac-
cording to the court, of the "disfavored" legal status of cohabita-
tion without marriage. Despite a grudging acknowledgement of
the law's recognition of the societal trend toward cohabitation, the
court could perceive no affirmative promotion of cohabitation as a
matter of governmental policy and thus no compelling need for
protecting unmarried couples.3 97
The dissent in Donahue disagreed both with the compelling gov-
ernmental interest standard applied by the majority and with the
result.398 Besides perceiving the state's interest in broader terms-
access to housing free from unwarranted discrimination-and thus
compelling, the dissent also found the majority's "picking and
choosing" among the categories of prohibited discrimination inap-
propriate, and the burden on the Donahues' religion slight.399
b. Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission
Evelyn Smith, a Presbyterian, owned a duplex that she refused
to rent to Kenneth Phillips and Gail Randall, an unmarried couple,
because of her religious belief not only that fornication is a sin, but
that "contributing" to the sin of another is also a sin.400 The FEHC
found Evelyn Smith violated the fair housing law's prohibition on
marital status discrimination, and Evelyn Smith petitioned for a
writ of mandate. A different California appellate court held that
although landlord Evelyn Smith violated the provision of the
FEHA prohibiting marital status discrimination against unmarried
couples, she was entitled to an exemption based on her rights to
396. Id at 44. The court either overlooks or ignores the fact that if one can just
characterize the state interest sufficiently narrowly, the state interest ipso facto will
never be compelling.
397. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44-45.
398. Id at 46-49 (Grignon, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice would have found
that the Donahues were not entitled to an exemption even under the compelling state
interest standard. Id at 49.
399. Id Because the dissent perceived or characterized both the state's interest
and the burden on the Donahues' religious exercise differently from the majority's
characterization, the balance tilts the other way, illustrating once again how easily the
elements of the compelling state interest test can be manipulated by either side in an
exemption case and why, once again, the test can never be depended upon to produce
fair results.
400. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397.
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the free exercise of religion under both the federal and state
constitutions.
The court's initial phrasing of the issue suggests the outcome of
the case: "The question here presented is whether plaintiff is con-
stitutionally entitled to exemption from the operation of a statute
designed to eliminate housing discrimination against unmarried
couples where the enforcement of the statute would interfere with
plaintiff's free exercise of religion."' 401 With this statement, the
court not only articulated the state's interest as narrowly as possi-
ble ("to eliminate housing discrimination against unmarried
couples"), but also presumed a burden on Evelyn Smith's free ex-
ercise of religion. The court accepted at face value the "religiosity"
and "sincerity" of Evelyn Smith's claim.401 The court acknowl-
edged the United States Supreme Court's decision in Employment
Division v. Smith.4°3 The court, however, decided that the case
before it fit within the "hybrid" exception created by Employment
Division v. Smith, thus triggering the compelling state interest stan-
dard of review rather than the "incidental effects" test articulated
in that same case and mandated for most free exercise exemption
cases.
404
In applying the compelling state interest test to the facts before
it, the Evelyn Smith court relied on articulations of the test from a
great many United States Supreme Court opinions. The court dis-
regarded, however, the fact that the Supreme Court rarely followed
the test in deciding free exercise exemption cases.40 5 The Evelyn
Smith court acknowledged California's "significant interest in erad-
icating discrimination in employment and housing," but narrowed
401. Id. at 398.
402. Id. at 398-99. "We thus accept on faith, as it were, the sincerity of plaintiff's
assertion her religious convictions and beliefs preclude her from renting to an unmar-
ried couple on penalty of herself committing a sin." The "invitation" to a nightmare
of fraudulent claims inherent in that statement is truly frightening.
403. 494 U.S. 872.
404. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403. The court found Evelyn Smith's free speech rights as
well as her free exercise rights were implicated (by the requirement imposed by the
FEHC that she post notices on her property), thus resulting in a "hybrid" constitu-
tional claim. Besides the fact that a different standard for "hybrid" constitutional
claims was a concept created out of whole cloth by the majority in Employment Div.
v. Smith, the concurrence in Evelyn Smith makes a salient point: The free speech
aspect of this case is easily severable as it involves only the remedy, not the purported
wrong; thus the "hybrid" nature of the claim quickly evaporates. That is especially
significant because the majority admitted that if the Employment Div. v. Smith "inci-
dental effects" standard was applied, Evelyn Smith's free exercise of religion would
not be "actionably infringed" under the First Amendment. Id. at 401.
405. See discussion supra parts I.B and I.C.
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the inquiry to whether the interest in eradicating discrimination in
housing against unmarried couples was an overriding governmental
interest.4 6
As both Donahue and Evelyn Smith illustrate, if the court can
qualify and narrow the interest sufficiently, it is much easier to find
that it is not compelling. Although the Evelyn Smith court ac-
knowledged the complete absence in the statutory language or the
legislative history of a hierarchy of priorities among the prohibited
bases for discrimination, the court found it "reasonable" to pre-
sume that the legislature did not intend all categories to be
equal.4 7 In support of this unwarranted presumption, the court
cited classification distinctions from equal protection jurisprudence
and the sometimes disparate treatment of married and unmarried
couples in other contexts, from which the court detected "the
state's strong interest in the marriage relationship. '408 The court
concluded that the legislative history suggests the purpose in ad-
ding "marital status" to the list of proscribed bases for discrimina-
tion was to protect "single men and women, students, widows and
widowers, divorced persons, and unmarried persons with chil-
dren. '40 9 This observation does not undermine the argument for
providing protection to cohabitating couples. Individuals in the
groups mentioned by the court are precisely those who would
choose to cohabit, and their interests would be harmed if unmar-
ried couples were not included in the protection.
The Evelyn Smith court attempted without much success to dis-
tinguish Lee,410 another commercial context case. Although it is
difficult to support an assertion that the interest in eradicating dis-
crimination of any prohibited type is less important than maintain-
ing the fiscal integrity of the social security system (the subject of
Lee), that was the challenge the Evelyn Smith court faced. The
observation that an exemption in Lee would have had practical
consequences that were not present in this case is astonishingly na-
ive. Certainly, no one would argue with the conclusion that the tax
406. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404.
407. Idt
408. Id. at 404-05. The court stumbles into the usual logical fallacy of finding that if
the state has an interest in supporting marriage, ipso facto the state can have no inter-
est in supporting any other form of relationship. It is not necessarily an either/or
situation. It is quite logical and consistent for the state to strongly support marriage
for those who choose it and simultaneously support other forms of relational associa-
tion for those who do not.
409. Id at 405.
410. 455 U.S. 252.
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system could not function with a "myriad of exceptions flowing
from a wide variety of religious beliefs. '411 One does not need a
great deal of imagination or perspicacity, however, to foresee simi-
lar "practical consequences" to the entire system of antidiscrimina-
tion laws, both federal and state, from "myriad exceptions flowing
from a wide variety of religious beliefs." Rather, one needs only a
sense of history and culture in this society to understand what an
intractable problem discrimination remains, despite the presence
and enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. Moreover, exemp-
tions to the antidiscrimination laws create "opportunities" for the
many people who are inclined to take advantage of them.
Although the facts of the Evelyn Smith case were "a single landlord
with two duplexes" for rent, the ramifications of the court's deci-
sion extend far beyond the facts that were before the court. The
court's failure or unwillingness to acknowledge that is as disturbing
as the result itself.
In the Evelyn Smith court's view, the California Constitution's
Free Exercise Clause is broader than its federal counterpart be-
cause the California Constitution contains an express guarantee of
freedom of religion, but the federal Constitution does not.4 12 The
court extrapolated from this "broader scope" a heavier burden on
the state to justify any regulation that infringes on the free exercise
411. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407.
412. IAt at 409. The court's severely edited quote from the California Constitu-
tion's Free Exercise Clause is very misleading. The better argument is that the Cali-
fornia Constitution actually provides less protection than the Federal Constitution.
The California Constitution's Free Exercise Clause provides in full: "Free exercise
and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed. This
liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the
peace or safety of the State."
First, the phrase "this liberty" refers back to the phrase "free exercise and enjoy-
ment of religion"; "liberty of conscience" connotes a freedom to believe rather than a
freedom to act. Secondly, unlike the federal Free Exercise Clause, the California Free
Exercise Clause provides an explicit exception to freedom of religion for conduct that
is "licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state." Lastly, the word
choice is again indicative of intent: "This liberty of conscience [that is, to believe]
does not excuse acts [that is, conduct] that are licentious," etc. Thus, the freedom to
believe expressly does not extend to freedom to act when those actions conflict with
otherwise legitimate governmental regulations and policies within the police power of
the state. For judicial support of the view that the California Constitution's Free Ex-
ercise Clause provides less protection than the federal Constitution, see Board of
Medical Quality Assurance v. Andrews, 260 Cal. Rptr. 113,120 (1989). Based on the
policy statement that California's Fair Housing Law "shall be deemed an exercise of
the police power of the state for the protection of the welfare, health and peace of the
people of this state" because discrimination "foments domestic strife and unrest," the
court's omission of the very phrases in the California Free Exercise Clause that would
preclude an exemption is dishonest.
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of religion, thus justifying strict scrutiny of any infringement of free
exercise of religion regardless of the presence of other constitu-
tional claims.413
After declining to analyze Evelyn Smith's claims under the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act,4 14 the court addressed the poten-
tial tenants' privacy rights as guaranteed by the California
Constitution. The court found that because the landlord was per-
mitted to refuse to rent to unmarried couples, it "follows inexora-
bly therefrom that plaintiff may lawfully inquire of prospective
tenants as to their marital status. ' 415 There was no invasion of the
tenants' privacy because the tenants volunteered the information
that they were not married. Even if there was a violation, the de
minimis invasion furthered the significant countervailing interest in
the landlord's free exercise of religion. 16 Despite the "significant"
413. Evelyn Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 409. Thus the court starts with a misleading
quotation from the California Free Exercise Clause, from which it derives a faulty
interpretation of the clause, upon which it bases a rule and standard of review that
essentially guarantee the result the court wants to reach. One good poke and this
house of cards should fall.
414. See supra part I.C.1.
415. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 411. This is arrant nonsense. If the conflict arises from a
landlord being forced to facilitate the purported sin of another because the landlord
knowingly rents to unmarried couples, it does not follow that landlord may inquire
about marital status in order to bootstrap herself into the position of knowing and
thus burdening her free exercise of religion. This permits the free exercise claimant
herself to create the very burden that triggers the exception to the otherwise valid
regulation. As far as I am aware, .there is no free exercise case in any jurisdiction that
permits the free exercise claimant to create the burden from which he or she will then
be judicially relieved. One hopes that that absolutely untenable state of affairs is not
what this court envisioned. If the court insists on creating an exemption for landlords
who desire to discriminate against those whose characteristics are not visible to the
naked eye, perhaps a more sane approach would be analogous to the "don't ask/don't
tell" policy regarding gays in the military: the tenants should not volunteer informa-
tion about their marital status and the landlords cannot ask.
The other significant ramification of the court's destruction of the tenants' right to
privacy is the problem of where to draw the line. May the landlord then ask married
couples if they use contraceptives or commit adultery? May the landlord ask single
tenants if they intend to fornicate or indulge in other sexual acts on the premises?
May the landlord ask same sex roommates if they are homosexual?
When the court says that "a federal right, created by statute or by the federal Con-
stitution, is not trumped by a state constitutional provision," id, the court is saying
that Evelyn Smith's federal right of free exercise cannot be trumped by the tenants'
state right of privacy. But might this not work the other way as well? Could a federal
right of privacy trump a state right of free exercise? The court conveniently avoids
this dilemma in note 18, where the court says that the federal right of privacy protects
individuals from governmental action; however, one might argue that a landlord's
otherwise unlawful inquiry into marital status, which is made lawful only by judicial
approval, constitutes governmental action.
416. Evelyn Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 411-12.
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interest in eradicating housing discrimination based on marital sta-
tus, the court found that interest not sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify the burden on Evelyn Smith's free exercise under either the
federal or state constitutions.417
2. Alaska: Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission
In Swanner, the Alaska Supreme Court held first that landlord
Swanner had violated municipal and state antidiscrimination laws
by refusing to rent apartments to each of three different unmarried
couples after learning their marital status. Second, the court held
that enforcing the fair housing laws against Swanner did not de-
prive him of his right to the free exercise of religion under either
the United States or the Alaska Constitution.418 Finding no "hy-
brid" claim, the Alaska court analyzed Swanner's federal free exer-
cise claim under the "incidental effects" standard as mandated by
Employment Division v. Smith.
The court determined that the fair housing law was facially neu-
tral, because it had a secular meaning and did not refer to religious
practices as such. Moreover, its purpose, to prohibit discrimination
in the rental housing market, was neutral.419 The second require-
ment of the incidental effects test, that the law be generally appli-
cable, was also met. The fair housing laws applied to everyone
involved in renting and selling property and did not refer to or al-
lude to any religion or religious group. Therefore, the enforcement
of the fair housing law did not violate Swanner's free exercise
rights under the federal Constitution.420
Although the Free Exercise Clauses in the Alaska Constitution
and the United States Constitution are identical, the court declined
to apply the "incidental effects" test of Employment Division v.
Smith to the free exercise claim under the Alaska Constitution. In-
417. 1&
418. Swanner, 874 P.2d 274, 276. According to Swanner's Christian religious be-
liefs, even a nonsexual living arrangement by roommates of the opposite sex was im-
moral and sinful because such an arrangement suggested the appearance of
immorality (fornication); therefore, Swanner refused to rent to anyone who intended
to live with someone of the opposite sex because he "expects" those persons will
engage in fornication. Swanner argued that he discriminated based on conduct, not
on marital status. See id at 278 nA. Relying on its earlier decision in Foreman, the
court concluded that Swanner unlawfully discriminated on the basis of marital status
and not on the basis of conduct. Even Swanner's own argument does not support his
position. Even if one accepted his conduct/marital status distinction, he was refusing
to rent based on his "assumption" regarding conduct and not on conduct itself.
419. 874 P.2d at 279-80.
420. Id. at 280.
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stead, the court chose to follow Alaska cases that had adopted the
Sherbert compelling state interest test.421 Under that test, the
claimant must show that a religion is involved, that the conduct in
question is religiously based, and that the religious belief is sincere.
Once the threshold requirements are met, religiously impelled con-
duct can be forbidden only if it "pose[s] some substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order or where there are competing govern-
mental interests of the highest order [that] are not otherwise
served." 422 The court found that Swanner met the three threshold
requirements, but that the government's "transactional interest in
preventing acts of discrimination based on irrelevant characteris-
tics," such as marital status, outweighed Swanner's interest in act-
ing on his religious beliefs.423 The court alluded to the fact that any
burden on Swanner's free exercise of religion was self-imposed.
424
421. See supra part I.B.
422. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 281. Swanner urged the court to follow the decisions in
Minnesota and California that granted landlords a free exercise exemption from the
statutory prohibition on marital status discrimination in housing. The court rejected
Swanner's suggestion because the Minnesota decision, French, relied heavily on the
criminal antifornication statute, whereas Alaska had repealed its antifornication stat-
ute some years before. The court observed that the Donahue decision in California
was uncitable because it had been depublished and that neither the Minnesota nor
California decisions could provide the court with meaningful guidance in interpreting
the Free Exercise Clause of the Alaska Constitution. Ia at 281 n.10.
423. Id. at 282. This court made a useful distinction between what it called the
state's "derivative" interest in ensuring access to housing for everyone and the state's
"transactional" interest in preventing individual acts of discrimination based on irrele-
vant characteristics. When the state does not object to the specific activity, but is
concerned about some other variable that the activity will affect, the state's interest is
derivative; and there is a numerical cutoff below which the harm is insignificant. In
the context of rental housing, if it could be shown that even with an exemption for the
landlord and others like him, the tenants would still be able to find alternative hous-
ing, then the government's interest would not be sufficient to overcome the landlord's
interest.
If, on the other hand, the state objects to the activity itself, as where the state has
decided the activity is per se harmful even if insignificant numbers of people engage in
it, the state's interest is transactional. In the context of rental housing, the legislature
determined that housing discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics (such as
marital status) was an "independent social evil" and should be eliminated (not merely
reduced, but completely eradicated). Therefore, it is irrelevant to the state's transac-
tional interest if tenants can find other housing; allowing housing discrimination that
"degrades individuals, affronts human dignity and limits one's opportunities results in
harming the government's transactional interest in preventing such discrimination,"
and thus an exemption for the landlord was not warranted. Id
This distinction is the closest analog to the "direct harm to the individual and soci-
ety" distinction that will be developed later in this Article. Both distinctions provide
compelling reasons for a policy against constitutionally compelled free exercise ex-
emptions from the antidiscrimination laws.
424. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282.
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That is, he voluntarily chose to engage in the property management
business, an area of endeavor that happened to be regulated by
antidiscrimination laws and not an activity required by his religious
beliefs.
The court's final point on the free exercise claim exemplified the
essential difference between the claim of exemption in these land-
lord discrimination cases and the claim of exemption in other free
exercise cases. That difference is the direct third party harm that
an exemption would create, or as the court said: "Because Swan-
ner's religiously impelled actions trespass on the private right of
unmarried couples to not be unfairly discriminated against in hous-
ing, he cannot be granted an exemption from the housing antidis-
crimination laws." 425
The dissent in Swanner would have preferred to pick and choose
among the legislatively created bases for prohibiting discrimination
and would have found a compelling state interest in preventing dis-
crimination on some bases (race and sex) but not on others (mari-
tal status). As with the majority in Donahue, the dissent just could
not understand that discrimination on the basis of marital status
was degrading or damaging to personal dignity.426
3. Minnesota: Cooper v. French
In Minnesota, Layle French, a member of the Evangelical Free
Church, refused to rent a house to Susan Parsons when he discov-
ered that Parsons intended to live there with a man to whom she
was not married. Although neither Parsons nor her fiance told
French they were planning to engage in sexual relations on the sub-
ject property, French believed not only that sex outside of marriage
was sinful, but also that unmarried adults of the opposite sex living
together (even without engaging in sex) was sinful because it
created the "appearance of evil."427 In French, the Minnesota
425. 1d. at 284.
426. Id at 288. Unfortunately, one can imagine a judge of twenty-five years ago
making the same comment about sex discrimination or forty years ago about race
discrimination. What all of these judges fail to grasp is that discrimination itself, on
whatever basis, is degrading, offensive and damaging to human dignity for the person
who is the target of the discrimination. For judges who perhaps have never exper-
ienced discrimination on any basis, this basic concept is apparently difficult to
understand.
427. French, 460 N.W.2d at 3-4. French based his refusal not on any actual knowl-
edge that Parsons and her fiance would engage in sexual relations, but on his assump-
tion that they were "likely" to engage in sexual relations. Id. at 3. Unlike Donahue
and Evelyn Smith where the "knowing facilitation of sin" was the problem for the
landlord, here it was apparently the facilitation or aiding and abetting in creating the
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Supreme Court, by a four-to-three vote, held that French's refusal
to rent to an unmarried couple did not violate the Minnesota
Human Rights Act's prohibition on marital status discrimination.
According to the court, French's right to the free exercise of reli-
gion under the Minnesota Constitution outweighed any interest
Parsons otherwise had in cohabiting with her fiance.428 Because of
the decision in Employment Division v. Smith,429 the Minnesota
court declined to apply federal constitutional law and opted instead
to analyze the case in light of the broader free exercise protection
found in the Minnesota Constitution. The court required the state
to demonstrate either that the religious practice in question was
"licentious" or "inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state,"
or that the state had a "compelling and overriding interest" not
only in the general purpose behind the statute but also in refusing
to grant an exemption to French.430 It is not surprising that the
state could not meet that insurmountable burden.
As in Donahue and the dissent in Swanner, the court simply
could not understand that discrimination against unmarried
couples could be pernicious, particularly because the state itself
distinguished between married and unmarried couples in other
contexts. The court disingenuously inquired, "How can there be a
compelling state interest in promoting fornication when there is a
state statute on the books prohibiting it?"431
This bias is illustrated further by the court's suggestion that re-
quiring Parsons to abide by the law prohibiting fornication was less
"appearance of evil." "Religious" belief or not, that is an extremely, flimsy, tenuous
basis upon which to deny tenants their real and substantial right to be free from dis-
crimination in housing.
428. Although French was the first reported case on this issue, it is different from
the later cases in one very significant detail. Unlike the other four cases on this issue
(Donahue, Evelyn Smith, Swanner and Desilets), the French court is the only one that
did not find a violation of the prohibition on marital status discrimination in the fair
housing law where the landlord refused to rent to an unmarried couple. Obviously it
simplifies matters considerably if the court finds that the tenants have no rights
against which the landlord's free exercise claim must be balanced. See supra part
II.C.3. text for discussion of the definition of "marital status." For its decision to
exclude unmarried couples from the protection of the antidiscrimination statute, the
French court relied almost exclusively on the legislature's failure to repeal the an-
tifornication statute. In Desilets, the court put Massachusetts' antifornication statute
in the proper perspective: outdated and probably unenforceable. In Donahue, Evelyn
Smith, and Swanner, the jurisdictions had repealed their antifornication statutes years
before the cases arose.
429. See supra part I.C.
430. French, 460 N.W.2d at 9.
431. Id: at 10. That phrasing suggests that moral outrage played a significant role in
this decision.
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restrictive than compelling French to cooperate in breaking it. The
court also observed that failing to provide an exemption for French
would be "punishing French for refusing to disregard a statute
prohibiting fornication as well as his religious beliefs." 432 This is
not a sound rationale, especially in light of the fact that French had
no knowledge that sex would even take place on the property and
would have refused to rent to an unmarried couple even if he knew
that no sex would occur.
In a vigorous dissent, the Chief Justice, joined by two other jus-
tices, accused the majority of misconstruing legislative history, pub-
lic policy, and the facts. The dissent would have found both that
the legislature intended to protect unmarried couples under the
prohibition on marital status discrimination and that the landlord
was not entitled to an exemption. As did the majority in Swan-
ner433 and to some extent the dissent in Donahue,434 the dissenting
justices in French considered it significant that French voluntarily
chose to enter into commercial activity that was regulated by the
state. The First Amendment does not confer upon an individual a
right to require others in the marketplace to conform to one's own
values as a precondition to doing business with him or her.435
Thus, any burden on French's religious belief was considerably
lessened by the fact that it was self-imposed.
In finding a compelling state interest that would outweigh
French's free exercise claim, the dissent characterized the state's
interest more broadly than did the majority. The dissent stated,
"[p]roviding equal access to housing in Minnesota by eliminating
pernicious discrimination, including marital status discrimination,
is an overriding compelling state interest. '436 The dissent rejected
432. Id. at 10-11. The court concluded its discussion of the moral implications with
a statement about the "moral values and institutions that have served Western civili-
zation for eons," citing a one-hundred-year old case for support. Id
433. See supra part Ifl.A.2.
434. See supra part MI.A.1.a.
435. French, 460 N.W.2d at 14-15 (Popovich, CJ., dissenting).
436. Id at 16 (Popovich, CJ., dissenting). The dissent accused the majority of rely-
ing on "very old cases from other jurisdictions" (in perceiving the only possible state
interest as the promotion of morality) and completely ignoring both the Human
Rights Act and controlling precedent from the Minnesota courts and the United
States Supreme Court. Like the dissenting justice in Donahue, the dissent found it
inappropriate that the majority "picks and chooses" among the legislatively prohib-
ited classifications for discrimination. Id. at 19. Furthermore, although it was appro-
priate that the legislature had authorized the state to treat married couples and
unmarried couples differently in some contexts, it had not authorized private individ-
uals to treat other individuals differently because of their marital status. Id. In fact,
that is precisely what the fair housing law prohibited. Therefore, the majority's list of
1995] 783
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
the majority's reliance on the antifornication statute for several
reasons. First, there was no evidence of fornication. Second, the
antifornication statute had fallen into disuse and was of dubious
constitutionality. Third, the enforcement of the antifornication
statute was the prerogative of. the state, which had not delegated
that right to suspicious individual landlords like French. Fourth,
this was not a prosecution for fornication. Finally, French's argu-
ment that he would be "aiding and abetting" the commission of
fornication by renting to an unmarried couple was ludicrous.437
4. Massachusetts: Attorney General v. Desilets
The most recent case on this issue is Attorney General v. Desilets,
decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on July
14, 1994. Paul Desilets, a Roman Catholic landlord, refused to rent
to Mark Lattanzi and Cynthia Tarail, an unmarried couple, based
on the landlord's policy of not renting to "any person who intends
to engage in conduct that violates [landlord's] religious principles."
Desilets believed that he would commit a sin if he facilitated the
sinful conduct of another, in this case fornication.438 The Massa-
situations where the state treated married and unmarried couples differently was irrel-
evant to the question of whether an individual may discriminate on the basis of mari-
tal status. Obviously, the same observation applies to the majority opinions in
Donahue and Evelyn Smith and the dissent in Swanner.
437. Id at 18-19.
438. Desilets, 636 N.E. 2d at 234. The scope of landlord's policy-Desilets would
not rent to "any person who intends to engage in conduct" that violated his religious
principles-encompasses a far larger class of objectionable tenants than simply un-
married couples. Since the landlord's Roman Catholic religion objects to (among
other things) divorce, abortion and contraception, would he be justified in refusing to
rent to all or any of the following based on his religious principles: a doctor who
performs abortions or dispenses contraceptives; anyone who works for or with a doc-
tor who performs abortion or dispenses contraceptives; anyone who works for a hos-
pital where abortions are performed; anyone employed by a pharmacy that dispenses
contraceptives; anyone employed by a pharmaceutical company that manufactures
contraceptives; anyone who is divorced; anyone who facilitates divorce (lawyers,
paralegals, legal secretaries, etc., in law offices that represent divorce clients)? Con-
sidering the substantial number of taboos in the Roman Catholic religion (and many
other Western religions as well), this is only a minuscule list of the potential tenants
Desilets might find objectionable based upon his "religious beliefs." And this does
not even take into account the incredible panoply of religious beliefs in our pluralistic
culture. The list could go on for pages, including such objectionable (to some) behav-
iors as drinking, smoking, dancing, playing cards, cursing and swearing, eating pork,
wearing suggestive clothing, using makeup, covering one's head or failing to cover
one's head, etc. The obvious problem is: Where does one draw the line that clearly
needs to be drawn to avoid unmitigated chaos? Who is qualified to decide that a
particular belief of a particular religion should get an exemption, but a different belief
or a different religion should not? Because there is simply no principled way for a
court on a case-by-case basis to draw that line, the court should simply refuse to draw
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chusetts court held that Desilets violated the state fair housing law
that prohibited housing discrimination based on marital status.
The court then remanded the case to the superior court for resolu-
tion of the conflict between the landlord's free exercise rights
under the state and federal constitutions, and the state antidis-
crimination statute.439
Before remanding, however, the court set forth its view of the
appropriate standard for deciding the issue, the burden of proof for
each party, and other relevant considerations for the lower court.
The court rejected the Employment Division v. Smith "incidental
effects" standard in favor of the compelling state interest standard/
balancing test of Sherbert and earlier Massachusetts cases.
Although the Massachusetts court did not actually decide the is-
sues of "sincerity" and "burden," its "suggestions" are implicit in
the opinion. The court suggests that "sincerity" is probably a given
and that the antidiscrimination law probably does "burden" the
landlord's free exercise of religion." ° The court also indicated that
although the "commercial context" of the Desilets case was not dis-
positive on the existence of a burden, it was relevant in balancing
the interests if a burden on free exercise was determined to be
present.441 The remainder of the majority opinion addressed the
state's burden of proving that the interest in enforcing the antidis-
crimination statute was compelling.
In several ways, the court created a very difficult burden of proof
for the state. It defined the state's interest narrowly; that is, the
elimination of discrimination generally in housing against unmar-
ried cohabiting couples. It also designated a secondary, particular-
the line by declining to grant any individual exemptions and then permit the legisla-
ture to create exemptions to the extent they are appropriate under the Establishment
Clause.
439. Id. at 235. The judge of the superior court had decided the free exercise/an-
tidiscrimination issue on cross motions for summary judgement, granting the land-
lord's motion and denying the Attorney General's; and the Attorney General
appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that neither party was entitled to summary
judgement and remanded the case to the superior court to determine whether the
state could show a compelling governmental interest in "eliminating housing discrimi-
nation against cohabiting couples." Id. at 241. Although the court was very circum-
spect about whether the state would be able to meet its burden of proof, the narrow
characterization of the state's interest by the court suggests that it will be difficult.
440. Id at 237-38. The court referred to several U.S. Supreme Court decisions that
accepted without question claimants' assertions of sincerity. The court also referred
to the appellate court opinions in Swanner, Evelyn Smith, Donahue and French, all of
which, despite differing results, found that the application of the antidiscrimination
law to the landlord did create a "burden" on the landlord's free exercise of religion.
441. Id at 238.
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ized aspect of the state's interest: ensuring availability of sufficient
numbers of rental units in the geographical area in which the land-
lord's units were located. The court did suggest several avenues
that might be useful for the state in meeting its burden of proof.
Uniformity of enforcement of the antidiscrimination laws may be
the least restrictive alternative (if administration of the antidis-
crimination laws with individual exemptions would be "impracti-
cal"). Moreover, the state might meet its burden if the context of
the landlord's claim was the business of leasing apartments and not
participation in a formal religious activity.' 2
The dissent in Desilets would have affirmed summary judgment
for the landlord because "it is clear.., that the Commonwealth
can have no reasonable expectation of sustaining its burden of
proving.., that [it] has an interest in ensuring the availability of
rental housing for unmarried couples with a sexual relationship-
that outweighs the defendants' interest in conforming their con-
duct to the will of God. '" 3 Based on that loaded statement and
the general tone of the dissenting opinion, it is not difficult to pre-
dict what position the dissenting justices will take if the Desilets
case works its way back to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in the future.
442. Id at 241.
443. I at 246-47. The attitude of the dissenting justices toward tenants who may
be entirely unable to find adequate housing might accurately be summarized as:
"That's your tough luck." To wit:
Thus, the Commonwealth's interest in accommodating cohabitation cannot
possibly outweigh the defendants' interest in conforming their conduct to
their religious conviction... regardless of whether... 'the rental housing
policies of people such as the defendants can[not] be accommodated, at least
in the Turners Falls (Montague) area, without significantly impeding the
availability of rental housing for people who are cohabiting or wish to co-
habit.' Even if discrimination of the sort challenged here [were to] present a
significant housing problem if a large percentage of units [were to be] un-
available to cohabitants, that is, even if discrimination of the sort challenged
here were to make it difficult or impossible for unmarried couples to cohabit
in Turners Falls or elsewhere, neither the court nor the [l]egislature can con-
stitutionally give preference or priority to a so-called right of cohabitation
over the moral and other fundamental values recognized in and promoted
by, the Massachusetts Constitution's clearly articulated guarantees of the




IV. Justifications Supporting a General Policy Against
Individual Exemptions
Housing discrimination seriously undermines access to a basic
necessity of life. The purported reason for the discrimination is
irrelevant to the negative effects-practical, symbolic and psycho-
logical-on both society and the individual against whom the dis-
crimination is directed. It cannot be disputed that the
government's interest in ensuring access for all to available housing
stock is important. Surely that interest is equally compelling, if not
more so, as many other governmental interests that have been
found to justify regulations that burdened the free exercise of
religion.
This section will examine several justifications that support a
general policy against individual exemptions. First, there is a com-
pelling state interest in preventing invidious discrimination gener-
ally 4 4 because of the dual effect of discrimination: it harms not
only the individual against whom it is directed, but society as well.
In the landlord cases, a free exercise exemption always causes di-
rect, individual injury to members of the class the statute was
designed to protect by directly depriving those individuals of the
benefits of the antidiscrimination laws." 5 This individual injury is
distinct from the additional, more diffuse injury that judicially sanc-
tioned discrimination inflicts on society.4 6 In addition, an exemp-
tion from the antidiscrimination laws for those engaged in business
is completely unsupportable and against public policy." 7 Finally,
the courts are singularly ill-equipped to decide which religious
claims merit exemptions from governmental regulations under par-
ticular circumstances." 8
A. Compelling State Interest in Preventing Invidious
Discrimination
A general policy against individual, constitutionally mandated
free exercise exemptions in the landlord discrimination context is
supportable because of a compelling governmental interest in the
prevention and eradication of discrimination generally, including
marital status discrimination against unmarried couples in the con-
444. See infra part IV.A.
445. See infra part IV.B.
446. See infra part IV.C.
447. See infra part IV.D.
448. See infra part 1V.E.
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text of housing.449 Also, a governmental interest need not be of
constitutional magnitude in order to be compelling. The question
of whether the state's interest is compelling is central to all of these
cases. Nevertheless, before the court can decide if the state's inter-
est is compelling, the court must identify what the state's interest is.
As these cases, particularly those with a majority and a dissenting
opinion, vividly demonstrate, there is no unanimity on that ques-
tion. The fact that the articulation of the state's interest can be
manipulated so transparently in order to produce the "correct"
outcome provides support for a policy against individual exemp-
tions.4 50 But that alone will not resolve the dispute. In the land-
lord discrimination cases, it is critical both to characterize the
state's interest broadly and to recognize that the elimination of
housing discrimination is a compelling interest.
1. Broad Characterization of State's Interest
If one characterizes the state's interest broadly as "the eradica-
tion of discrimination in housing," or even "the eradication of pro-
hibited (or invidious or pernicious) discrimination," it is relatively
easy for the state to demonstrate the importance of that interest,
how the antidiscrimination statutes further the goal in the least re-
strictive manner, and why an exemption would undermine the goal
and thus should be disallowed. If one follows-the opposite extreme
and characterizes the state's interest in heavily negative, moralistic
terms as "the promotion of fornication," the state will be utterly
unable to show the importance of such an interest.451 Fortunately,
449. Based upon the five state court decisions so far on this issue and on the pas-
sage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act at the federal level, it is assumed that
any U.S. Supreme Court review of the cases that have already been decided or any
future cases will have to grapple to some extent with the compelling state interest
standard/balancing test.
450. Another argument against individual exemptions also relates to the state's in-
terest. The courts consistently undervalue the strength or "compeliingness" of the
state's interest. Unlike the legislature, courts always decide on a case-by-case basis,
and the state interest in a challenged regulation will rarely be seriously threatened if
only this one exemption is granted. Courts, trained to decide on the facts of the case
before them and not necessarily for the larger society, often fail to perceive as com-
pelling a state interest that becomes compelling only cumulatively. See In Defense of
Smith, supra note 139, at 312. If the state's interest can reasonably be construed as
compelling in relation to cumulative concerns, even if not exactly compelling in rela-
tion to the one exemption, then the better policy is to grant no exemptions from the
regulation. Otherwise, the result is certain unfairness; exemptions are granted until
the interest becomes compelling and then the door is slammed shut. Whether one is
entitled to an exemption should not be determined by a race to the courthouse.
451. The majority in French adopted this characterization. See supra part Ifl.A.3.
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few courts go to that extreme. Instead, most that want to charac-
terize the state's interest narrowly simply embellish the simple
statement with qualifiers and modifiers, such as "the elimination of
marital status discrimination in housing against unmarried
couples. 45 2 There are undoubtedly dozens of other permutations,
but the more the court circumscribes the state's interest, the more
difficult it will be for the state to show that the interest is
compelling.
There is support in both federal and state law and policy for the
proposition that the state's interest in these cases should be charac-
terized broadly rather than narrowly and that the elimination of
invidious discrimination on any prohibited basis is and should be
compelling. As there are no United States Supreme Court cases
on marital status discrimination, the argument must be made by
analogy. In doing so, however, one can look to the persuasive rea-
soning employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in other discrimina-
tion cases. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,453 the U.S. Supreme
Court, in finding that Minnesota had a compelling interest in eradi-
cating discrimination based on sex, relied on the same rationales
and policy considerations that in the past had supported a finding
that the government had a compelling interest in preventing dis-
erimination based on race. The analogy is credible because both
types of discrimination are based on "archaic and overbroad as-
sumptions," and both involve "acts of invidious discrimination in
the distribution of publicly available . . . services . . . causing
unique evils that government has a compelling interest to pre-
vent. ' 45 4 By the same reasoning, discrimination based on marital
status is based on archaic assumptions and, as with all acts of invid-
ious discrimination, deprives the victim of personal dignity. The
Court found that discrimination, because it produces "special
harms," was entitled to no constitutional protection.4 55
452. Donohue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32.
453. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
454. Id. at 625, 628. The Court observed that in both instances the unwarranted
assumptions force "individuals to labor under stereotypical notions" that are irrele-
vant to their abilities. lId at 625. In Roberts, the Supreme Court decided a challenge
by the Jaycees to the applicability of the Minnesota Human Rights Act which prohib-
ited discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sex. The Court recog-
nized that the Act, which initially prohibited discrimination based on race and
gradually broadened the scope of the Act and expanded the prohibited bases of dis-
crimination, reflected a strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination
generally.
455. Id. at 628. The Jaycees claimed that their constitutional right to freedom of
association outweighed the rights of Minnesota's female citizens to be free from sex
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Other courts have addressed the issue of invidious discrimina-
tion in relation to sexual orientation. For example, in Gay Rights
Coalition v. Georgetown University,456 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that enforcement of the District
of Columbia's Human Rights Act prohibition against discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation did impose a burden on the pri-
vate Catholic university's First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion. The District of Columbia had a compelling governmental
interest, however, in eradicating discrimination based on sexual
orientation, which outweighed the burden on the university's free
exercise of religion. The Court indulged in a fairly lengthy, but
eloquent, discourse on the evils of invidious discrimination in all its
forms.4 7 In general, discrimination is pervasive and its effects are
cumulative. It inflicts psychological injury by stigmatizing its vic-
tims as inferior; and because discriminatory acts occur in pervasive
patterns, the victims suffer particularly frustrating, cumulative and
debilitating injuries.5 8
This case is particularly instructive because if there is one area of
prohibited discrimination that is more likely to precipitate moral
umbrage than unmarried cohabitation, it is sexual orientation. The
court's thoughtful and provocative analysis justifies the recognition
of a compelling governmental interest in the eradication of all
forms of discrimination unrelated to individual merit. A number of
the Court's observations about discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation could easily be adapted to marital status discrimination.
Consider the court's comments, adjusted to address marital status
discrimination:
Our society is built on a... model [of married cohabitation].
We are met at the outset with centuries of attitudinal thinking,
discrimination. The Court disagreed. See infra part IV.B.I.. It can be argued that
discrimination on any prohibited basis produces "special harms," whether the basis be
an immutable characteristic, like race or sex, or a choice, like marital status or reli-
gion. The size of the group potentially affected by the Jaycees' discrimination was
undeniably large-more than half the population. Although unmarried cohabitants
do not equal half the population, the individual effects of the discrimination may be
just as severe.
456. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1987).
457. I& at 31-39. This portion of the opinion might be enlightening reading for
those judges who just cannot seem to understand what is so harmful or damaging or
pernicious about discrimination against individuals or groups with whom those judges
apparently cannot identify. See, e.g., the majority opinions in Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d 32, Evelyn Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, French, 460 N.W.2d 2, and the dissent in
Swamer, 874 P.2d 274, 288.
458. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Forward In Defense of the An-
tidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 8 (1976).
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often colored by sincerely held religious beliefs, that has . . .
stunted the growth of legal theories protecting [unmarried
couples] from invidious discrimination... Such discrimination
has persisted throughout most of history .... This country has a
long and unfortunate history of discrimination based on [marital
status].45 9
Of course, race discrimination is also analogous to marital status
discrimination in some respects. For example, in Bob Jones Uni-
versity,"" the Supreme Court found a compelling governmental in-
terest in eradicating discrimination that unquestionably
outweighed even the substantial infringement of Bob Jones Uni-
versity's rights to the free exercise of religion. The practice of ra-
cial discrimination was contrary to fundamental public policy and
violated "deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice,"
as well as the rights of individuals.461 Although Bob Jones Univer-
sity involved the question of discrimination based on race and not
marital status, the focus on a type of discrimination with a long and
negative history, which the courts and legislatures had seen fit to
condemn only relatively recently, suggests obvious parallels to
other forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on
marital status.462
459. 536 A.2d at 33, 37. Other courts have also taken the position that the govern-
ment has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in all its forms. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Assoc., 676 F2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982) ("by
enacting Title VII, Congress clearly targeted the elimination of all forms of discrimi-
nation as a 'highest priority.' "); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 489 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Russell v. Belmont College, 554 F. Supp.
667, 677 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
460. 461 U.S. 574. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
461. 461 U.S. at 592.
462. 1l at 595. The long and negative history of marital status discrimination is
amply supported by a survey of antifornication and anticohabitation laws in the
United States. See supra part II.C.2. It was only in the 1960s that courts, legislatures,
and society generally began to change their attitudes about unmarried cohabitation
and began to extend to unmarried couples protections that originally were created to
protect individuals from discrimination based on race. Progress in eradicating dis-
crimination, whether based on race or some other basis, has been slow and much
remains to be done. But reasonable minds can no longer differ on the question of
whether racial discrimination is a social evil or exerts a pervasive and pernicious influ-
ence wherever it is allowed to prosper. The detrimental effect of discrimination, both
to individual dignity and to the fabric of society, is common to discrimination gener-
ally, whatever the particular characteristic that triggers it.
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2. Elimination of Housing Discrimination as a Compelling State
Interest
Statutory and decisional law in California and other states sug-
gests that the elimination of discrimination generally is a compel-
ling governmental interest. California's FEHA expressly declares
that housing discrimination, on any of the prohibited bases (includ-
ing marital status), contravenes public policy and that its elimina-
tion is necessary "for the protection of the welfare, health and
peace of the people of this state.' ' 463 There is nothing in the FEHA
or its legislative history to suggest that the elimination of housing
discrimination based on marital status is anything but a compelling
governmental interest.
The court in Pacific Union Club v. Superior Court left no doubt
as to the state's position in regard to discrimination, although the
court ultimately ruled in favor of a completely private discrimina-
tory club. The court stated that "[d]iscrimination... is repugnant
in any form .... Indeed, it is without question that the state has a
legitimate and compelling state interest generally in the battle
against discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, national
origin, or other invidious categories of discrimination."'  Further,
the dissenting justice in Donahue465 was convinced that California
had a compelling interest in "providing its citizens access to hous-
ing.., free from unwarranted discrimination" and insisted that the
correct focus was the state's interest in providing discrimination-
free access to housing and not simply preventing marital status dis-
crimination in housing. In addition, the position of the court in
Pines v. Thomson was unequivocal:
As a general proposition, the government has a compelling in-
terest in eradicating discrimination in all forms .... While the
application of the antidiscrimination laws over First Amend-
463. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920. The California Legislature concluded that dis-
crimination based on race, religion, creed, color, national origin, marital status, sex, or
age "foments domestic strife and unrest." Id See also ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200 (a)
(Supp. 1965) ("Discrimination not only threatens the rights and privileges of the in-
habitants of the state but also menaces the institutions of the state and threatens
peace, order, safety and general welfare"); N.Y. Exnc. LAW § 290 (3) (McKinney
1951) ("Discrimination... not only threatens the rights and proper privileges of its
inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundations of a free democratic state.").
464. 283 Cal. Rptr. 287, 298 (1991) (emphasis added).
465. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49. In Molko, 762 P.2d at 60, the California Supreme Court
framed the state's interest not in terms of the specific category of persons to be pro-
tected, but in terms of the state's goal in providing protection at all. The state clearly
had a compelling interest in protecting "its citizens" from the "substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order" that the Unification Church's conduct posed.
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ment objections has chiefly occurred in the context of racial or
sexual discrimination, California has chosen to broadly interdict
discrimination on the basis of religion on the same terms and for
the same reasons as discrimination on other invidious bases.
Despite an undeniable burden on the free exercise of religion, the
court found the burden "amply justified" by "the compelling state
interest in eradicating invidious discrimination." 6
As the statement of public policy in the California FEHA indi-
cates, housing is a basic human need, and it is critically important
that the government's laws and policies be interpreted and imple-
mented to enhance access to housing for those individuals and
groups who are likely targets of discrimination. Circumscribing the
government's interest so narrowly that inevitably it is outweighed
by a claimed infringement of free exercise rights seriously under-
mines the policy and potentially limits access to housing for a sub-
stantial segment of the population. A landlord's bias toward
cohabiting couples, even when clothed as a religious objection,
should not be allowed to trump the tenants' access to a basic
human need. This is especially true considering that, if the identi-
cal objection were based on race or religion or even sex, no court
would permit the discrimination. In the California Constitution,
the right of free exercise of religion expressly "does not excuse acts
that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
state."467 When this provision is read together with the identical
language in the policy statement of the FEHA, it is difficult to un-
derstand how any court could deny tenants their right to access to
discrimination-free housing, unless of course the judge shares the
landlord's personal distaste for nonmarital cohabitation."8
466. Pines v. Thomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866, 879-80 (1984) (emphasis added). The
Minnesota Supreme Court in McClure v. Sports and Health Club, 370 N.W. 2d 844,
853 (Minn. 1985), saw no need to characterize the state's interest narrowly: "The gov-
ernment has an overriding compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination in em-
ployment and public accommodation." The dissenting justices in French, 460 N.W.2d
at 16, agreed: "Providing equal access to housing in Minnesota by eliminating perni-
cious discrimination, including marital status discrimination, is an overriding compel-
ling state interest."
467. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
468. The tone of moral outrage in the majority opinion in French (that an unmar-
ried couple would presume to seek the protection of the antidiscrimination laws) and
the outright bewilderment in the majority opinion in Donahue (that the unmarried
couple could somehow feel offended or unfairly treated by the discriminatory acts)
suggest that some courts may be overly sympathetic to the landlord's bias and perhaps
too eager to find a justification for it. The dissenting justices in both the French and
Donahue cases clearly saw housing as a basic human need, irrelevant to a person's
1995]
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In order to be found compelling, a governmental interest need
not be a constitutional interest.4 9 The right to be free from marital
status discrimination in housing is a civil right.470 United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence is replete with examples of compel-
ling governmental interests that did not impact or implicate consti-
tutional interests in the slightest.471 Further, decisional law in the
federal and state courts demonstrates that a governmental interest
in preventing discrimination can be compelling even when it bur-
dens First Amendment rights. In Board of Directors of Rotary In-
ternational v. Rotary Club of Duarte,472 a gender discrimination
case, the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Cali-
fornia's Unruh Civil Rights Act,473 which guarantees all residents
marital status, and the state's goal in ensuring equal access a compelling governmental
interest.
469. The interest at issue in the landlord discrimination cases, whether stated
broadly or narrowly, does implicate constitutional rights. Stated broadly, the right of
an individual to be free from invidious or pernicious discrimination may affect Four-
teenth Amendment rights to equal protection. Or stated narrowly, the right of an
unmarried couple to be free from marital status discrimination in housing directly
affects the unmarried couple's federal and state constitutional rights of privacy and
free association.
470. See, e.g., CAL. GoVT. CODE § 12921 (West 1994); ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240
(1965); ILL. STAT. Awm., ch. 68, § 2-102 (1980); MicH. Coin'. LAWS ANN. § 37.22102
(West 1977); N.Y. Exuc. LAW § 291 (McKinney 1951). For discussion of the unmar-
ried couple's constitutional rights of privacy and free association, see infra part
IV.B.3. See also City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 439 (Cal. 1980)
(right of privacy in California is fundamental and compelling interest). Even in those
instances where the government cannot prohibit purely private discrimination, the
courts generally have refused on grounds of policy, justice and fairness to condone or
encourage such discrimination. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,429 (1984)("The Con-
stitution cannot control such prejudice, but neither can it tolerate it."); Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466 (1973)(The state may not grant aid if that aid "has a
significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce and support private discrimination"; "such
private bias is not barred by the Constitution.. .but neither can it call on the Constitu-
tion for material aid from the state."). On grounds of policy, justice and fairness, the
court's condoning of a landlord's discriminatory acts is unjustified legally and abro-
gates judicial responsibility.
471. What the court found to be a compelling state interest in the following cases
was not remotely related to a constitutional right or interest and, in several instances,
was actually rather weak. See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (uniform application of tax
laws); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599 (uniform day of rest for all workers); Mullaney v.
Woods, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1979) (maintaining fiscal integrity of the welfare system).
If the courts can find a governmental interest compelling where the interest is clearly
a matter of fiscal or administrative efficiency or convenience, then surely the govern-
mental interest in insuring discrimination-free access to housing is compelling. The
effect on the intended beneficiary of the regulation is not merely economic; rather, it
goes to the very identity and personal choices of those individuals who are to be
protected by the regulation.
472. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
473. CAL. Cr, L CODE § 51 (1982).
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equal access to business establishments. The Court held that the
state's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination out-
weighed the First Amendment freedom of private association of
the club members. In the Court's words, "public accommodation
laws plainly serve compelling state interests of the highest
order."474
B. Direct Third-Party Harm
The second justification supporting a general policy against indi-
vidual exemptions in the landlord discrimination cases is direct
third party harm. The exemption always directly harms individual
members of the class the statute was designed to protect by both
directly depriving them of the benefits of the statute and by bur-
dening their constitutional rights.
1. Individual Harm to Members of a Protected Class
Unlike other free exercise cases, granting a free exercise exemp-
tion from an antidiscrimination statute to a landlord who refuses to
rent to an unmarried couple always results in direct and immediate
harm to persons whom the statute was designed to protect. Even
the most ardent enthusiasts of individual free exercise exemptions
would draw the line at exemptions that result in direct harm to
others, a position universally supported by history, policy and Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence. No less a luminary than James
Madison took the position that free exercise of religion must be
limited when it harms others. In his words, free exercise may pre-
vail "in every case where it does not trespass on private rights or
the public peace. 475
474. In Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 549, the Court relied primarily on two earlier deci-
sions addressing the conflict between the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws and
First Amendment rights. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (Minnesota's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination justified the impact of the Minnesota Human Rights Act
on the rights to freedom of association of club members); Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (First Amendment freedom of association that entails invidious
private discrimination has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protec-
tions). For other examples of a compelling governmental interest in eliminating dis-
crimination outweighing First Amendment rights, see Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574;
Grosz v. Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984);
and E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); Dayton
Christian Sch. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 578 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
475. Gaillard Hunt, ed., Tim WumnrS OF JAMES MADISON 100 (G.P. Putnam's
Sons 1901) (quoted with approval in Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 143, at
1145). Even Michael McConneli, who seems rarely to have met a Free Exercise
Clause exemption claim that he didn't like, would apparently not grant exemptions
that would result in direct injury to a third party or a breach of the public peace.
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The purpose of the fair housing laws is to ensure discrimination-
free access to housing for all. Granting an exemption from these
laws to a landlord who refuses to rent to an unmarried couple be-
cause of their marital status causes direct injury to members of the
class the regulation was designed to protect: unmarried couples
and those who suffer discrimination because of their marital status.
Because this type of exemption always harms persons the statute
was designed to protect, it follows a fortiori that it will always di-
rectly contravene the public policy the regulation was designed to
further as well. This real and immediate injury to identifiable
individuals who are, by definition, members of the protected class,
renders individual free exercise exemptions from the antidis-
crimination laws simply unsupportable.
The issue of direct, immediate third party injury that would re-
sult if an exemption were granted is rarely addressed in free exer-
cise cases because injury, if it is present at all, is usually only
indirect and diffuse. In Barnette,476 however, the Court alluded to
the absence of third party harm as one justification for granting an
exemption. The Court observed that:
[t]he freedom [of religion] asserted by these appellees does not
bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other indi-
vidual. It is such conflicts which most frequently require inter-
vention of the state to determine where the rights of one end
and those of another begin. But the refusal of these persons to
McConnell, who finds justification for individual free exercise exemptions in "original
intent," believes that both groups that influenced the language ultimately adopted in
the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause agreed on this limitation: "Both the evan-
gelical advocates of religious freedom and the Enlightenment liberals agreed that the
legitimate powers of government extend only to punish men for working ill to their
neighbors." Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 143, at 1145. Under McConnell's
view, exemptions should have been granted in Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. 290, and
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574. Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 143, at 1145,
1146. Of course, it can be argued that there was third party harm both in Alamo,
where the regulation was designed to prevent worker exploitation and in Bob Jones
Univ., where the regulation was aimed at racial discrimination. See In Defense of
Smith, supra note 139, at 312 n.20 and 314-15. Douglas Laycock, another champion of
the right to individual Free Exercise Clause exemptions, also recognizes the unfair-
ness of exemptions that would shift a burden or duty onto others. See Douglas Lay-
cock, Toward a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 CoLum. L. REv. 1373, 1414-15
(1981). The "harm" Laycock perceives as unfair is only indirect. In the landlord dis-
crimination cases, of course, the injury is not only much more immediate, it is also
specifically directed toward members of the statutorily protected group. ("'Third
party" harm, as used in this Article, describes harm to someone other than the free
exercise claimant or the government).
476. 319 U.S. 624.
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participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny
rights of others .... The sole conflict is between authority and
the rights of the individual. . . .When [eccentricities] are so
harmless to others or to the state, the price is not too great.477
Even in Sherbert,4 8 the result was justified in part by the absence
of third party harm. The recognition of Mrs. Sherbert's right to
unemployment benefits did not directly abridge the liberties of any
other person.479
In Prince, the Court refused to grant Jehovah's Witnesses an ex-
emption from the child labor laws. The Court focused on the in-
jury to children, the protected class, that would result from an
exemption, saying that "[p]arents may be free to become martyrs
themselves, but it does not follow they are free.., to make mar-
tyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full legal
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves."4 0 The
Court found the third party injury unacceptable even though the
children in Prince joined their parents in claiming free exercise
rights. In contrast, the tenants are unwilling victims of the land-
lord's exemption in the landlord discrimination cases.
477. lId at 630, 642. Third party harm as a result of a free exercise exemption is as
rare in state Free Exercise Clause cases as in U.S. Supreme Court cases. But when it
is present, it is usually dispositive. The California Supreme Court recognized third
party harm as a critical fact in Walker v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert.
denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989), where the court held that the Free Exercise Clause did
not exempt Christian Scientist parents from criminal prosecution for failing to provide
medical care for their gravely ill child who died. An exemption would have permitted
direct harm to children who would be victimized by their parents' religious beliefs.
This dispositive factor is simply not present in any of the free exercise cases upon
which the courts have relied in granting exemptions to landlords from the fair housing
laws. But the one court that refused to exempt the landlords from the antidiscrimina-
tion law certainly recognized the direct injury that tenants would suffer. The Alaska
Supreme Court observed. "Because Swarmer's religiously impelled actions trespass
on the private rights of unmarried couples to not be unfairly discriminated against in
housing, he cannot be granted an exemption from the housing antidiscrimination
laws." Swanner, 874 P.2d at 284.
478. See supra part I.B.
479. 374 U.S. at 409.
480. 321 U.S. at 170. Although he dissented from the majority's refusal to grant an
exemption in Prince, Justice Jackson also would have curtailed religious freedom
when it interfered with the rights of others: "Our basic difference seems to be as to
the method of establishing limitations which of necessity bound religious freedom.
My own view must be shortly put: I think the limits begin to operate whenever activi-
ties begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public. Religious activi-
ties which concern only members of the faith are and ought to be free-as nearly
absolutely free as anything can be." Id: at 177 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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Of the more recent Supreme Court cases, Bob Jones Univer-
sity481 is most analogous to the landlord discrimination cases. In
Bob Jones University, an Internal Revenue Code regulation denied
tax-exempt status to a private religious school that practiced racial
discrimination.482 The purpose of the statute was clearly to prevent
and discourage racial discrimination. If granted, an exemption
from the regulation would have enhanced the school's ability to
practice discrimination, thus causing direct injury to the very class
the regulation was designed to benefit, the victims of racial
discrimination.
2. Direct Deprivation of Benefits
The second aspect of direct third party harm in the landlord dis-
crimination cases is the direct deprivation of benefits to the indi-
viduals who are harmed. In many free exercise cases the effect of
the exemption is to ensure the claimant receives a tangible benefit
481. 461 U.S. 574. In Bob Jones Univ., as in all the free exercise/tax benefit cases, a
free exercise exemption would have caused indirect injury as well. Whenever a tax
exemption or other economic benefit is granted to a party (pursuant to a Free Exer-
cise Clause exemption or otherwise), all taxpayers are affected. The very fact of the
exemption means that other taxpayers are indirect and vicarious "donors" to that
privileged status. A number of Free Exercise Clause cases involve this type of "indi-
rect" third party harm. See e.g., Jimmy Swaggart, 493 U.S. 378 (exemption from state
sales tax would result in subsidy by other payers of tax); Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (exemption
for Amish from Social Security taxes may result in other taxpayers and employers
subsidizing exemption); Bowen, 476 U.S. 693 (if exemption from use of social security
number caused fraud, other social security taxpayers affected); Gillette, 401 U.S. 437
(if military draft exemption granted, affects other draftees who also have military ser-
vice responsibility); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599 (exemption from Sunday closing law may
affect claimant's competitors).
In most Free Exercise Clause cases, both those in which exemptions have been
granted and otherwise, there is no harm, either direct or indirect, to third parties. See,
e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (exemption from unemployment regulations that require
availability for work on Saturday arguably caused no third party harm, unless one
perceived indirect burden on employers who contribute to unemployment compensa-
tion fund by claimant's ability to collect unemployment compensation; this applies to
the three Sherbert "clones" as well); Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (exemption to permit
Orthodox Jewish air force officer to wear yarmulke indoors would have no effect on
anyone else); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (exemption to permit claimants
to collect unemployment compensation notwithstanding violation of criminal statute
prohibiting use of peyote would not harm anyone, unless similar argument as with
Sherbert).
In several cases, an argument can be made that someone (other than the claimant)
might be harmed by an exemption, but because that third party was "affiliated" with
the claimant, the issue did not arise. See, e.g., Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (arguably the
"plural wives" of Reynolds and others could be hurt by exemption for polygamy);
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (arguably children of Amish might be harmed by exemption from
compulsory education laws).
482. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574.
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(usually economic or financial) that would otherwise be withheld
because of the claimant's religiously motivated inability to comply
with some regulation that is a prerequisite for the benefit. Cer-
tainly Sherbert and the unemployment benefits cases fit this de-
scription, as do the cases dealing with tax-exempt status and
welfare or Aid for Families with Dependent Children benefits.483
In these cases, ensuring the benefit to the free exercise claimant
generally has no direct detrimental effect on anyone else.4 4 The
effect of an exemption in most of the remaining free exercise cases
is neutral in regard to tangible benefits. They neither ensure tangi-
ble benefits to the claimant nor deprive anyone else of benefits
because the "benefit" to the claimant is the conduct itself, and the
effect on others, if any, is negligible.48
What remains is a very small class of free exercise cases in which
the direct effect of an exemption for the claimant is to deprive
someone else of benefits to which they are entitled. In Bob Jones
University,4" one effect of conferring tax-exempt status (a tangible
benefit) on a school that practiced racial discrimination was to de-
prive minorities of the benefits of freedom from discrimination by
making it easier for the school to discriminate. In the landlord dis-
crimination cases, the deprivation of benefits is more immediate
and personal. The direct effect of an exemption for the landlord is
to deprive the couple not only of access to housing but also of the
right to be free from discrimination, the very benefit the fair hous-
ing law guarantees them, as well as their constitutional rights of
privacy and free association.
In the familiar free exercise exemption claim, the claimant is
faced with choosing between the claimant's exercise of a First
Amendment right and the claimant's "participation in an otherwise
available public program."4 7 In the landlord case, however, the
claimant's choice is between the claimant's exercise of a First
Amendment right and someone else's "participation in an other-
483. For the former, see, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. 252; Jimmy Swaggart, 493 U.S. 378. For
the latter, see, e.g., Bowen, 476 U.S. 693. Gillette, 401 U.S. 437, can also be seen as a
tangible benefit case; an exemption would insure to claimant a draft exemption, but
would not deprive anyone else in order to do so.
484. It should be noted, however, that there is perhaps an indirect or diffuse effect
on other taxpayers or the society as a whole.
485. Cases that might be characterized as "neutral" benefit cases are: Braunfeld,
366 U.S. 599; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Barnette, 319 U.S. 625; Goldman, 475 U.S. 503;
Lyng, 485 U.S. 439; Prince, 321 U.S. 158; Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145.
486. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
487. Thomas, 450 U.S. 707, 716. In the landlord cases, the "otherwise available
public program" is the benefit of the antidiscrimination laws.
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wise available public program." The claimant's ability to partici-
pate in a government-sanctioned benefit is not threatened in these
cases. Rather, the right to participate of someone else, whom the
statutory scheme was designed to protect, is sacrificed.
When the claimant is the person who suffers the negative conse-
quences of the exercise of religion (i.e., loss of employment) and
seeks some government benefit to alleviate partially the predica-
ment, usually no one else suffers any direct negative consequences
of the claimant's conduct. In marked contrast, the claimant in the
landlord cases suffers no direct negative consequences of his act,
but an innocent third party (who does not happen to adhere to the
same religious beliefs) suffers direct harm and in addition is unable
to invoke the protection of the statutory scheme, government pro-
gram or policy designed to alleviate his predicament. The free ex-
ercise claimant who says, "I am willing to suffer significant
inconvenience or hardship to myself in order to practice my reli-
gion, but please do not deny me the protection of a government
program that can perhaps mitigate that inconvenience," perhaps
engenders our sympathy. The free exercise claimant who says, "I
am not willing to suffer any substantial inconvenience or hardship
in the practice of my religious beliefs, but I should be allowed to
inconvenience or harm others with impunity, so please deny them
the protection of a government program that would mitigate their
inconvenience because that program impinges on my practice of
my religious beliefs," more likely engenders our antipathy.
Furthermore, in the usual free exercise case, the court can ac-
commodate the free exercise claim by permitting the claimant to
act in accordance with religious beliefs and receive the benefits
that otherwise would be denied to the claimant. In the landlord
discrimination case, however, accommodating the free exercise
claim necessarily results in the denial of a benefit otherwise avail-
able to an innocent third party who becomes simply the unwilling
victim of the claimant's free exercise of his religion. That is the
antithesis of accommodation.
As Sherbert and its progeny illustrate,4 8 the Supreme Court has
demonstrated some willingness to protect the religious claimant's
ability to participate in government benefits. The court, however,
should be much more willing to protect the ability of third parties
to participate in the government benefits designed for them.
Moreover, the court should be very reluctant to sacrifice a third
488. See supra part LB.
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party's individual rights on the altar of a claimant's free exercise
rights. If the court is willing to save the free exercise claimant from
self-sacrifice, the case is even more compelling for saving the inno-
cent third party victim who otherwise would be sacrificed by the
free exercise claimant. A claim for an exemption that can be ac-
complished only by actively depriving someone else of benefits to
which they are entitled cannot be justified on any ground and
should be rejected outright.
3. The Other Side of "Burden": Tenants' Constitutional Rights
The third aspect of direct third party harm in the landlord dis-
crimination cases is the additional burden on tenants' constitu-
tional rights of privacy and free association. Upholding a
landlord's free exercise claim against the fair housing law's prohibi-
tion against housing discrimination tramples on the tenants' statu-
tory rights to discrimination-free housing and constitutional rights
of privacy and free association. The ability of a landlord to act on
religious beliefs is properly circumscribed when free exercise of
those beliefs directly harms third parties and deprives them of ben-
efits to which they are entitled. When the price of accommodating
landlord's free exercise rights is paid with the tenant's rights, that is
not an acceptable method of accommodation. The state has a com-
pelling interest in the prevention and eradication of discrimination
not only because of the harm it causes to individuals but also be-
cause of its effect on society in general.
As free exercise cases usually involve no or negligible direct
harm to any third party, state and federal court analyses have fo-
cused on the harm or "burden" on the claimant if an exemption is
denied and the harm to the government's interest if an exemption
is granted. Both perspectives undeniably are important. In the
landlord discrimination cases, however, there is another side to the
"burden" and another perspective to be considered. In balancing
these concerns, due consideration must be given to the "burden"
on the one who suffers the negative consequences of the claimant's
exercise of religious rights.489
489. The landlords in these cases argue strenuously that they are not discriminating;
they are merely exercising their religious rights. Certainly, the landlord's perspective
of what his or her conduct meant to the tenant cannot and should not be trusted by
the court. "If the actor's subjective view of what an act means were to determine
whether compelling [or prohibiting] the act is unconstitutional, then every private ac-
tor would hold a veto over all of our civil rights laws." Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d
at 52.
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Whenever a landlord discriminates against potential tenants on
any basis, the landlord causes a dual injury: the denial of access to
housing and the discrimination itself. When a landlord discrimi-
nates against an unmarried couple on the basis of marital status,
the action also implicates rights of privacy and free association.
When the court ratifies the landlord's discriminatory act, rights
under the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses are affected
as well.
Single individuals, as well as married couples, have a fundamen-
tal, constitutional right of personal privacy under both federal and
state law.490 This right extends to "certain kinds of important deci-
sions," including decisions about sex and marriage.491 Thirty years
of federal and state cases have established and affirmed these
rights of sexual privacy.
When a landlord refuses to rent to an unmarried couple because
of their marital status, the tenants' constitutional rights of freedom
of intimate association are implicated as well. The freedom of inti-
mate association is closely related to the right of privacy. The
United States Supreme Court concluded in Roberts that choices to
enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must
be secured against undue intrusion because of the role of such rela-
tionships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to
our constitutional scheme.4 2 Thus, freedom of intimate associa-
tion is protected as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In
the qualitative continuum of personal relationships that the U.S.
Supreme Court has described, 493 the more intimate the relationship
the more protection it warrants. As the California court in Pacific
Union Club explained, the "freedom to associate protects admis-
490. Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the fundamental right of marital privacy (regarding use of contracep-
tives), through Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extended right of personal
privacy from married individuals to unmarried individuals), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (right of personal privacy or a guarantee of certain areas or "zones of
privacy" included a woman's right to abortion), and Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977) (extended right of privacy to minors), the U.S. Supreme Court
has extended the right of privacy to cover all manner of personal decisions regarding
intimate heterosexual relationships. The right of privacy, however, has not been ex-
tended to homosexual relationships. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(upheld Georgia law prohibiting consensual sodomy).
491. Carey, 431 U.S. 678, 684. The Court commented that the "outer limits" of this
aspect of privacy had not been marked by the Court, suggesting that the types of
decisions protected by the right might be expanded but not contracted. Id.
492. 468 U.S. at 617-18.
493. See Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey infra notes 505-507.
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sion to the boudoir, but not to the bureaucracy. '494 Surely the
choice of one's living companions and the type of relationship that
is established with them are at the "boudoir" end of the contin-
uum. Therefore, judicially sanctioned inquisition into the intimate
details of a tenant's personal relationships would trample on rights
of intimate association.495
Unlike the federal Constitution, the California Constitution ex-
plicitly provides a right of privacy.496 The California courts49 have
championed and extended the right of personal privacy. For in-
stance, in Robbins v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
held that the state constitutional right of privacy extended to the
right of unmarried persons to cohabit.498 The California Supreme
Court in City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson found that the Califor-
nia right of privacy is broader than the federal right of privacy, that
it is fundamental, and that the state has a compelling interest in
preserving and protecting it.499 These California Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the express California constitutional provi-
sion on privacy place the right of privacy (including the right to
cohabit) on at least an even par with the California constitutional
provision on the free exercise of religion. In fact, the California
Constitution arguably provides greater protection for privacy than
for religion. For instance, the free exercise right exempts from its
protection practices that are licentious or inconsistent with the
494. 283 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
495. A free exercise exemption for the landlord who discriminates arguably vio-
lates both the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses. Certainly Atkisson, 130
Cal. Rptr. 375, found the denial of public housing to unmarried cohabitants violated
the rights of privacy, due process and equal protection. For the proposition that all
individual free exercise exemptions may violate the Equal Protection and Establish-
ment Clauses, see generally Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, supra note 25, and In Defense of Smith, supra note 139.
496. The very first sentence of the California Constitution provides: "All people are
by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are en-
joying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property,
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." CAL. CONSr., Art. I, Sec-
tion 1.
497. The notable exceptions are the Donahue and Evelyn Smith cases.
498. Robbins, 695 P.2d 695 (right of privacy protects diverse personal freedoms in-
cluding the right of unmarried persons to cohabit). See also Atkisson, 130 Cal. Rptr.
375 (evicting cohabiting tenant from public housing violated right of privacy); Rider v.
Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1988) (state constitutional right of privacy applies
to sexual relations outside marriage); Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404 (Cal.
1987) (same); Wellman v. Wellman, 164 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1980) (prohibition on over-
night guests for custodial parent violated right of privacy).
499. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 439, 440 & n.3 (Cal. 1980).
The court said the constitutional provision was intended to "ensure a right of privacy
not only in one's family, but in one's home." Id. at 439.
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peace and safety of the state. There is no such limitation on the
constitutional right to privacy.500
Given the California Constitution's expansive protection for the
right of privacy and its more circumscribed protection for the free
exercise of religion, the cavalier attitude of the Donahue and Eve-
lyn Smith courts toward the unmarried couple's constitutional right
of privacy is especially troublesome. The Donahue court perceived
nothing inappropriate or offensive about a "neutral" inquiry into.
the tenants' marital status, despite the constitutional protection for
sexual privacy and an explicit prohibition in the FEHA on any in-
quiry about marital status.50 1 Furthermore, an inquiry that likely
will be used as the basis for discriminating against the tenant hardly
can be characterized as "neutral."
The Evelyn Smith court went further. It completely abrogated
all rights of privacy guaranteed to unmarried couples under the
California Constitution.502 The court held that because claimant's
free exercise rights permit her to refuse to rent to unmarried
couples, ipso facto, she may inquire into their marital status. 503
This is a naked non sequitur. When the tenants raise federal and
state constitutional rights of privacy, those countervailing constitu-
tional considerations are an aspect of the balance that the court
must address in determining whether a compelling governmental
interest will outweigh any burden on the free exercise right. The
court cannot decide first, without considering the right to privacy,
that there is no compelling interest, and then hold that the claimant
is free, therefore, to invade the tenants' privacy. The Evelyn Smith
court's holding that not only may landlords discriminate against
unmarried couples as tenants, but that they may also violate the
constitutional rights of privacy of these and all other tenants, ex-
tends far beyond the scope of the case and sets a dangerous prece-
dent. The suggestion in Donahue, expressly confirmed in Evelyn
Smith, permits an inquisition into the personal lives of all potential
500. See Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Andrews, 260 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120
(1989). When these two California constitutional provisions are construed with the
explicit policy statement in California's fair housing law (that it is a necessary exercise
of the police power to protect the welfare and peace of the people of the state), it is
incomprehensible that the majorities in Donahue and Evelyn Smith could have
reached the decisions they did, unless, of course, the courts were motivated by some-
thing other than legitimate statutory and constitutional interpretation.
501. CAL GoV'T CODE § 12955(b).
502. See supra part I.LA.1b.
503. Evelyn Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395.
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tenants so that landlords may determine if the tenants are free
from sin according to the landlord's religious beliefs.
The Evelyn Smith court's final insult was to trivialize the tenants'
claim to their privacy as not serious or egregious, but slight. Cases
like Griswold,5°4 Eisenstadt,505 and Carey5°6 suggest that an inquiry
into someone's sexual relations is hardly "trivial." The right of pri-
vacy is just as "dear" to those whose privacy is violated as the right
of free exercise is to those who believe that right has been violated.
For the Evelyn Smith court to exalt the latter by belittling the for-
mer shows a lack of civility and judicial restraint.
C. Harm to Society
The third justification supporting a general policy against indi-
vidual exemptions in the landlord discrimination cases is the gener-
alized harm caused to society by discrimination. Aspects of this
harm include the effects of invidious discrimination on the society
as a whole, the "floodgates" phenomenon that is likely to occur
from granting individual exemptions to the antidiscrimination laws,
and the implication of Establishment Clause values.
1. Societal Effects of Invidious Discrimination
A person's marital status, like a person's race or sex, indicates
nothing about his or her attitudes, characteristics or potential. It is
a "false measure of individual worth, one unfair and oppressive to
the person concerned, one harmful to others because discrimina-
tion inflicts a grave and recurring injury upon society as a
whole. ' '507 All civil rights legislation is based upon the premise that
society as a whole will benefit from the elimination of offensive and
demeaning stereotypes and arbitrary, irrational prejudices.
Invidious discrimination is a personal injustice that inflicts psy-
chological injury by stigmatizing its victims as inferior and robbing
them of personal dignity.508 Overt judicial endorsement com-
504. 381 U.S. 479 (holding that a Connecticut law prohibiting use of contraceptives
was an unconstitutional intrusion upon the right of marital privacy).
505. 405 U.S. 438 (holding that Massachusetts statute permitting married persons
to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy but prohibiting distribution of contra-
ceptives to single persons for that purpose violated Equal Protection Clause).
506. 431 U.S. 678 (holding that regulations imposing a burden on decision as funda-
mental as whether to bear or beget a child may be justified only by compelling state
interest and must be narrowly tailored).
507. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 32. For discussion and analysis of eradica-
tion of discrimination as a compelling governmental interest, see supra part IV.A.
508. See Roberts, 468 U.S. 609; Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 37. Although
marital status is not a suspect classification (as is race) or an immutable characteristic
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pounds the injury.50 9 In the landlord discrimination cases, the in-
jury caused to the tenant by the landlord's discrimination itself is
separate from the injury paused by the lost access to housing.
Therefore, suggestions such as the court's proposition in Dona-
hue510 that tenants simply can look elsewhere for alternative hous-
ing might resolve the lack-of-access injury, but do not even
recognize the discrimination injury. It also sounds disturbingly
close to "separate but equal," the rationale that once was for many
a perfectly acceptable justification for racial discrimination.
When a court condones business decisionmaking motivated by
misinformed beliefs about individuals based on stereotypes, it legit-
imizes and magnifies the harm done to society. Reliance on stereo-
types is precisely what the legislature intended to discourage and
prohibit by enacting civil rights laws. The court's stamp of official
approval on a landlord's overt violation of antidiscrimination laws
undercuts the stated public policy behind the fair housing laws and
sends a cynical message that antidiscrimination laws can be vio-
lated with impunity. Judicial vindication is intrinsically valuable.
An otherwise unacceptable act earns credibility and respectability
from judicial recognition. With this message, coupled with the
court's tone and the trivialization of the victim's rights, the decision
perhaps functions as a nod and a conspiratorial wink to those who
are not sincerely religious. The courts imply that if you are clever
enough to disguise your otherwise unacceptable bias in the respect-
able cloth of religion, they will endorse your violation of the an-
tidiscrimination laws (which are not meant to be taken all that
seriously anyway). Thus, the court neutralizes the message the fair
housing laws were intended to impart.
In Roberts, the United States Supreme Court alluded to its fre-
quent recognition that invidious discrimination causes serious so-
cial and personal harms. The Court stated that based on "archaic
(as are race and sex), those distinctions do not negate the personal injustice, the psy-
chological injury, and the stigma that attend any invidious discrimination.
509. Besides the demeaning "message" to the tenants that they are inferior, the
court's preferential treatment of the landlord violates the Establishment Clause: "Di-
rect government action endorsing... a particular religious practice is invalid .... [I]t
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insid-
ers, favored members of the political community." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Not satisfied with merely approving a double in-
jury to the tenants, the court, particularly in the French case, proceeded to heap ridi-
cule and abuse on the tenants for daring to think they had a claim that might
outweigh that of the clearly superior landlord.
510. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32.
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and over-broad assumptions . . . [it] forces individuals to labor
under stereotypical notions ... [and] thereby both deprives per-
sons of their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of
wide participation in political, economic and cultural life.' 5 1 1 The
Court found that acts of invidious discrimination cause unique evils
that government has a compelling interest to prevent. As such,
those practices are entitled to no constitutional protection.
In addition to actual and symbolic harm to society, discrimina-
tion may also create secondary effects. For example, widespread
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws that permit denial of ac-
cess to housing may contribute to the societal problem of home-
lessness. Because many thousands of unmarried couples have
children, this would affect not only single individuals but families
as well. 12 Furthermore, exemptions from discrimination laws may
significantly encourage private discrimination in all areas, thus ex-
acerbating the divisiveness that discrimination engenders.513
511. 468 U.S. at 625, 628. See also Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574 (discriminatory
treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the society and violates fundamental public
policy; governmental interest outweighs any "public benefit" conferred by school);
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 569 (1984). Justice Powell, in his concurrence in
Bob Jones Univ., expressed concern for the element of "conformity" that informed
the majority's analysis. The majority ignored the important role of tax exemptions in
encouraging "diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints" that
contributed to a "vigorous, pluralistic society." 461 U.S. at 609-10. The effect of a
free exercise exemption in the landlord discrimination cases creates the opposite ef-
fect. It stifles diversity in order to preserve the majoritarian moral scheme, of which
the deciding judges are no doubt a part.
512. There is also the view that no individual, religion-based exemptions should be
granted, partly because of their effect on society. In a pluralistic society such as ours,
exemptions for some and not others create ill will, resentment and divisiveness, fur-
ther weakening any sense of community. See West, supra note 37, at 602-03.
513. This effect would, of course, emasculate the policy behind the fair housing and
all other civil rights laws. The extent to which an exemption would affect the policy or
purpose of the regulation is and should be an important consideration in whether an
exemption should be granted. In Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, for example, the fact that an
exemption for the Amish from the compulsory school attendance law would have a
neutral affect on the policy of ensuring minimal education of children was dispositive.
In Yoder, the state's compelling interest in requiring children to attend school until
age sixteen was to prepare citizens who could participate effectively in society and to
prepare individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. The
evidence showed that forcing Amish children to attend public school, rather than go
through the Amish religion's own well-established and effective, albeit informal, pro-
gram of vocational education that was precisely tailored to the roles they would fill in
Amish society, would do little to achieve the state's articulated interest in the statute.
In terms of the ultimate value of education in preparing a child "for life," the Amish
program had a demonstrated record of success in training and preparing Amish chil-
dren not only for their participation in the segregated Amish community, but also for
their roles, however limited, in interaction with mainstream society and as productive,
law abiding and self-sufficient citizens, however idiosyncratic some of their customs.
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2. The "Floodgates" Phenomenon
The second aspect of societal harm caused by exemptions for dis-
criminatory conduct is the probability of a plethora of similar
claims for exemption. As in other areas of judicial decisionmaking,
free exercise jurisprudence has been influenced by what might be
called the "floodgates" phenomenon. Considering that judicial de-
cisions are made necessarily on a case-by-case basis, to "do justice"
a court must keep one eye on the case at issue and the other on the
possible larger consequences of that decision. The importance of
this dual perspective is magnified in free exercise cases when the
court realizes that an exemption granted may be tantamount to an
invitation to others to assert similar claims. If the court grants a
few exemptions, then refuses further requests, blatant unfairness
and inequity result. If the court grants exemptions to all comers,
complete chaos may result. Before anarchy and chaos reigned
supreme, the courts would be required to close the door they had
opened, resulting in decisions that were arbitrary, unpredictable
and discriminatory, thus creating an unfair advantage for those
who win the race to the courthouse.514
The Supreme Court has been keenly aware for decades that judi-
cial recognition of the potential consequences of an exemption is
essential to responsible decisionmaking. Justice Frankfurter stated
in his dissent in Barnette in 1943, "I am aware that we must decide
the case before us and not some other case. But that does not
mean that a case is dissociated from the past and unrelated to the
future."515 In Braunfeld, the Court acknowledged the source of the
dilemma. It stated that
When entering the area of religious freedom, we must be fully
cognizant of the particular protection that the Constitution has
accorded it. Abhorrence of religious persecution and intoler-
ance is a basic part of our heritage. But we are a cosmopolitan
In other words, the Amish demonstrated that they could on their own meet-or even
surpass-the state's goals under the compulsory secondary education law, thus nulli-
fying the state's compelling interest in secondary education at least as to the Amish.
The Yoder case is distinguishable from practically every other free exercise case
ever decided because of this complete absence of effect on the state's purpose if the
exemption was granted. For this reason, Yoder as an exemption case is often seen as
an aberration and effectively limited to its facts. Obviously, there is no relationship
between Yoder and the landlord discrimination cases, where the effect of an exemp-
tion on the policy behind the statute is direct and disastrous. Any reliance on Yoder
in the landlord discrimination cases is therefore completely misplaced.
514. See West, supra note 37, at 604-05.
515. 319 U.S. at 660 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious
preference.5 16
In our widely diverse and heterogeneous society, faced with the
possibility of "myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of
religious beliefs... [and] no principled way.., to distinguish"
among the claims, the Supreme Court uniformly has rejected the
individual claim for exemption.517 Therefore, any conscientious
and responsible court will consider the potential or probable conse-
quences of an exemption. This is not pure speculation.518 In
pondering the potential for the floodgates, several variables are
relevant. As discussed below, these factors include: (a) the prob-
able number of individuals who could be affected adversely by sim-
ilar exemptions; (b) the attractiveness of the opportunity for an
exemption to a similar claimant; and (c) the risk, if any, involved in
acquiring "standing" to assert a claim.
516. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.
517. Lee, 455 U.S. at 253. Our country's history and tradition of cultural diversity
and religious pluralism explains both the Court's approach to the controversy and the
existence of the controversy in the first place. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 610
n.4 (Powell, J., concurring): "A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been
respect for diversity. This has been characteristic of the peoples from numerous lands
who have built our country. It is the essence of our democratic system." See also
Gillette, 401 U.S. at 455, 457 ("A virtually limitless variety of beliefs are subsumable
under the rubric, 'objection to a particular war.' Ours is a nation of enormous hetero-
geneity in respect of political views, moral codes and religious persuasions."); Bowen,
476 U.S. at 708 n.17 ("It is readily apparent that virtually every action that the gov-
ernment takes, no matter how innocuous it might appear, is potentially susceptible to
a free exercise objection."); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310 ("In the realm of religious faith,
and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one
man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor... the essential characteristic of
[our] liberties is that under their shield many types of life, character, opinion, and
belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more neces-
sary than in our country for a people composed of many races and of many creeds.");
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 658 ("When dealing with religious scruples we are dealing with
an almost numberless variety of doctrines and beliefs entertained with equal sincerity
by the particular groups."); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 439 ("A broad range of governmental
activities will always be considered essential to the spiritual well-being of some citi-
zens, often on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. Others will find the very
same activities deeply offensive and perhaps incompatible with their own search for
spiritual fulfillment and with the tenets of their religion.").
518. On this issue, the courts that decided Donahue, Evelyn Smith and French seem
either doggedly determined to ignore both the United States Supreme Court admoni-
tion and the real consequences of their decisions or myopically convinced that there
will be no consequences of their decisions.
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a. Number of Individuals Potentially Adversely Affected by
Similar Claims
The logical extension of an exemption for landlords who wish to
avoid "facilitating" a sin or the mere appearance thereof is daunt-
ing. There are probably very few acts of human conduct of which
some religion somewhere does not disapprove. Thus, various land-
lords may consider any type of behavior committed by any tenant
to be sinful. As a result, the outcome is premised in the landlord's
assumptions. 19 Clearly, after a short time, the exceptions will
swallow the rule.
Although the Court under the standard set forth by the Supreme
Court may not question the propriety or correctness of an asserted
"sincerely held religious belief," it rather strains the credulity that a
landlord having certain religious beliefs is now permitted to con-
sider the possibility that any prospective tenant might indulge in
any type of behavior that the landlord's religion considers sinful,
and that the landlord is then further permitted to refuse to rent to
anyone who might (or is likely to or the landlord assumes is likely
to) indulge in such "sinful" behavior.
Considering the infinite variety of acts and behaviors that might
be considered sinful in a country as religiously pluralistic as ours,
this exercise borders on the fantastical. Could a landlord ask
about, assume conduct, or refuse to rent to (or a business owner
refuse to do business with) someone who did or might do or might
have done any of the following: cohabit, practice birth control,
have an abortion or advocate the right to an abortion, have a child
out of wedlock, fornicate, commit adultery, get divorced, enter into
an interracial marriage or relationship, drink alcohol, use drugs,
gamble, smoke, eat meat, eat pork, eat meat and milk at the same
meal, dance, play cards, swear or curse, celebrate birthdays and
holidays, dress or speak or conduct themselves in a suggestive man-
ner, advocate equal rights for women or minorities, seek the assist-
519. This "expansion" of the factual grounds for a free exercise claim is not so
faficiful as one might think. Even within the Donahue case, Mrs. Donahue testified
that she might refuse to rent to a married couple if one of the partners was a Catholic
who had previously been divorced or if she knew that one of the partners was a Cath-
olic and the couple had married outside the Catholic Church. Fair Employment and
Hous. Comm'n v. Donahue, Administrative Record, Volume II, Tab 2, at 105, 110
(cited in Appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits, No. S024538 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1992)
at 14, and Real Party in Interest, Opening Brief on the Merits, at 3). And in the
Evelyn Smith case, Mrs. Smith's counsel took the position that a Catholic landlord
had the right to refuse to rent commercial space to an attorney who does divorce




ance of medical professionals, approve of (or be) a woman working
outside the home, fail to attend church on Sunday, be a homosex-
ual or bi-sexual, adhere to a religion that does not recognize a sin-
gle supreme being, or belong to a race or religion different from
that of the landlord?
As the examples illustrate, in the landlord discrimination cases,
the number of individuals who could be affected adversely by simi-
lar exemptions is very large indeed. Because the courts in these
cases have held that landlords are excused from the antidiscrimina-
tion laws, both to avoid facilitating someone else's perceived sin
and to avoid contributing to the mere "appearance of evil," the
cases have extremely broad implications. No state regulation is
forcing landlords to choose between compliance with the regula-
tion and their direct commission (that is, their own conduct) of a
sin according to their religious beliefs. The relationship is much
more attenuated and far reaching than that. When the courts open
the door to religious exemptions for anyone who wants to avoid
the perceived facilitation or appearance of someone else's sin, there
is simply no limit to the number of individuals who could be af-
fected by such a ruling. Certainly, the ruling affects all unmarried
couples who are actually cohabiting. In addition, the ruling could
affect all unmarried, unrelated adults who live together or intend
to, for whatever reason, including roommates and friends. In Cali-
fornia alone, nearly half of all households do not contain a married
couple, and nearly half of the households in California are occu-
pied by renters.520 Because the elderly, the poor, students and eth-
nic minorities are most likely to live with someone else for
economic reasons, these groups would be affected
disproportionately.
b. Motivation for Fraudulent Claims
The second consideration in anticipating the consequences of an
exemption is the "attractiveness" of the opportunity for an exemp-
tion to similar claimants. Stated negatively, if the motivation
(other than religion, of course) to bring a claim is strong, the po-
tential for fraudulent claims exists. The California Supreme Court
stated the issue succinctly, when it observed that
although judicial examination of the truth or validity of religious
beliefs is foreclosed by the First Amendment, the courts of ne-
520. Real Party in Interest, Opening Brief on the Merits, No. S024538 (Sup. Ct.
Cal. 1992) at 15, filed April 30, 1992. See also supra part I.A. for statistics regarding
unmarried couples in the United States.
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cessity must ask whether the claimant holds his beliefs honestly
and in good faith or whether he seeks to wear the mantle of
religious immunity merely as a cloak for illegal activities.521
In fact, the absence of a potential for fraudulent claims appears to
be a sine qua non for the United States Supreme Court to grant a
free exercise exemption. Thus, the Supreme Court has addressed
or alluded to this issue in nearly every free exercise case it has
decided.
For instance, in the Sherbert-Thomas group of unemployment
benefits cases,522 there was little evidence that permitting the ex-
emption would engender widespread abuse by the filing of fraudu-
lent claims by unscrupulous claimants. The substantial
inconvenience and risk a claimant would have to undergo in order
to test his free exercise claim would function as an effective deter-
rent to most fraudulent claims. It was unlikely that large numbers
of people would quit their jobs voluntarily to take advantage of an
opportunity to cheat the unemployment compensation system.523
Similarly, in Yoder, the law itself was sufficiently narrow that an
exemption would not invite a plethora of claims based on related
laws.524 Further, an exemption from the state law requiring educa-
tion to the age of sixteen did not present a particularly tempting
opportunity to feign religious belief.525 In these cases, the insignifi-
cant risk of fraudulent claims removed one obstacle to the Court's
willingness to grant exemptions.
Cases involving economic advantage, with no threshold incon-
venience to be overcome, present quite a different picture. The
Court in Lee distinguished Yoder by observing that, although the
Amish claimed free exercise exemptions in both cases, and in both
cases the Amish had an alternative mechanism for meeting the
521. People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1964) (relying on Ballard, 322 U.S.
78). The court's concern for fraudulent claims is not overstated. The only distinctions
between authentic and bogus claims are verity and sincerity. Because the court will
not question the verity of a claimed religious belief and will tread only very lightly on
the sincerity of the belief, the result could be open season on fraudulent free exercise
claims. It would make a complete shambles of our entire civil and criminal law struc-
ture if wholesale exemptions were granted. Therefore, it is essential that individual
exemptions, if granted at all, be strictly and narrowly circumscribed to prevent an
onslaught of superficially similar claims that could well be fraudulent.
522. See supra part I.B.
523. See also Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring).
524. The purpose of the statute was not only to provide educational opportunities
for children but also to minimize exploitative and unhealthful child labor practices.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 228-29. The Court perceived the Amish as uniquely equipped to
meet this dual purpose on their own. Id. at 235-36.
525. Id at 235-36.
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state's interest, the consequences of an exemption from social se-
curity taxes in Lee would be far more significant than an exemption
from compulsory education in Yoder.5- The opportunity to escape
from the payment of taxes would be irresistible to many, and the
Court implied that not all those "religious" claims would be au-
thentic.527 Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, was consider-
ably less oblique in identifying the problem. He stated, "[a] tax
exemption entails no cost to the claimant; if tax exemptions were
dispensed on religious grounds, every citizen would have an eco-
nomic motivation to join the favored sects. ' 52
Although perhaps no motivator could be as universal as tax
avoidance in encouraging people to "get religion," free exercise ex-
emptions from the discrimination laws are likely to produce sub-
stantial numbers of fraudulent religious claims as well.
Fortunately, not everyone would be compelled to religious conver-
sion in order to practice discrimination with impunity. But the in-
vitation to elevate socially unacceptable conduct based on personal
bias and prejudice to a "core belief" of newly discovered religious
sensibility would be irresistible to some, perhaps many. The undis-
puted presence of widespread intolerance and discrimination in
our society 29 suggests that those exemptions would be pursued
avidly. The various forms of discrimination that exist in a society
as socioeconomically, ethnically, politically and religiously diverse
as ours are legion and, one might argue, growing. Intolerance for
526. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259-60.
527. Id
528. Id at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens recognized that the majority had
rejected the free exercise exemption claimed by the Amish not because of a particu-
larly compelling state interest under these facts (the Amish historically had demon-
strated their ability to care for their own needy and elderly, and their nonpayment of
social security taxes would be more than offset by the elimination of their right to
collect social security benefits), but because of the risk of other claims that would
follow. Stevens conceded that this risk would be small in regard to Amish claims
similar to the one at issue in this case, but he agreed with the majority about the
likelihood that a flood of arguably analogous claims (objection to payment of taxes,
social security or otherwise, on other religious grounds) would follow. In all of the
free exercise/tax exemption cases, the result is partially justified by a concern for
fraudulent claims. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574; Jimmy Swaggart, 493 U.S.
378. The same concern is evident in welfare benefits cases, see Bowen, 476 U.S. 693,
and in draft exemption cases, see Gillette, 401 U.S. 437. The Court, in rejecting a
claim for an exemption from Sunday closing laws, expressed a concern for fraudulent
free exercise claims in order to gain competitive advantage. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S.
at 609.
529. This is evidenced by the myriad federal, state and local laws that make dis-
crimination illegal and the vast volume of literature that addresses the problem.
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what one disagrees with, while not so universal a motivation as
economics, can be every bit as potent where it does exist.5 30
c. Risk in Acquiring "Standing"
The third indicator of the probable larger consequences of an
exemption is the risk, if any, involved in acquiring "standing" to
assert a claim. Secondarily, this factor is also an indicator in the
instant cases of the "sincerity" of the claim. If one must endure
some risk, inconvenience or hardship for the sake of religion at the
pre-claim stage in order to be in a position to assert a free exercise
claim, the opportunity or advantage that an exemption would pro-
vide is considerably less attractive because it is more difficult to
acquire. Justice Stevens observed in Lee that a "tax exemption en-
tails no cost to the claimant."'5 31 Thus, there is no threshold barrier
to discourage fraudulent claims and no inherent test of the claim-
ant's religious sincerity.
In Sherbert and the unemployment cases, there was such a bar-
rier. The Court noted that "[n]o comparable economic motivation
could explain the conduct of the employees in Sherbert and
530. There is some indication that exaggeration of a minor tenet of a religion to a
"central" belief (if not outright fabrication) has already occurred in the landlord dis-
crimination cases that have been decided. The landlords in several of these cases have
been represented by "out of town" litigation counsel for groups advocating the
agenda of the religious right. Jordan Lorence, litigation director for Concerned Wo-
men for America, a conservative Washington, D.C., based organization that lobbies
for the preservation of conservative family values, represented Evelyn Smith. In the
Desilets case, the landlords were represented by attorneys for the American Center
for Law and Justice, a Virginia Beach-based organization founded by Christian evan-
gelist broadcaster Pat Robertson. In two separate interviews with Lorence, he indi-
cated that the religious right had finally found the "hook" on which to hang their
moral and philosophical objections to the behavior of others. In an interview in 1989,
Lorence said, "The cases in the past have been based on general disapproval of sex
outside marriage. Now we've injected the First Amendment with exercise of religion
and I think we have a real clash of values and world views here." Jody Timken, Un-
married Tenants Bring Clash of Values into Court, Cm. Tiun., Aug. 27, 1989, at C-1.
Lorence referred to the growing number of these types of cases around the country
and the fact that the exercise of religious beliefs is the common defense now being
raised. In a different interview, Lorence stated- "The wrinkle injected into the Chico
case [the Evelyn Smith case] is the religious liberty issue. There have been other court
cases in California involving landlords that refused to rent to cohabiting couples, but
there's never been an issue of whether a landlord's right to do that is protected under
the Free Exercise Clause." Jerry DeMuth, Landlords Reject Unmarried Couple on
Religious Grounds, WASH. PosT, Oct. 21,1989, at F-14. These remarks suggest both a
calculated plan to find a "legitimate" basis for conduct that violates the antidis-
crimination laws, and the transparency of the claimed "religious" basis for the objec-
tion to the laws. The courts should be extremely vigilant lest they allow bigots to hide
behind religion.
531. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Thomas. In both of those cases, changes in work requirements dic-
tated by the employer forced the employees to surrender jobs they
would have preferred to retain rather than accept unemployment
compensation." 532 The sincerity of the adherents' religious beliefs
was demonstrated by the risk they were willing to take at the pre-
claim stage: foregoing employment and possibly unemployment
benefits. Similarly in Braunfeld, the dissent noted the evidence of
claimants' sincerity in their conduct: "[iln appellants' business area,
Friday night and Saturday are busy times; yet appellants, true to
their faith, close during the Jewish Sabbath, and make up some, but
not all, of the business lost by opening on Sunday. ' 533 Clearly the
appellants in Braunfeld were willing to "risk" the economic disad-
vantage they would suffer by closing in order to adhere to their
religious beliefs while everyone else was open.
In general, the landlords suffer no inconvenience that would
demonstrate the sincerity of their claim. They take no risks, give
up nothing for their religious beliefs, and merely demand accom-
modation by impeding the rights of others. In this context, with no
reliable indicator of religious sincerity, a high probability of fraud-
ulent claims because of strong motivating factors, and the lack of
risk or sacrifice involved in asserting a claim, these claims should
be viewed with a particularly high degree of suspicion.
.3. Violation of the Establishment Clause
Finally, free exercise exemptions from the antidiscrimination
laws harm society because they collide with First Amendment Es-
tablishment Clause limitations on the state's power to favor reli-
gion.534 In effect, the judicial exemption favors the landlord by
denying the protection of the antidiscrimination laws to the in-
tended beneficiaries of those laws. The Supreme Court summa-
rized the purpose and focus of the Establishment Clause in Gillette
v. United States. It stated that, "[n]ecessarily the constitutional
value at issue is neutrality .... It is surely true that the Establish-
ment Clause prohibits government from abandoning secular pur-
532. Id
533. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
534. For discussion of this view of all individual free exercise exemptions, see supra
note 139, and authorities cited therein. Despite the often-quoted dictum that policies
that advance or inhibit religion may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, see
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), that is not what the Establishment
Clause says. The Establishment Clause prohibits policies that promote or benefit reli-
gion; it does not prohibit policies that inhibit religion. Inhibitions are the province of
the Free Exercise Clause. See Where Rights Begin, supra note 23, at 983 n.172.
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poses in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on religion
as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organiza-
tion. '5 35 The state has a legitimate interest in avoiding even the
appearance of favoring religious over nonreligious applicants.
In the landlord discrimination cases, when the Court grants a
free exercise exemption to the landlord to permit the prohibited
discrimination against the tenants, the Court indicates a clear pref-
erence for favoring religious applicants (for the exemption) over
nonreligious applicants (for protection under the antidiscrimina-
tion laws). The result is an abandonment of the government's sec-
ular purpose by putting an imprimatur. on religion as such.
Essentially, these courts accomplish what no other free exercise
case has ever done; they overtly aid religion by granting an exemp-
tion that denies benefits to the very group the statute is intended to
protect. Furthermore, no reasonable definition of religious free-
dom has ever included a right to require others to observe one's
own beliefs. None could, as that would be a patent violation of the
Establishment Clause.
Both the Evelyn Smith5 36 and the Desilet 537 cases essentially
have been co-opted on the landlord's side by high proffile, right
wing religious groups whose religion-based political agenda is well
known. That involvement converts the Establishment Clause con-
cerns present in any free exercise case into egregious Establish-
ment Clause violations in the landlord discrimination cases. The
Establishment Clause violation is exacerbated because judicial def-
erence to personal, religion-based bias favors the most intolerant
of religions to the detriment of all other religions as well as society
as a whole. Before capitulating to those who would destroy the
Establishment Clause and turn the country into a fundamentalist
Christian state, the courts in Donahue and Evelyn Smith would
have been well advised to ponder what the California Supreme
Court said about the volatile mix of religion and politics. The court
observed:
Ours is a religiously diverse nation .... Respect for the differing
religious choices of the people of this country requires that gov-
ernment neither place its stamp of approval on any particular
535. 401 U.S. at 450. In Lee, Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's rejection of
the free exercise claim not so much as a practical matter (administrative conven-
ience), but to keep the government out of the realm of evaluating the relative merits
of differing religious claims and thus inadvertent encroachment upon the Establish-
ment Clause. 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
536. See supra part JI.A.1.b.
537. See supra part III.A.4.
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religious practice, nor appear to take a stand on any religious
question. In a world frequently torn by religious factionalism
and the violence tragically associated with political division
along religious lines, our nation's position of governmental neu-
trality on religious matters stands as an illuminating example of
the true meaning of freedom and tolerance. 538
D. No Justification for Exemption for Businesses
The fourth justification supporting a general policy against indi-
vidual exemptions in the landlord discrimination cases is that an
exemption for those engaged in for-profit, nonreligion-related
business is simply unsupportable and against public policy. This
type of exemption is unwarranted for several reasons: these land-
lords' businesses have no connection at all to religion; a religious
exemption for businesses contravenes the civil fights laws; the
landlords' burden in these cases is self-imposed and arbitrarily cre-
ated; and there is a less restrictive means available to accommodate
the landlords' exercise of religion.
The landlord discrimination decisions are unprecedented in
holding that landlords' religious beliefs allow them as owners of a
business to refuse to do business with those who do not conform to
their beliefs. To permit a business establishment to cloak discrimi-
nation in the shroud of the free exercise of religion will have a
disturbing and far-reaching impact not only on tenants but also on
patrons and customers of all businesses. If free exercise rights can
trump civil rights across the entire spectrum of business relation-
ships, it could be the death knell for the civil rights laws.
1. No Connection to Religion
The landlords' free exercise claims are asserted in a wholly com-
mercial context: the residential real estate rental market. Clearly,
there is no essential connection or relationship between religion
and the leasing of apartment units. Landlords' businesses in these
cases are not religious corporations or associations.539 Landlords
are operating purely commercial, for-profit enterprises. The hous-
ing accommodations they provide are not offered to further any
538. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 821 (Cal. 1991).
539. In California's fair housing act, there is an express exemption from the prohi-
bition against housing discrimination for renting out a bedroom in an owner-occupied
home. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12927(c). The Legislature also excluded from the defini-
tion of housing accommodations any accommodation operated by a religious associa-
tion in furtherance of a religious purpose. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12927(d).
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religious purpose, and there is no assertion that they have engaged
in this business endeavor under any perceived religious compul-
sion. The landlords' conduct here (refusal to rent to those whose
status they disapprove of) is neither part of a worship service nor
part of a central religious practice. Indeed, it does not even involve
landlords in the direct commission of a purported sin. Rather, it is
their supposed contribution to the presumed sin of another (one of
their business patrons) in a business context. Other than these
landlord discrimination cases, there are no free exercise cases any-
where that have granted exemptions on so attenuated a basis.
There is a close relationship between the centrality of the reli-
gious belief and the context in which the religious claim is raised.
Delving too deeply into "centrality" of the belief to the religious
claim skates dangerously close to unacceptable questioning of the
verity of the belief itself. But because of the relationship of cen-
trality to "burden," a necessary element in balancing, it cannot be
avoided entirely. In this regard, the most "central" religious beliefs
are those that are essential to the worship service itself.
Yet, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to reject even free ex-
ercise claims based on conduct that was at the "theological heart"
of the religious ceremony. In Lyng, 40 the Supreme Court denied
to Native American groups a free exercise exemption, the effect of
which would have been to preserve certain lands that concededly
were essential to the very existence of the Native American reli-
gion. Similarly, in Employment Division v. Smith,5 41 the Supreme
Court refused an exemption to Native Americans for the sacra-
mental use of peyote, despite the fact that peyote as a sacramental
symbol was as central to the claimants' worship service as bread
and wine is to some Christian services.542 Indeed, the peyote was
an object of worship in itself. In general, the Court has denied
540. 485 U.S. 439. Site specific land use is at the very heart of Native American
religions. It functions much as dogma does in Western religions. Id at 460. The
worship ceremony consisted of traveling to specific historically and religiously signifi-
cant locations and performing specific spiritual activities and rituals. The Court con-
ceded that the government road through the area could well destroy the Native
Americans' ability to practice their religion. Id at 439-40.
541. 494 U.S. 872. The reliance of the majority in Donahue and Evelyn Smith on
People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964), is misplaced. The court in Woody, Califor-
nia's "peyote" case, granted an exemption, but only because the use of peyote was the
central feature of the Native Americans' worship service and an object of worship
itself. There is nothing remotely similar in the voluntary, commercial activity under-
taken by the landlords in Donahue and Evelyn Smith.
542. 494 U.S. 872.
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most exemptions where the belief, even if not a component of the
worship ceremony, was a central tenet of the religion.543
In the landlord discrimination cases, the landlords believe that
facilitating presumed extramarital sex or the appearance of evil is
sinful. Although this belief is certainly not a component of a wor-
ship service, a prohibition on the direct commission of acts of extra-
marital sex is arguably a central tenet of some Christian religions.
On the other hand, a prohibition on the facilitation of the assumed
sexual acts of third parties is undoubtedly not a central tenet of
those same religions.
The relationship between religion and the context in which the
claim arises is also relevant. In many Supreme Court cases,
although the subject matter of the regulation was traditionally the
subject of religious beliefs as well, the Court has denied exemp-
tions when the two conflicted. For example, rules regarding mar-
riage and the rearing and educating of children are central to many
religious belief systems. Yet, when conduct based on those beliefs
conflicts with state regulations, the claim for an exemption from
the law in order to act in conformity with the religious belief is
usually denied.5"
In contrast, when the context in which the claim arose bears no
relationship whatever to religious activity, the Court has been
quick to note that and to deny the claim. In Braunfeld,545 Ortho-
dox Jews and merchants who engaged in the retail sale of clothing
and home furnishings wanted an exemption from the Sunday clos-
ing laws because their religious beliefs required them to close their
businesses on Saturday. The Court noted that the Sunday closing
law simply regulated secular activity, imposing only an indirect bur-
den on the claimants, and the state's interest in a uniform day of
rest was compelling, "particularly in this day and age of increasing
state concern with public welfare legislation."5 6 In Lee, the Court
addressed the "business" issue directly and forcefully. The Court
stated that when religious believers enter into commercial activity,
they cannot expect the regulations governing conduct in that area
543. See Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (central obligation of male Orthodox Jews to wear
yarmulke); Prince, 321 U.S. 158 (public distribution of religious pamphlets by children
as well as adults was a central tenet of the religion of the Jehovah's Witnesses); Reyn-
olds, 98 U.S. 145 (duty of male members to practice polygamy was central tenet of
Mormon Church).
544. See, e.g., Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (marriage); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574 (ed-
ucation); Prince, 321 U.S. 158 (children).
545. See supra notes 32-35, and infra note 552.
546. 366 U.S. at 605-07.
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of endeavor to conform to their personal religious beliefs. Further-
more, they cannot expect to be shielded from every burden inci-
dent to practicing their religious beliefs in the commercial arena.5 47
Despite the fervent wishes of some religious minorities, there is a
secular world, and renting apartments is not a religious exercise.
Landlords are engaged in a wholly commercial endeavor, whatever
their personal beliefs, and their conduct should thus be subordinate
to legitimate government regulation of commercial activities.
Whatever tolerance and respect for diversity this nation has man-
aged to achieve results directly from the existence of a boundary
between personal beliefs and marketplace decisions. If one wishes
to do business in a secular commercial world, one must be willing
to play by the rules. Refusal to do so, especially when sanctioned
by the court, creates chaos in the marketplace. Perhaps those who
are unwilling or unable to abide by the rules should seek an area of
endeavor with rules more to their liking.
2. Religious Exemption for Business Contravenes Civil Rights
Laws
The second reason that a religious exemption for landlords is un-
warranted is that such an exemption contravenes the civil rights
laws. The civil rights laws do not prohibit all discrimination.
Purely private acts of discrimination, morally reprehensible though
they may be, are not actionable.548 Legislatures in effect draw a
line distinguishing public from private activity, regulating only the
former. This does not mean that those who cross the line waive all
constitutional liberties. By entering the marketplace, however,
participants do give up the right to consider only their own per-
sonal rights and beliefs when they act. They become subject to
state rules and regulations that prevent them from compelling con-
547. 455 U.S. at 261. Despite the majority's protestations to the contrary, the dis-
senting judge in Donahue correctly relied on Pines v. Thomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866(1984), where the court held that enjoining publishers of Christian Yellow Pages from
limiting ads to "born again" Christians did not violate business owners' free exercise
rights, despite the fact that the nonprofit enterprise was operated for a religious pur-
pose. Requiring claimant business to act in a nondiscriminatory manner did not re-
quire them to endorse religious beliefs or business practices of anyone with whom
they did business. Claimants' secular, commercial conduct performed for profit ne-
cessitated their compliance with the civil rights laws. "A legal compulsion by court
order to refrain from discrimination... can hardly be characterized as an endorse-
ment." Id at 878.
548. See, e.g., Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545. See also Pacific Union Club v. Superior
Ct., 232 Cal. App. 3d 60, 72 (1991), relying on Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
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formity to their beliefs as a precondition for others to do business
with them. They remain free, in their private lives, to associate or
not with whomever they please, sinners or saints. But in the mar-
ketplace, those rights are circumscribed. Business people may not
vent their personal animus at the expense of those seeking to fulfill
basic human needs.
The fair housing laws seek to eliminate the use of stereotypes,
arbitrary prejudices and personal biases as a part of the business
decisionmaking process because they have no bearing on the legiti-
mate business interests of the decisionmaker.549 The laws are di-
rected only toward business but, in order to achieve their remedial
goal, are construed very broadly so as to include every possible
kind of business.
Screening people who live in rental housing, based on character-
istics that bear no relationship to whether the person would be a
good tenant from a business perspective, is precisely what the fair
housing laws were designed to eliminate. Housing is a commodity
like anything else. Those who choose to transact in the commodity
are operating a business and it is essential that they conform to
state laws prohibiting discrimination just as every other business
owner must.
To permit landlords to ask all prospective renters about their
past, present and future sexual/fornication/adultery activities or
simply assume certain conduct and then act according to their "sin-
cerely held religious beliefs," may lead to an extension of such in-
trusive questioning into other business contexts. To illustrate,
imagine a scenario in which an individual enters a retail store (or
the lunch counter of a department or drugstore) to purchase an
item of clothing, and before serving the customer the proprietor
asks her about her marital status and whether she sleeps with her
boyfriend. When the proprietor finds out she is unmarried and yet
involved in a sexual relationship with her boyfriend, he refuses to
serve her. When challenged, the proprietor defends his conduct by
saying that based on his religion, he does not approve of her sexual
relationship with her boyfriend and, therefore, claims the right to
refuse to serve the customer because providing food or clothing is
"facilitating" a lifestyle that he believes is sinful.
This scenario is disturbingly close to the tactics used in the South
thirty years ago to deny service to racial minorities in "whites only"
establishments. Whether or not such discrimination was based on
549. See generally O'Connor, 662 P.2d 427; Marina Poin Ltd, 640 P.2d 115.
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a religious belief that the races should be kept separate, the effect
on those subjected to discrimination was identical. Whether the
motivation was hatred or misguided religious belief did not change
the harmful effect on the member of the racial minority who was
refused service.
Landlord discrimination is not that different from the lunch
counter or retail store. Landlords have elicited or presumed
knowledge about the prospective tenants' private lives. Such infor-
mation is irrelevant to a business decision to rent to good tenants.
Furthermore, if the landlords' objection is to "facilitating" the
commission of a sin by someone else, then retailers who provide
one with any of life's necessities-food, clothing, household goods,
etc.-would be entitled to an exemption in order to avoid enabling
those purchasers to live and engage in lifestyle choices, thereby
"facilitating" those purchasers in committing sins. One cannot pre-
dict where this line of "reasoning" might end.
Few would argue that a landlord's personal bias should receive
greater consideration than a tenant's basic need for housing. Why
that identical bias should be condoned by a court when it is clothed
as a religious objection is unclear, especially when the court admits
that personal bias, even clothed as religious objection, would not
be judicially condoned if it was based on race. The bias is no less
irrational and its effect on innocent third parties is no less damag-
ing either because it is based on race rather than marital status, or
because it is based on an admission of personal prejudice rather
than religion. It seems all one needs to do to exercise otherwise
prohibited personal prejudices is to dress them up as religious ob-
jections, thus rendering them respectable and worthy of judicial
protection, even at the expense of those whom the legislature has
deemed to be worthy and deserving of protection from
discrimination.
3. Landlords' Burden Is Self-Imposed and Arbitrarily Created
The third reason that a religious exemption for landlords is un-
warranted is that landlords' burdens are both self-imposed and ar-
bitrarily created.550 As the Supreme Court said in Lee, when
550. Arguably, there is no constitutionally cognizable burden on landlords' exercise
of religion in these cases. In the usual free exercise case, the claimant is unable to
engage in religiously inspired conduct without violating the law. Here there is no
burden on the claimant's conduct. The fair housing law does not force landlords to
live together in sin against the dictates of their religion. Prohibiting the landlord from
imposing his or her religious beliefs and religiously motivated appropriate conduct
standards on someone else does not burden the landlord's free exercise of religion.
822
DISCRIMINATION-FREE HO USING
members of a religion "enter into commercial activity as a matter
of choice, '551 they cannot expect to impose their views on everyone
else. When the conflict between religious beliefs and government
regulations arises, it is relevant that the claimant's predicament is
caused by his or her own voluntary choices. If the "burden" from
which the claimant wishes to escape by means of an exemption is
self-imposed, the law is often reluctant, with good reason, to
intervene.552
Landlords enter into the residential rental market as a matter of
voluntary choice in order to make money. If they do not like the
government regulations imposed upon them in that activity, they
are free to choose some other area of endeavor that is not regu-
lated in a manner that conflicts with their religious beliefs. If, how-
ever, they choose freely and voluntarily to remain in an economic
endeavor that is regulated in order to achieve a substantial govern-
mental interest, then the landlords must live with the consequences
of their economic choices. The choice for these landlords should
be between being landlords and complying with the law, or doing
something else where they encounter no religious conflict.
Further, landlords act arbitrarily in practicing their religious be-
liefs so as to create the burden. Landlords apparently do not ques-
tion single, prospective tenants as to their past sexual history and
present and future sexual intentions, or married prospective ten-
ants regarding their history or intent regarding adultery. If land-
lords merely assume an unmarried couple is indulging in sex
outside marriage, but single (or married) prospective renters are
not, then landlords have made not one but at least two and possibly
three unwarranted assumptions. If their "sincerely held religious
belief" is that it is a sin to facilitate sex outside marriage, then from
a logical perspective it is equally incumbent upon them to avoid
facilitating the sinful behavior of single, noncohabiting renters and
married renters, as well as cohabiting couples. Assuming all un-
married couples will engage in extramarital sex and yet failing to
The Free Exercise Clause may afford landlords protection from the government's
forcing them to live in sin. It does not, however, afford landlords the right to dictate
the conduct of third parties to suit landlords' religious beliefs. Thus, the "burden"
that the landlords claim in these cases is readily distinguishable from the burden in
typical free exercise cases.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the landlord's free exercise of religion is bur-
dened, that burden is self-imposed and warrants no judicial relief.
551. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
552. For instance, in Braunfeld, the claimants had chosen voluntarily to enter the
retail business. The Court saw no constitutional infirmity in putting claimants to a
choice between their business and their religion.
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even question single and married tenants renders landlords' exer-
cise of their "religious beliefs" both over- and under-inclusive.
4. Availability of Less Restrictive Means
The fourth reason that a religious exemption for landlords is un-
warranted is that there are less restrictive means available to ac-
commodate landlords' exercise of their religion. If the courts are
willing to view the landlord-tenant, religion-discrimination conflict
as something other than an all-or-nothing battle, both interests
may be accommodated by applying a balancing test. Usually, in
balancing the state interest and a religious belief, both the court
and the claimant look to the government to demonstrate not only
that the government's interest is compelling, but also that the
state's goal is accomplished by the least restrictive means possible.
Occasionally, however, something resembling a "least restrictive
means" emanates from another source. In Yoder,553 the Amish
claimants, by demonstrating their successful and effective tradition
of training their children beyond eighth grade, established a less
restrictive alternative to the state compulsory education law.
Moreover, this alternative also accommodated their religious
practice.
In the landlord discrimination cases, although the state's interest
in preventing discrimination is compelling, the state has not pro-
posed (probably because it cannot) a less restrictive alternative to
accommodate landlords' religious beliefs than compliance with the
antidiscrimination statutes. Also, landlords certainly have not
fashioned or proposed their own less restrictive alternative to meet
the state's goal of ridding the society of unjust discrimination.
In most of the landlord discrimination cases, the religious objec-
tion is to "knowingly" facilitating the commission of sin by some-
one else. If landlords can be insulated from the knowledge,
perhaps the landlords' "sin" would disappear. One obvious solu-
tion is simply not to inquire as to tenants' marital status and not to
make assumptions about behavior based on marital status. A pos-
sible alternative solution is the employment of a manager or man-
agement company to manage the property, including screening
potential tenants. Although perhaps more expensive, this avoids
the substantially more adverse economic impact incurred by pursu-
ing another business. Employment of a rental agent or adoption of
a "don't ask, don't assume" policy by landlords would require a
553. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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minimal alteration in landlords' behavior that could then accom-
modate both their own religious beliefs and the civil and constitu-
tional rights of their tenants.554 If landlords are unwilling to make
554. This is comparable to the reasonable alternative means requirement under Ti-
tle VII in the employment area, where both employer and employee have duties re-
garding the accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs. Civil Rights Act of
1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 93 (1975). An-
other possible solution: If the purpose of the antidiscrimination statutes regarding
housing is to prevent and redress discrimination in housing (that is, to make the vic-
tims of housing discrimination whole), it does not seem fair to abandon that laudable
and necessary goal entirely when a landlord raises a countervailing constitutional
claim such as free exercise. Even if a landlord's constitutional claim is valid, why does
the court simply not bother to make the victims whole even as to the tangible detri-
ment to their housing situation? There should be some balance struck between two
colliding constitutional rights when both are compelling. If we are unable to "make
victims whole" in the traditional sense (ordering landlord to rent to them) because
that would violate the landlord's free exercise rights, then victims should be compen-
sated in an alternative manner that may make landlord's free exercise of religion
more costly or more difficult, but not impossible. If the landlord is permitted free
exercise, but it is accomplished only by engaging in unlawful discrimination, the land-
lord should be compelled to compensate his victims so they are not left as the com-
plete losers in the constitutional battle. It is admittedly a Solomonic remedy that will
make no one completely happy, but it will achieve some measure of accommodation
of both constitutional principles. The landlord will still be able to freely exercise that
religious belief that results in unlawful discrimination, but it will be a more costly
exercise. Tenants, the victims of discrimination, will not obtain the specific housing
they desire, but the discriminatory impact will be partially alleviated by enabling them
to obtain comparable and costlier housing elsewhere, but with no greater out-of-
pocket expenditure because of the compensation paid to them by the landlord.
Does balancing always mean choosing one value to the complete exclusion of the
other? In some cases, yes. The court in Donahue conceded that if the discrimination
had been based on race, rather than marital status, the state's compelling interest in
eradicating race discrimination would have prevented the landlords from obtaining an
exemption from the antidiscrimination laws based on their free exercise claim. But in
those cases of obvious discrimination, where the court cannot see its way clear to find
the state's interest sufficiently compelling to override a free exercise claim, perhaps a
middle ground approach that tries to accommodate both constitutional values is bet-
ter, rather than choosing to completely disregard one of those values with its attend-
ant legislative history and strong public policy basis. The state is forced, even when it
has a sufficiently compelling interest in achieving the goal of the statute, to achieve
that goal by the least restrictive alternative in order to accommodate countervailing
compelling constitutional rights of other individuals or classes. Why do we not try to
achieve the same accommodation between warring constitutional rights when the
state's interest is compelling but the court does not want to sacrifice the claimant's
countervailing right? Allow the claimant the free exercise of the constitutional right,
but make the claimant compensate the victims of the discrimination. The two behav-
iors or acts cannot possibly be accommodated (tenants want to rent the house from
the landlord and the landlord does not want to rent to the tenants), but monetary
compensation is likely to make tenants more nearly whole in alleviating at least the
financial aspects of the discrimination. The alternative would not work nearly so well.
Compensating the landlord for having to rent to tenants is unlikely to make the land-
lord whole since it presumably does not alleviate the landlord's pangs of conscience
about renting to tenants in violation of religious beliefs.
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some effort to compromise to resolve a conflict caused by their
own choices, and if landlords are disturbed by the possibility that
some of their tenants may indulge in sinful behavior, perhaps land-
lords should invest in some other less "conscience-taxing" form of
income production.
E. Proper Judicial and Legislative Roles
The fifth justification supporting a general policy against individ-
ual exemptions in the landlord discrimination cases is a recognition
of the appropriate judicial and legislative roles in creating exemp-
tions. There is simply no principled way for the court to decide
among competing claims for individual exemptions and the legisla-
ture is the more appropriate decisionmaker.
Shortly after Yoder, the Supreme Court began to retreat from
the apparently pro-free exercise exemption posture it had adopted
in Yoder.555 The Court's retreat can be explained partially by its
realization that the Court is singularly il-equipped to decide which
religious claims merit exemptions from government regulations
under particular circumstances.
For instance, the compelling state interest standard, 56 if applied
properly, requires courts to: (1) accurately identify each of the
state interests implicated in the challenged regulation; (2) deter-
mine the importance of each, including their cumulative impor-
tance; and (3) speculate about the extent to which an exemption
would undermine those interests. The more numerous and com-
plex the state interests, the more difficult the court's task becomes,
involving "severe problems of empirical guesswork and computa-
tion of tradeoffs. 5 5 7 The required evaluation includes predictions
as to how many others may demand similar exemptions and the
feasibility of administering a system with an unknown number of
exemptions.558 Predicting the future is a daunting task even for an
institution with access to resources and expertise that could assist
in resolving those questions.
1. No Principled Way for Courts to Decide
For courts, the necessary case-by-case approach to any question
makes such predictions of the future impossible. By definition,
courts' views are narrowly focused and not well-suited to resolving
555. See supra part I.B.1.
556. See supra part I.B.2. for a discussion of the compelling state interest standard.
557. Where Rights Begin, supra note 23, at 950.
558. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
826
DISCRIMINATION-FREE HOUSING
questions, projected over a long period of time, about behavioral
predictions and economic and social uncertainty. When a court
grapples with such questions, the risk of error is significant and the
consequences sobering. The court risks imposing unreasonable
and oppressive restraints on the government's ability to function.
More important, the court risks the denial of civil and constitu-
tional rights of individuals.5 59
The Supreme Court in Lee 6 recognized the insurmountable dif-
ficulties that might result from granting individual free exercise ex-
emptions, other than those specifically allowed by Congress, to
social security tax laws. The Court stated that "[t]o maintain an
organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great vari-
ety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the com-
mon good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated, but there is a
point at which accommodation would radically restrict the operat-
ing latitude of the legislature. ' 561 The Court in Lee recognized the
dangers of a piecemeal approach by the judiciary, carving out ex-
ceptions and exemptions not recognized explicitly by the legisla-
ture that created the statutory scheme. If a pattern of judicially
created exemptions begins, the ultimate effect on the statutory
scheme is unpredictable, except that the more exceptions or ex-
emptions that are recognized, the greater the deleterious effect on
the government's ability to realize its statutory goals.
Although the Supreme Court apparently recognized the institu-
tional problems confronting the courts in deciding most individual
free exercise exemption cases, other courts have not been so will-
ing to acknowledge their limitations. Yet, the potential personal,
administrative and political consequences are no less severe when a
state or lower federal court decides a free exercise case. Ad hoe
balancing is a particularly unsatisfactory approach when the court
is faced with a conflict between the free exercise of religion and the
application of the civil rights laws. Unlike other constitutional
claims, there is no principled way for a court to decide or adminis-
ter fairly a piecemeal system of individual free exercise exemptions
from the antidiscrimination laws. Therefore, courts should defer to
legislatures, bodies with far greater institutional competence to de-
cide this issue.
559. Where Rights Begin, supra note 23, at 950-52.
560. See supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
561. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259.
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2. Legislature as Appropriate Decisionmaker
Equally unconvincing as a justification for denying tenants the
right to be free from discrimination is the argument that the state
cannot both support marriage and protect unmarried couples.
Both the landlords and the courts confuse the state's prerogatives
with the landlord's rights. The legislature is free to create free exer-
cise exemptions to the discrimination laws provided they do not
violate the Establishment Clause. Just because the legislature has
created some exemptions, however, does not suggest that addi-
tional, individual exemptions are warranted. In fact, quite the op-
posite is true. The legislature could have created an exception to
compliance with the antidiscrimination laws for commercial land-
lords who had religious objections. The fact that the legislature did
not exempt landlords suggests that they should not be granted indi-
vidual exemptions either.
The state legislature enacts the human rights laws to prevent
commercial entities like landlords from imposing arbitrary, moral-
istic and judgmental policies on individuals and to require those
commercial entities to base their decisions on merit and legitimate
business concerns. Furthermore, a legislature's silence should not
be interpreted as an invitation to the court or an opportunity to
deny benefits to unmarried couples, but rather as a directive to
provide those benefits in the absence of an explicit exception in the
statute.5 62 The court's acceptance and approval of a landlord's dis-
criminatory act allows business entities to decide which relation-
ships should be recognized and protected and which should not.
The admonition against judicially created exemptions is further
justified because legislatures (both federal and state) have created
specific exceptions to the antidiscrimination laws. For example,
California's fair housing law provides very limited exceptions for
religious organizations (operating for other than a commercial pur-
pose) and for owner-occupied, single-family residences.5 63 Legisla-
tive exceptions to the civil rights laws are detailed, very narrowly
circumscribed exceptions. They are narrowly drawn precisely to
avoid enormous loopholes in the antidiscrimination laws, such as
the ones the Donahue, Evelyn Smith and French courts created de-
spite the legislatures' obvious intent. Because of the difficulty in
determining the bona fides of religiously based claims and the dire
562. John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal
for the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASINGS LJ. 1415, 1444-45 (1991).
563. CAl. GOV'T CODE §§ 12955.4, 12927(c).
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consequences for civil rights laws in general if these types of ex-
emptions are granted, legislatures do not (and should not and
probably would not) create this type of exemption to the civil
rights laws.
The courts in the landlord discrimination cases have displayed a
schizophrenic attitude toward the legislature. They feign extreme
deference to the legislature that in other areas created an apparent
preference for marriage. Yet, they unequivocally reject the judg-
ment of the same legislature that explicitly prohibited marital sta-
tus discrimination against unmarried couples and stated that the
elimination of such discrimination was the public policy of the state
and an interest of the highest order. The legislature is obviously
aware of this apparent conflict between the treatment of married
and unmarried couples. But the conflict is more apparent than
real, and the court's reliance on it to deny protection to unmarried
couples is a self-serving sham.
Some courts take the approach that the legislature cannot possi-
bly support both married and unmarried couples, and if the legisla-
ture will not decide which one it wants to protect, the court will
decide in its stead. This is completely inappropriate and amounts
to judicial usurpation of the legislature's appropriate role under the
separation of powers doctrine upon which our system of govern-
ment is based. As stated in Bamette, "[j]udges should be very diffi-
dent in setting their judgment against that of the state in
determining what is and what is not a major concern, what means
are appropriate to proper ends, and what is the total societal cost in
striking the balance of imponderables. '"564 Defining the scope and
effect of the state's interest in marriage is the legislature's role, not
the court's (and certainly not the landlord's). The same state legis-
lature, which obviously values marriage in some contexts, has also
explicitly prohibited marital status discrimination and explicitly
limited the ability of business and commercial entities, such as
landlords, to reward or penalize individuals because of their mari-
tal status.
564. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 652 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter's ad-
monition to the majority about the importance of judicial self-restraint when second-
guessing the legislature is as relevant today as it was fifty years ago. See also Fnzer v.
Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C.Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nor., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312 (1988) ("A court cannot lightly dispute a determination by the political branches
that the interests at stake are compelling"); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452 ("The courts cannot
offer to reconcile the various competing demands on government, many of them
rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours.
That task .... is for the legislatures.").
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The Supreme Court has recognized the wisdom of leaving well
enough alone. When the Congress has created a law with excep-
tions, the Court generally has refused to extend the exceptions be-
yond those created by Congress, based upon clear legislative intent
to recognize only limited exceptions to the regulation. 65
The court's role also does not include selecting prohibited bases
of discrimination. As the dissenting judges in both Donahue and
French observed, it is inappropriate for the court to "pick and
choose" among the legislatively determined prohibited categories
of discrimination.5  The court is not a superlegislature. When the
court grants a free exercise exemption based on marital status dis-
crimination, but would not grant a similar exemption for race, the
court is eliminating marital status as an appropriate category for
the antidiscrimination laws. In the process, the court rejects as un-
worthy of judicial protection a category of persons the legislature
has clearly designated as worthy of protection. A judge's personal
preferences regarding favored and disfavored types of discrimina-
tion should not in any way influence the decision. When the legis-
lature draws a line (by excepting certain acts) it is not up to the
565. "Granting an exemption from social security taxes to the employer operates to
impose the employer's religious faith on the employees. Congress drew a line, ex-
empting the self-employed Amish but not all persons working for an Amish em-
ployer. The tax imposed on employers to support the social security system must be
uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provided explicitly otherwise." Lee,
455 U.S. at 261. See also Gillette, 401 U.S. at 445 (Court refused to extend exceptions
beyond those provided in the Selective Service law because of clear legislative intent
to recognize only limited exceptions).
566. It may be difficult for some individuals to recognize invidious discrimina-
tion, but one must not lose sight of the continuing fight of minorities to be
protected from a 'probable majority' point of view. It was not so long ago
that blacks and women were widely viewed as second class citizens. Dis-
crimination usually comes in less obvious forms-such as against single par-
ents, those with AIDS, homosexuals, the elderly, and those living together-
but no less invidious forms. The majority would have us return to the day of
'separate but equal' where individuals such as French would be permitted to
keep their neighborhoods free of 'undesirables' and 'nonbelievers.'
French, 460 N.W.2d at 17 (Popovich, C.J., dissenting); see Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d at
49 (Grignon, J., dissenting) ("It is inappropriate for courts to determine on a case-by-
case basis that the state has a compelling state interest to prevent certain types of
housing discrimination, but not others.") The majority in Donahue, of course, failed
to follow its own advice when it was inconvenient to do so (that is, when it did not
support the result the court wanted to reach). The court cited the rule of statutory
construction that when a statute contains an exception to a general rule, no other
exception should be implied. Id. at 38. But when it was inconvenient, the court ig-
nored the rule and created an additional exception to the antidiscrimination statute
for all religious objections.
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court to redraw the line more to its liking. The statute should be
enforced as written.
Conclusion
No precedent from the United States Supreme Court or other
jurisprudence supports an individual, court-ordered free exercise
exemption for a landlord who violates the antidiscrimination laws
while engaged in the business of rental housing. The fair housing
laws are designed specifically to protect tenants from discrimina-
tion based on a landlord's personal biases. Although neither courts
nor legislatures can dictate the morals of the marketplace, neither
should they condone discriminatory acts that are clothed in the re-
spectable shroud of the free exercise of religion. An exemption
based not upon the landlord's own conduct, but on the landlord's
disapproval of the presumed conduct of others-who are then di-
rectly harmed by the exemption-is a travesty. Such an unwar-
ranted exemption makes a mockery not only of the legitimate free
exercise exemption, but also of the civil rights laws. To avoid the
inevitable "holy wars in the consumer marketplace" that a prolifer-
ation of pro-landlord decisions would bring, the courts should sim-
ply deny individual, free exercise exemptions to landlords who
discriminate. To the extent exemptions are warranted at all, they
should be drawn narrowly and only by the legislature.
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